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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Orbital Maneuvering System
(OMS) hardware.
Although the OMS and aft Reaction Control System (RCS) are housed
in the same pod, this report only addresses the OMS. The aft RCS
report addresses the analysis of the RCS separately.
The OMS provides the thrust to perform orbit insertion, orbit
circularization, orbit transfer, rendezvous, and deorbit. The
OMS is housed in two independent pods located one on each side of
the tail and consists of the following subsystems:
o Helium Pressurization
o Propellant Storage and Distribution
o Orbital Maneuvering Engine
o Electrical Power Distribution and Control
The IOA analysis process utilized available OMS hardware drawings
and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and
hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and
analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality
was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each
failure mode.
Figure i presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the four subsystems of the OMS. A summary of the number of
failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below with
Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F) criticality
second.
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Figure 1 - OMS OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: I/i I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
Number : 54 I 150 9 139 325 274 951
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
+ +
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number
i/i
54
2/IR 1 2/2150 9
3/IR
44
3/2R
ll9
TOTAL
376
Of the 951 failure modes analyzed, 376 were determined to be PCIs.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utiliz-
ing available drawings, schematics and documents to breakdown the
respective subsystem into components and low-level hardware
items. Each hardware item is evaluated for failure mode,
effects, and criticality. These data are documented in the
respective subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the
NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL reevaluation results. The IOA
analysis approach is summarized in the following Steps 1.0
through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and
Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is to be performed and
documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 OMSGround Rules and Assumptions
The OMSground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined
to provide necessary additions and clarifications to the ground
rules and assumptions contained in NSTS 22206.
3.0 SUBSYSTEMDESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Orbital Maneuvering System (Figure 2) provides propulsive
thrust for orbit insertion, on-orbit translations, and deorbit.
The OMSis housed with the aft RCS in two pods on either side of
the tail. The OMSutilizes the hypergolic propellants, monomethyl
hydrazine (MMH, fuel) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO, oxidizer), to
provide a total delta v capability of up to i000 ft/s. The OMS
is also used during aborts to dump OMSpropellants. Figures 3
and 4 present an overview of the OMSbreakdown hierarchy and
Figure 5 presents the OMSschematic.
The IOA analysis has defined the OMSas being comprised of the
following subsystems.
o Helium Pressurization
o Propellant Storage and Distribution
o Orbital Maneuvering Engine
o Electrical Power Distribution and Control
3.1.1 Helium Pressurization Subsystem
The helium pressurization subsystem is used to maintain
pressure in the propellant tanks to feed propellants to the
OMSengines. The subsystem consists of a helium tank, two
helium pressurization valves, two dual pressure regulator
assemblies, two parallel vapor isolation valves, a dual
series-parallel check valve assembly, and couplings. A
schematic diagram of the OMShelium pressurization subsystem
is shown in Figure 6.
3.l.l.a Helium Tanks
Each pod contains one helium supply tank for the
purpose of pressurizing the oxidizer and fuel tanks.
The helium supply tank is a spherical pressure vessel
consisting of a titanium liner with a fiberglass
structural overwrap. The maximum diameter of the tank
is 40.2 inches producing a usable volume of 17.03
cubic feet. The tank operating pressure ranges from a
low of 460 psia to a maximum of 4800 psia.
3.1.l.b Helium Isolation Valves
The helium isolation valves (Figure 7) are continuous-
duty solenoid-operated valves. The valves are
energized open and spring-loaded closed. The OMSHE
PRESS/VAPORISOL switches on Panel 08 permit automatic
or manual control of the valves. With the switches in
the General Purpose Computer (GPC) position, the valves
are automatically controlled by the GPC during an
engine firing sequence. The valves are controlled
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Figure 2 - ORBITAL MANEUVERING SYSTEM OVERVIEW
7
=E_u
I
=._-_ <_ >, <
-_=_. _. >_
uj _:) (n
_ TT i
v" I _
_uJ
i.iiJ _1 I.LI ..,j
TT
Figure 3 - OMS HARDWARE BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY
T--
m.
O
O'
E
I-
J
E
i m
h
Figure 4 - OMS EPD&C BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY
9
(.9
O
Figure 5 - OMS SCHEMATIC
i0 ORIGINAL PAG£ iS
OF POOR QUALrTY
HELiUm STORAG£ TANK
_ HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES
PRESSURE REGULATORS
____ _ _ OUAO CH£Ct( VALVES
Figure 6 - HELIUM PRESSURIZATION SUBSYSTEM
ll
Figure 7 - HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE
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manually by placing the switches in the OPEN or CLOSE
position. Each valve contains a position feedback that
is sent to the GPC for display on the Cathode Ray Tubes
(CRTs).
3.1.l.c Helium Pressure Regulator Assemblies
Pressure regulation is accomplished by two pressure-
regulating assemblies, one downstream of each helium
tank isolation valve. Each assembly contains a primary
and secondary regulator in series, and a flow limiter
(Figure 8). The primary regulator is normally the
controlling regulator. The secondary regulator is
normally open and will not become the controlling
regulator until the primary regulator allows a higher
pressure than normal. The flow limiter allows a
minimum of 104 scfm and a maximum of 304 scfm. All
regulator pressures are in reference to a bellows
assembly that is vented to ambient (Figure 8).
Outlet Press Primary Secondary
o Normal flow (0 to 265 scfm) 255+/-4 psig 262+/-4 psig
o High flow (304 scfm) 245 psig min. 252 psig min.
o Lockup 264 psig 271 psig
3.1.1.d Vapor Isolation Valves
These valves are low-pressure, two-position, two-way,
solenoid-operated valves (Figure 9). The valves are
energized open and spring-loaded closed. These valves
are used to isolate the helium system and fuel tank
from the oxidizer tank.
These valves can be commanded manually or by the GPC
depending on the position of the HE PRESS/VAPOR ISOL
switches on Panel 08. Either of the two (A or B)
switches in the OPEN position energize both VAPOR ISOL
valves to the open position. With the switches in GPC
or CLOSE positions the GPC is allowed to open or close
the valves automatically.
3.1.1.e Quad Check Valve
The check valve unit is mounted between the regulators
and the propellant tank to pass ullage pressure demand
flow downstream and to preclude upstream backflow of
helium and propellant vapors, or liquids. Each unit
consists of four check valve elements arranged as two
parallel assemblies of two series check valve elements
(Figure i0). External test/checkout ports allow
functional checkout without disassembly of the unit.
Filter elements are located at unit's inlet and test
ports.
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Figure 8 - HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
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3.1.2 Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
This subsystem consists of one fuel and one oxidizer tank,
tank and crossfeed isolation valves, pressure relief
assembly, manual isolation valve, corresponding feedlines,
and couplings. The subsystem is capable of several
propellant feed configurations. These include nominal OMS
feed, OMS crossfeed, OMS/RCS interconnect and mixed
crossfeed. The OMS engines can be operated individually
using propellant from either pod. All valves can be
controlled manually by switches located in the forward
flight deck, with GPC software sequences or GPC memory write
procedures. A schematic of the OMS propellant storage and
distribution subsystem is shown in Figure ii.
3.1.2.a Propellant Tanks
The propellant supply is contained in domed, cylindrical
titanium tanks within the OMS pod. The forward and aft
sections of each tank has a fluid volume of 63 and 27
cubic feet, respectively.
The tank operating pressure is 250 psia with a maximum
operating pressure of 313 psia. The propellant tanks
contain the propellant gaging and the propellant
acquisition and retention assemblies.
3.1.2.a.1 Propellant Acquisition and Retention Assembly
Each propellant tank is divided into two compartments:
forward and aft. The propellant acquisition and
retention assembly (Figure 12) is located in the aft
compartment and consists of a communication screen and
a trap reservoir.
The communication screen allows propellant flow while
preventing helium gas from crossing through the screen,
and retains propellant in the aft compartment during
zero g.
The trap reservoir contains four stub galleries and a
collector manifold. The stub galleries acquire
wallbound propellant at OMS startup. The stub
galleries also have screens which allow propellant flow
while preventing gas ingestion. The collector manifold
is connected to the four stub galleries and contains a
gas arrester screen to further prevent gas ingestion.
3.1.2.a.2 OMS Gaging
A capacitance system is used to measure the amount of
propellant in the OMS tanks. The system consists of
forward and aft capacitance probes and an electronic
17
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Figure 12 - PROPELLANT TANKS WITH ASSEMBLIES
19
totalizer. Propellant quantities are updated only
during OMS burns. Figure 12 shows an overview of the
OMS gaging system.
The design of the probes uses the electrical properties
of the propellant to measure the height of propellant
between two concentric tubes. Fuel is a conductor and
forms one capacitor plate; the other plate is the inner
tube of the probe, which is a glass tube with a
metalized silver coating on the inside. The oxidizer
is dielectric, and the capacitor plates are the outer
and inner nickel tubes of the probe.
An ungageable region exists between the top of the
bulkhead screen and the bottom of the forward probe.
This represents the tank quantity between 30 percent
and 44 percent. An integration routine using burn time
and a preset flowrate is used by the totalizer to
update the quantity of this region.
Forward Probe - The forward probe measures the
propellant above the bulkhead screen. The forward
probe consists of the concentric capacitance probes,
probe electronics, helium pressurization gas inlet, and
the gas inlet diffuser screen.
Aft Probe - The aft probe measures the propellant below
the bulkhead screen. The aft probe consists of the
concentric capacitance probes and the probe
electronics.
Totalizer - The totalizer receives inputs from the
forward probe, aft probe, tank isolation valves,
crossfeed valves, engine control valves and outputs
total and aft quantities for each tank. A block diagram
of the totalizer logic flow is shown in Figure 12.
An OMS to RCS gaging program calculates the OMS
propellant used by the aft RCS from each pod during
interconnect operations.
3.1.2.b Pressure Relief Valves
The pressure relief valve is located upstream of the
propellant tanks but downstream of the helium quad
check valves. The pressure relief valve (Figure 13)
consists of a relief valve, burst diaphragm, and a
filter.
In the event excessive helium and/or propellant vapor
pressure ruptures the burst diaphragm, the relief valve
opens and vents the system. The relief valve will
close and reseal after the excessive pressure has
returned to the operating level.
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The burst diaphragm provides a more positive seal of
helium than a relief valve. The filter prevents any
fragments from the nonfragmentation type diaphragm from
entering the relief valve seat.
The diaphragm rupture pressure is 305+/-8 psig. The
relief valve will open at a minimum of 291 psig and a
maximum of 307 psig. The minimum reseat pressure is
285 psig.
3.1.2.c Propellant Feed and Interconnect Lines
The propellant feed lines connect each of the left and
right pod's propellant tanks to their corresponding
engine. The crossfeed lines are connected to the feed
lines to allow the crossfeeding of propellant from one
pod's propellant tanks to the other pod's engine.
Furthermore, the OMS propellant interconnect lines are
connected to the RCS crossfeed lines to feed propellant
from either OMS pod's tanks to the RCS aft jets.
3.1.2.d Tank Isolation and Crossfeed valves
These valves are ac motor operated with bistable ball
type flow control (Figure 14). They serve to isolate
the propellant tank from the feed and crossfeed lines.
The TANK ISOLATION and the CROSSFEED switches on Panel
08 permit GPC or manual control of the valves. With
the switch in the GPC position, the valves can be
automatically controlled by the computers. The valves
are controlled manually by placing the switches in the
OPEN position allowing an electric signal to provide
power to the ac motors to open the valves. With the
switches in the CLOSE position a signal is sent to
allow power to the ac motor to drive the valves closed.
The ac motor valve operates on i15 volt ac, 400 Hz
three-phase power but will operate with only two phases
if required. The microswitch position indicators
utilize 28 volt dc power to generate the open and close
position discretes. The valves are activated by logic
circuits in the Orbiter Motor Control Assemblies (MCA).
Valves may be moved by manual or GPC command.
A valve will operate when ac power to the motor is
turned on by a set of relays in the MCA logic. The
high rpm input of the ac motor is stepped down by the
planetary gears to turn a semicircular gear sector (not
shown). The gear sector in turn drives the
brake/clutch (rocker assembly) on the top of the valve
assembly. The brake/clutch turns a torsion rod, which
is connected to an actuator finger. The actuator
finger is the device that moves the valve ball.
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When the valve drives to the command position, cams on
the bottom of the semicircular gear sector activate
microswitch position indicators. These discretes are
fed back to the MCA logic to remove power from the valve
within 50 msec after reaching the commanded position.
The actuation time for a valve is from i.I to 1.3
seconds for three-phase operation and approximately 1.5
seconds for two-phase operation. Propellant flow
through the valve is established within 0.5 seconds of
the first valve motion.
3.1.2.e Manual Isolation Valve
The ground manual isolation valve is used to isolate
the propellant tank from the helium pressurization
subsystem for ground operations. The nonpowered valve
can only be opened with a special tool which cannot be
detached with the valve in the closed position. Open
during all flight phases, the valve has redundant seals
to external leak paths (Figure 15).
3.1.3 Orbital Maneuvering Engine Subsystem
The OMS engine is a pressure fed, hypergolic reacting
bipropellant, regenerative-cooled, fixed thrust rocket
engine. The engine can be gimbaled to provide thrust vector
control (TVC). Major assemblies are the GN2 (pneumatic),
bipropellant ball valves, injector, combustion chamber,
nozzle extension, engine purge valve, fuel/oxidizer lines,
couplings, and gimbal system (Figure 16). Two OMS engines
are installed on the Orbiter vehicle, one per pod.
Engine operation is controlled via GPC software sequences.
Ignition is commanded only after specific crew system con-
figurations (switch positions and CRT inputs) have been
completed. However, shutdown can be commanded manually at
any time during a burn. Crew/flight controller insight into
engine operation is via pressure, temperature, and valve
position instrumentation provided with the engine.
3.1.3.a Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2) Assembly
The purpose of the OMS GN2 (pneumatic) assembly is to
store pressurized nitrogen gas and supply on command
regulated GN2 to actuate the bipropellant ball valves
and purge the fuel side of the injector assembly.
Also, sufficient regulated GN2 is stored in an
accumulator for a minimum of one engine start.
The GN2 assembly consists of a fill and vent valve,
storage tank, engine pressurization valve, check valve,
pressure regulator, relief valve, accumulator, and
associated instrumentation (Figures 17 and 18).
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\Figure 16 - ORBITAL MANEUVERING ENGINE SUBSYSTEM
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Figure 17 - GN2 PNEUMATIC PACK ASSEMBLY
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3.1.3.a.1 Fill and Vent Valve
The fill and vent valve is a two-way, high-pressure
coaxial, single solenoid-operated valve (Figure 19).
The valve is used only during ground operations to
pressurize or vent the GN2 (pneumatic) assembly. There
is no electrical power to the solenoid coil during
flight. The valve is designed to fail closed via an
internal spring. During fill operations the GN2 is
filtered through sintered stainless steel wire filters
at the inlet and outlet ports. The valve is bolted
directly to the GN2 storage tank. There is no
instrumentation on this valve.
3.1.3.a.2 Storage Tank
The GN2 storage tank is a fracture-critical component.
The tank is manufactured from titanium bar stock in two
halves, then welded together. One half incorporates
the mounting flange for the fill and vent valve. The
second half incorporates the mounting flanges and flow
passages for the remaining GN2 components. Initial GN2
loading is 0.43 pounds at 3000 psia and 70 degrees F.
Nominally, this loading will supply 17 engine
start/purge cycles. Instrumentation consists of two
strain gage-type pressure transducers, which can be
monitored on CRT display "GNC SYS SUMM2" and the
cockpit dedicated meter "OMS PRESS N2/He" on Panel F7.
The tank pressure transducer designated P1 is hardwired
to this meter. The transducer outputs are limit sensed
in the PASS (OPS 2 and 8) and the BFS (OPS i, 3, and 6)
and will trigger an SM alarm (class 3) if one or both
go out of limits. These pressures are included in the
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) downlist for
ground monitoring.
3.1.3.a.3 Engine Pressurization Valve
The OMS engine pressurization (PRESS) valve is a two-
way, high-pressure, dual solenoid-operated shutoff
valve. The purpose of this valve is to start and stop
the flow of GN2 in the pneumatic actuation system. The
valve will open with the application of electrical power
(23-28 V dc) and only one solenoid is required for
nominal operation. With the loss of electrical power
the valve is designed to fail closed via an internal
spring. During GN2 flow conditions, the gas is
filtered through a sintered stainless steel wire filter
at the inlet port. Instrumentation consists of a leaf
spring switch, which is activated by a push rod
integral to the valve poppet assembly. Closure of the
switch completes an electrical circuit to indicate an
open valve. Valve open/closed status can be monitored
29
Figure 19 - GN2 FILL AND VENT VALVE
3O
on CRT display "GNC SYS SUMM 2" in the PASS (OPS 2 and
8) and BFS (OPS i, 3, and 6). The switch's open/closed
status is in the GNC downlist and is available for
ground monitoring.
The engine pressurization valve is not controlled by
the GPC software. Activation of the valve can only be
accomplished by manual control of the "OMS ENG" switch
on cockpit Panel C3. Placing the "OMS ENG" switch in
the "ARM/PRESS" position will open the "ENG PRESS VLV"
and allow GPC software to activate the engine control
valves for a burn, open the purge valves at burn
completion, and repressurize the GN2 accumulator. With
the "OMS ENG" switch in the "ARM" position the software
will inhibit opening of the purge valves.
3.1.3.a.4 Pressure Regulator/Relief Valve
The GN2 pressure regulator is a modulating,
pressure reducing, direct acting pressure-operated
mechanical regulator with an integral pressure operated
relief valve. The purpose of the regulator is to reduce
high upstream GN2 tank pressure (470 to 3000 psig) to
the downstream nominal on-orbit ball valve actuator
pressure (310 +/- i0 psig). If downstream pressure
does increase, (at 360 psig maximum) the regulator will
lock up stopping GN2 back-flow. If the regulator
fails open or if downstream pressure rises to 450 psig,
the integral relief valve will open to vent GN2. At
400 psig the relief valve will reseat to stop venting.
During active GN2 flow the gas is filtered through a
sintered stainless steel wire filter at the inlet port.
There is no instrumentation on this device. However,
actual operation can be inferred from the GN2 storage
tank and reservoir outlet pressures. The operating
pressure levels of the regulator and relief valve may
be mechanically reset.
3.1.3.a.5 Check Valve
The GN2 check valve is a one-way flow, cartridge type
valve. The purpose of this valve is to prevent GN2
accumulator back flow from occurring if a leak occurs
upstream of the check valve. The valve is held close
by a mechanical spring and will open with a pressure 6
psig above the downstream level. Reseat pressure is 1
psig delta across the valve. There is no
instrumentation associated with this component.
3.1.3.a.6 GN2 Reservoir
The GN2 reservoir (accumulator) is a fracture-critical
component manufactured from titanium bar stock.
Manufacturing is done in two halves, Which are welded
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together. The assembly is then bolted to a mounting
flange, which is part of the GN2 storage tank. The
reservoir nominally holds about 0.0008 pounds of GN2 at
320 psia and 70 degrees F. This quantity is enough to
guarantee a minimum of one engine start. Instrumentation
consists of one strain gage-type pressure transducer
located between the check valve and the reservoir
inlet/outlet. This measurement is titled "GN2 REG P",
and is monitored on the CRT display "GNC SYS SUMM2" in
the PASS (OPS 2 and 8) and BFS (OPS i, 3, and 6). This
pressure is also limit sensed and will trigger an SM
alert (class 3) if it goes out of limits. GNC downlist
of this pressure, for ground monitoring, is also
available.
3.1.3.a.7 Engine Control valve
The engine control valve is a three-way, two-position,
dual solenoid-operated valve (Figure 20). The valve is
normally closed to the bipropellant valve pneumatic
actuator inlet port. Upon receipt of electrical power
(23-32 V dc) redundant solenoids in tandem will open
the valve allowing the flow of pressure regulated GN2
into the actuator, deflecting a piston and opening the
bipropellant valves. Removal of electric power will
close the valve. Closure is accomplished mechanically
by an internal spring. Under flow conditions the GN2
is filtered through a sintered stainless steel wire
filter located in the inlet port. The valve is bolted
to an integral attach flange on the actuator assembly.
Purge of pressurized GN2 from the valve and the
actuator cylinder is done during the close cycle.
Instrumentation for the control valve is a leaf spring
switch. Activation is by a push rod, which is an
integral part of the valve poppet assembly. Design and
operation of the switch is identical to the "ENG PRESS
VLV". However, this switch is not monitored in the
cockpit but is in the OI downlist for ground monitoring.
3.1.3.a. 8 Actuator
The bipropellant ball valve actuator is a pneumatically
operated rack for opening the fuel and oxidizer ball
valves (Figure 21). The actuator is mechanically
closed via internal spring forces. Comprising the
assembly are an actuation plston/cylinder, a toothed
rack for mating with the ball valve pinion, closure
springs, and a Linear Variable Differential Transformer
(LVDT). The LVDT is calibrated to show the percentage
of ball valve rotation as a function of the rack's
linear motion. Output of the LVDT can be monitored on
the "GNC SYS SUMM 2" in the PASS (OPS 2 and 8) and BFS
(OPS i, 3, and 6). The output is also in the GNC
downlist for ground monitoring.
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3.1.3.a.9 Bipropellant Ball Valve Assembly
The bipropellant ball valve was analyzed as part of the
OMEassembly but is discussed here for continuity. The
OMSengine bipropellant ball valve is a rotating open/
close flow valve used to control the flow of propellant
to the OMSengine. The assembly consists of four
valves; pairs of fuel and oxidizer valves in series.
Each pair is linked mechanically to its actuator via a
pinion that mates with the actuator rack. valve pairs
are rotated simultaneously 90 degrees for 100 percent
open. There is no instrumentation on these valves.
However, nominal valve operation is inferred by engine
start, stop, and performance levels.
3.1.3.a.10 Engine Purge Valve
The purpose of the engine purge valve is to allow, on
command, the flow of regulated GN2 into the engine's
fuel (MMH) cooling passages. The GN2 purge is done,
nominally after every burn, to minimize the possibility
of fuel freezing in the internal cooling and injector
flow passages. The assembly consists of two valves in
series, a check valve, and instrumentation for monitor-
ing the open-closed status of the purge valves.
The purge valve is a two-way solenoid-operated shutoff
valve (Figure 22). With the application of electrical
power (23-32 V dc), the valve will open to allow GN2
flow. With the removal of power, internal spring
forces will close the valve. During the active GN2
flow conditions the gas is filtered through a sintered
stainless steel wire filter at the valve inlet port.
Instrumentation consists of a leaf spring switch. The
switch is activated by a push rod that is an integral
part of the poppet assembly. Closure of the switch
completes an electrical circuit to indicate an open
position. This signal is part of the GNC downlist for
monitoring the valve position by the ground. The purge
valve operation is not monitored in the cockpit;
however, a purge operation can be inferred by
monitoring the "GN2 TK P", "GNC REG P" on GNC SYS
SUMM2, Pc, and injector temperature readings.
Integral to the second valve is a check valve of
identical design to the check valve of 3.1.3.a.5.
Purging of the OMSengine fuel lines, cooling passages,
and injector head is accomplished systematically by the
OMSGPC firing sequencer software. Nominally the OMS
ENG switch is placed in the "ARM/PRESS" position for a
burn. This action opens the ENG PRESS VLV, repressuriz-
ing the GN2 reservoir and allowing the GPC to issue the
open command to the purge valves following the burn.
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Figure 22 - PURGE VALVE ASSEMBLY CROSS SECTION
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If the OMS ENG switch is placed in the "ARM" position,
the open commands are inhibited by the GPC.
3.1.3.b OME Assembly
The OME assembly consists of an injector, combustion
chamber, nozzle extension, and plumbing. The assembly
feeds fuel and oxidizer at the design mixture ratio,
confines the combustion of the propellants, and provides
for the expansion of the combustion gases to produce
thrust. There is one OME assembly in each pod.
3.1.3. b. 1 Injector
The OMS engine injector meters, atomizes, and directs
fuel and oxidizer into the combustion chamber, at the
design mixture ratio. This produces efficient and
stable combustion that will provide the required thrust
without endangering hardware durability. The injector
consists of an oxidizer/fuel manifold, core, fuel
distribution ring, platelet injector, and manifold
covers (Figure 23). All fuel and oxidizer passages are
separated by parent metal or redundant metallurgical
Joints.
All oxidizer and fuel manifold passages are machined
into the stainless steel core billet. The distribution
ring mates with the combustion chamber regenerative
cooling passages and delivers fuel to the fuel
manifold. The injector is made up of six 8-mil thick
platelet disks (one external, one face, three metering,
and one orifice). Each platelet hole pattern is photo-
graphically etched to assure no metal chips or burns
remain in the electron beam welded stack. The injector
hole pattern consists of 16 concentric alternating
rings of oxidizer and fuel orifices. Ring 16 sprays
fuel on the combustion chamber wall for film cooling.
The manifold covers incorporate attachment bosses for
installation of instrumentation (pressure and
temperature). All are sealed off except two, one for a
combustion chamber pressure transducer and the second
for a fuel injector inlet temperature thermocouple.
The fuel injector inlet temperature is on "PRPLT
THERMAL (DISP 89)" in the PASS (OPS 2) and on "GNC SYS
SUMM 2" in the BFS (OPS i, 3, and 6). The combustion
chamber pressure is hardwired to "OMS PRESS PC" meter
on panel F7 (output in percent). Both parameters are
part of the GNC downlist for ground monitoring. The
fuel injector temperature is limit sensed and will
trigger an SM alert (class 3) if it exceeds a high limit.
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Figure 23 - INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
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3.1.3.b.2 Combustion Chamber
The OMS engine combustion chamber confines the hot
combustion gases in a fixed volume producing the
required pressure and temperature that provides the
design thrust. The combustion chamber consists of an
acoustic resonator, inner and outer walls, nozzle
throat, fuel inlet distribution ring, thrust-gimbal
ring mounting pads, clevis mounts for attachment of
other assemblies and a nozzle attachment flange (Figure
24). Fuel is used to cool the assembly during engine
burns by regenerative and film cooling methods.
One hundred twenty longitudinal grooves are machined
into the combustor's stainless steel inner wall. When
mated to the outer wall these grooves make up the
regenerative cooling passages. These passages are
aligned and mated to the injector assemblies' fuel
distribution ring during final chamber assembly. The
remaining part of the regenerative cooling system is
the fuel inlet-dlstribution ring, which is an integral
part welded to the outer wall. The nozzle attachment
flange is an integral part of the distribution ring.
The thrust-gimbal ring mounting pads are also welded to
the distribution ring while the hardware-subsystem
clevis mounts are welded to the outer chamber wall.
Integral to the inner wall of the combustion chamber is
the converging-throat-diverging (initial) section of
the engine's nozzle. The converging section has an
area ratio (Ac/At) of 1.934:1, which blends into the
throat area (approx. 26.5 square inches). The diverg-
ing section is the initial section of the engine's
bell-shaped exhaust nozzle. The area ratio of this
section is 5.866:1 with a mean divergence angle of
about 30.5 degrees.
3.1.3.b.3 Nozzle Extension
The nozzle extension, when bolted to the combustion
chamber, completes the engine's bell-shaped exhaust
nozzle (Figure 25). It is fabricated from a columbium
alloy sheet stock. Nominal thickness is 0.030 inch.
However, the attach flange is made from 0.I0 inch sheet
and the exhaust plane stiffener ring is from 0.0775
inch sheet. These two sections are tapered to match
the 0.030 sheet at the girth welds. The final assembly
is coated with a silicide compound as a corrosion
preventive. Attachment to the combustion chamber is by
a split retainer ring with a graphite gasket. Thirty-
six bolts hold the extension in place.
The nozzle exit plane area is about 1458 square inches,
resulting in an expansion ration (Ae/At) of 55:1. The
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exit plane divergent angle is 0.55 degrees, which gives
a radial thrust component of about 900 pounds
(symmetric). At steady state operation, the exhaust
gas exit velocity is approximately i0,i00 ft/sec.
3.1.3.b.4 Plumbing
Plumbing for the OMS engine is divided into GN2
(pneumatic), fuel, and oxidizer lines. These lines are
fabricated from titanium alloy tubing incorporating
integral end fittings.
The fuel and oxidizer inlet lines are fabricated from
1.50-in.-O.D. stainless steel tube. Fittings are
welded to the tube for attachment in the propellant
feed lines and the inlet side of the bipropellant ball
valve assembly. The inlet lines also incorporate
bellows to allow for line flexing during gimbal
operations and engine assembly. At the attachment to
the feed lines, a flow balancing orifice and filter are
fitted to each line.
Outlet lines for the fuel and oxidizer are made from
1.250-in. O.D. titanium alloy tubing. End fittings are
welded in place for mating to the bipropellant ball
valve assembly, the oxidizer inlet manifold, and the
fuel's inlet distribution ring. Bellows are
incorporated in the lines to allow for engine alignment
during vehicle/engine mating.
Instrumentation for the plumbing consists of strain
gage type pressure transducers and thermocouples on the
fuel and oxidizer inlet lines. The pressure
measurements can be monitored in the cockpit on "GNC
SYS SUMM 2" in the PASS (OPS 2 and 8) and in the BFS
(OPS i, 3, and 6). The temperatures can be monitored
in the cockpit on "PRPLT THERMAL (DISP 89)" in SM OPS
2. The pressures and temperatures are part of the
GNC/OI downlist for ground monitoring. The
temperatures are also limit sensed and will trigger an
SM alert (class 3) if the limits are exceeded.
3.1.3.c TVC (Gimbal) Assembly
Each OMS engine is attached to the Orbiter via a
pivoting mount, which can be gimbaled up-and-down
(pitch) and side-to-side (yaw) to provide 3-axis thrust
vector control (Figure 26). Gimbaling is driven by two
electromechanical actuators on each engine (Figure 27).
Gimbal travel in the pitch and yaw axes is approxi-
mately +/-7 degrees and +/-8 degrees, respectively,
about the null. Since the engines are mounted on
opposite sides of the Orbiter's centerline (X-axis),
pointing one engine up and one down produces a roll
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43
=I 14'
u_
c_
i
i
_II
.lk
4
.i
-.-2" i_++
U'_ '"
[
I
11.
Figure 27 - OMS GIMBAL ACTUATOR
44
moment. With both engines firing, coordinated 2-axis
gimbaling of the two engines produces 3-axis Orbiter
flight control. The yaw gimbals control only yaw,
whereas the pitch gimbaling produces both a pitch and a
roll moment together. 3-axis TVC control is impossible
with only one engine. For a one-engine OMS burn, TVC
controls pitch and yaw and the RCS is used to control
roll. The crew can read the current engine gimbal
pitch and yaw angles on the CRT XXXX MNVR YYYY display.
The pitch and yaw angles are included in the OI down-
list for ground monitoring.
Each gimbal actuator has two channels: primary and
secondary. If the active channel stops running, the
other can take over. Both channels operate at the same
speed, taking four seconds to steer an engine through
its entire gimbal range at top speed. The crew can
select actuator drive via the CRT XXXX MNVR YYYY
display.
3.1.4 Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystems
3.1.4.a Thermal Control
Thermal control for the OMS is achieved by insulation
of propellant lines and walls that enclose OMS hardware
components, and by line-wraparound heaters and blanket-
type heaters. The heater system is divided into two
areas: the OMS/RCS pods, and the aft fuselage cross-
feed and bleed lines. Each of the heater systems has
two redundant heater systems, A and B, and are
controlled by switches on Panel AI4.
3.1.4.a.i Pod Thermal Control
The OMS/RCS pods use heater patches to provide thermal
control. Each heater patch consists of a redundant set
of wires, or elements, which have been formed into a
flat, tightly spiraled patch. The patch is then
mounted on existing hardware, and as electricity flows
through the highly resistant wires, the heat generated
warms the hardware as well as radiating into the
surrounding open areas. Each of the OMS/RCS pods are
divided into nine heater areas. Each of the heater
patches in the pods contain an A and a B element.
Each element has a thermostat which controls the
temperature from 55 degrees to 75 degrees, +/-5
degrees F. Temperature sensors are located throughout
the pods and supply temperature information to the
propellant thermal CRT display and to telemetry. The
crew can monitor this display only in SM OPS 2, whereas
the ground can monitor the temperature in all OPS.
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3.1.4.a.2 Crossfeed and Bleedline Thermal Control
The aft fuselage is divided into eleven heater areas.
Each area is heated in parallel by heater systems A and
B, and each areas has a control thermostat to maintain
temperature at 55 degrees to 75 degrees, +/-5 degrees
F. Temperature sensors are located on the control
thermostats and on the crossfeed and bleed lines. The
temperature sensors supply temperature to the
propellant thermal CRT display in SM 0PS 2, and to
telemetry to all OPS.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The OMS engine interfaces with the Shuttle's Data Processing
System (DPS), Pulse Code Modulator Master Unit (PCMMU), Caution
and Warning System (C&W), Displays and Controls (D/C), and the
Electrical Power Distribution and Control System (EPDCS).
Data from the OMS engine consisting of pressures, temperatures,
actuator position, and valve position are sent to the DPS via the
Flight Critical (FC) Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (MDMs) for
processing by the GPCs. Display and annunciation of the health
and status of the engine is accomplished by the DPS via CRT
displays, cockpit meters, C&W, and telemetry. The DPS system in
turn provides the engine with commands for valve configurations,
engine ON/OFF, and Thrust Vector Control (TVC).
A subset of the engine data is sent to the PCMMU via the
Operational Instrumentation (OI) MDMs to be telemetered. The
PCMMU combines these data with other OMS parameters, output from
the GPCs as part of the downlist, and routes them to the onboard
recorders and to the S-band to be transmitted to the ground as
part of the downlink.
A carefully selected subset of OMS engine data is sent to the C&W
for fault determination and alarm annunciation. The C&W
processes these data against present limits to determine
anomalies in engine performance. When anomalies are found,
hardware C&W signals are issued that activate indicator lights in
the C&W panel and the master alarm pushbuttons and turn on the
C&W tone.
Dedicated cockpit meters in the D&C panels are used to display
engine data either sent directly from the engine or routed
through the GPCs. The D&C panels also have switches and circuit
breakers that are used for manual valve configuration and power
routing. In the manual TVC mode, crew deflection of the
Rotational Hand Controller (RHC) is routed through the GPC for
scaling and then to the engine gimbal actuators to provide TVC.
Electrical power is provided to the engine by the EPDCS. Logic
power and dc power is provided to valve relays and TVC servo-
actuators.
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The OMSalso interfaces with the aft RCS through propellant
interconnect lines. OMSpropellant can be fed to RCS jets for
attitude holds, maneuvers, and translations on-orbit, and during
aborts for more rapid 0MS propellant dumping. RCS propellant is
not fed to the 0MS.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the hierarchy of the OMShardware
components. Figures 5 through 27 depict the functional details
of the OMSsubsystem components.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failures
are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for the three major hardware subsystems
of the OMS. Table II presents a separate summary of the failure
criticalities for the Electrical Power Distribution and Control
(EPD&C) subsystem of the OMS. Further discussion of each of
these subsystems and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs. The OMS analysis hierarchy is illustrated
in Figures 3 and 4.
Of the 284 hardware failure modes analyzed, 160 were determined
to be PCIs. A summary of the hardware PCIs is presented in Table
III. Of the 667 EPD&C failure modes analyzed, 216 were
determined to be PCIs. A summary of the EPD&C PCIs is presented
in Table IV.
Appendix D contains a cross reference between each PCI and
analysis worksheet in Appendix C.
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TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes & Criticalities (OMS HW)
Criticality:
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
VAPOR ISOLATION VALVE
QUAD CHECK VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
i/i
2
1
1
2
2
2/IR
==
m
2
5
2
2
1
2
2/2
m
i
w
m
w
3/1R
2
2
1
3
3/2R
I
m
m
3/3
1
1
2
6
1
TOTAL
2
6
5
6
5
3
9
5
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
PROPELLANT TANK
FWD GAGING PROBE
AFT GAGING PROBE
TOTALIZER
COMMUNICATION SCREEN
GALLERY LEG SCREEN
COLLECTOR MANIFOLD SCREEN
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
CROSSFEED VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
GIMBAL BELLOWS
FLEX LINE ASSEMBLY
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
3
2
2
1
1
13
2
2
4
2
w
4
ii
2
1
2
w
m
w
w
1
I
B
1
1
- 1
- 5
- 5
- 3
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 2
4 2
- 22
- 2
1 1
5
3
2
5
5
3
2
1
1
8
8
33
3
15
2
3
8
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER & ORIFICE
BIPROPELLANT VALVE
BIPROP CAVITY PRESS RLF
VALVE
PLATELET INJECTOR
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
NOZZLE EXTENSION
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
TVC GIMBAL BELLOWS
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
- 2
1 5
1 1
2 1
2
1 1
- 4
2 1
1 1
- 1
m
w
I
m
m
m
m
2
6
53
- 3
- 2
- 2
8 12
- 3
1 3
- 1
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TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes & Criticalities (OMS HW)
Criticality:
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
TANK FILL/VENT VALVE
STORAGE TANK
GN2 PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING
PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CHECK VALVE
ACCUMULATOR
ENGINE CONTROL VALVE
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PINION GEAR _ DRIVE ASSEMBLY
PURGE VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES & FITTINGS
i/i
1
1
1
2/IR
1
1
3
1
1
ii
5
2
2
2
- 1
- 1
- 4
- 2
- 4
- 2
- 2
- 4
- 1
- 1
- 2
3/2RI
o
m
7
1
3/3
1
1
2
5
2
TOTAL
3
2
2
6
5
4
3
2
ii
8
2
ii
3
6
7
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
GIMBAL RING
GIMBAL RING BEARING
GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD
GIMBAL DRIVE MOTOR
ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
REDUCTION GEAR
ANTIBACK DEVICE
GIMBAL DRIVE THRUST BEARING
SPHERICAL ROD END BEARING
MECHANICAL STOP, SNUBBER
NUT TUBE/OUTPUT SHAFT BEARING
OUTPUT SHAFT
CONTROLLER, GIMBAL ACTUATOR
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
m
D
m
m
Q
2
2
2
2
2
2
Q
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
2
2
1
2
1
2
TOTAL 154187111 8117 177128 
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TABLE II Summary of IOA Failure Modes & Criticalities (OMS EPD&C)
Criticality: I/i 2/IR 3/2R
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
METER
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, TOGGLE
m w
m
- 4
2/2 3/IR
- 16
- 20
- 4
- 2
- 2
m
m
3/3 TOTAL
- 16
- 20
- 4
- 2
12 12
- 6
- 1
- 2
1 2
- 1
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
FUSE
INDICATOR, EVENT
METER
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, ROTARY m
2
2
m
D
m
m
m
m
2
2 4
- 12
4 4
4 12
- 28
2 6
4
3
1
- 8
4 16
- 8
16 32
44 72
2 12
2 2
- 4
1 4
2 2
- 2
1 2
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TABLE II Summary of IOA Failure Modes & Criticalities (OMS EPD&C)
Criticality:
OME SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
GN2 ASSEMBLY
VALVES
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
TVC ASSEMBLY
CONTROLLER
FUSE
INSTRUMENTATION
GN2 ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, PRESSURE
OME ASSEMBLY
FUSE
METER
SENSOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
TVC ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, POSITION
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
POD
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
RELAY
RESISTOR
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
CROSSFEED
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
RELAY
RESISTOR
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
TOTAL
i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
I
2
6
2
1
I
1
17
6
2
4
2
4
- 8
4 1
- 14
1
2
2
4
2
1
3
3
TOTAL
8
22
8
2O
5
2
1
2
3
4
22
4
16
2
63
5
8 91
- 22
- 32
58
- 4
- 12
- 16
- 2
- 12
- 8
- I0
- 4
- 4
- 32
- 4
308
6
16
12
2
12
8
8
12
197
44
32
64
8
28
12
32
4
12
i0
22
4
12
13
44
4
667
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TABLE III
Criticality:
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
REGULATOR
VAPOR ISOLATION VALVE
QUAD CHECK VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (OMS HW)
3/IR TOTALi/I 2/IR
2
5
2
2
1
2
2/2
o
m
a
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
3/2R
w
m
2
5
5
5
5
1
4
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSY.
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION
VALVE
PROPELLANT TANK
COMMUNICATION SCREEN
GALLERY LEG SCREEN
COLLECTOR MANIFOLD
SCREEN
TANK ISOLATION VALVE
CROSSFEED VALVE
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
GIMBAL BELLOWS
FLEX LINE ASSEMBLY
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER & ORIFICE
BIPROPELLANT VALVE
BIPROP CAVITY PRESS
RLF VALVE
PLATELET INJECTOR
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
NOZZLE EXTENSION
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
TVC GIMBAL BELLOWS
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
LINES AND FITTINGS
1
1
13
2
2
4
3 2
2
2
4
Ii
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
5
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
a
w
m
D
- 1
- 1
- 1
1 1
- 1
w
m
m m
m
m w
w
m
5
2
5
3
ll
15
2
3
7
2
6
2
3
2
2
4
3
2
1
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TABLE III Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (OMS HW)
Criticality:
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
STORAGE TANK
GN2 PNEUMATIC PACK
HOUSING
PRESSURE ISOLATION VLV
REGULATOR
CHECK VALVE
ACCUMULATOR
ENGINE CONTROL VALVE
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PINION GEAR & DRIVE
ASSEMBLY
PURGE VALVE ASSEMBLY
LINES & FITTINGS
i/i 2/IR
1
3
1
1
ii
5
2
2
2/2
m
m
m
3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
m
m
m
2
1
m
1
3
3
2
ii
7
2
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
GIMBAL RING
GIMBAL RING BEARING
GIMBAL RING MOUNT. PAD
ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
ANTIBACK DEVICE
SPHERICAL ROD END
BEARING
MECHANICAL STOP,SNUBBER
OUTPUT SHAFT
m
1
2
1
2
TOTAL
m
154 I 8v I 1 I
m
m
m
m
B m
1
1
1
2
1
2
s116o
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TABLE IV Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (OMS EPD&C)
Criticality:
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
METER
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, TOGGLE
11,'I12,'IR12,'213,'IRI 3,'2R[TOTAL
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
1
6
a
1
6
4
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
INSTRUMENTATION
FUSE
INDICATOR, EVENT
METER
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, ROTARY
m
E
m
m
u
2
2
m
2
2
4
4
8
28
8
12
28
2
- 2
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TABLE IV Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (OMS EPD&C)
Criticality: I i/i I 2/IR I 2/2 I 3/1R I 3/2R ITOTAL
OME SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
GN2 ASSEMBLY
VALVES
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
TVC ASSEMBLY
CONTROLLER
FUSE
INSTRUMENTATION
GN2 ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, PRESSURE
OME ASSEMBLY
FUSE
METER
SENSOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
TVC ASSEMBLY
SENSOR, POSITION
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
POD
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
RELAY
RESISTOR
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
CROSSFEED
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
RELAY
RESISTOR
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
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1
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4
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2
m
m
m
n
g
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6
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a
m
a
m
m
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m
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1
u
41
m
l0
1
17
114
14
8
6
5
1
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41
4
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2
i0
!
5
17
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4.1 Analysis Results - Helium Pressurization Subsystem
Forty-one (41) failure modes were analyzed in the helium
pressurization subsystem and twenty-seven (27) are identified as
PCIs. Of the 27 PCIs, twenty-two (22) are single point failures
which could result in possible damage to surrounding pod
components, inability to repressurize the propellant tanks, or
mixing of hypergolic propellants in helium lines. The remaining
five (5) PCIs could result in the loss of life or vehicle if all
redundancy were lost.
These critical failures are caused by helium tank rupture, helium
leakage due to structural failure of components or lines, flow
path loss due to failure to open of components or system contami-
nation, and check valve failures. The redundancy provided by the
existence of two OMS pods is of no benefit in the helium
pressurization subsystem since there is no helium connection
between the pods.
4.2 Analysis Results - Propellant Storage and Distribution
Subsystem
One hundred seven (107) failure modes were analyzed in the
propellant storage and distribution subsystem, of which fifty-
nine (59) are identified as PCIs. Fifty-three (53) of the 59
PCIs are single point failures which could result in leakage of
propellant, inability to use or deplete propellant, system over-
pressurization, or loss of OMEs. One (i) of the 59 PCIs could
result in the loss of llfe or vehicle if all redundancy were
lost. The remaining five (5) PCIs could result in loss of
mission with the loss of all redundancy.
These critical failures are caused by structural failure of the
propellant tank, components, and propellant lines, seal failures,
contamination, failure of valves to open, failure of the pressure
relief assembly, and acquisition system screen structural
failures. The dual pod redundancy benefits only those components
located downstream of the crossfeed line.
4.3 Analysis Results - Orbital Maneuvering Engine Subsystem
4.3.1 Analysis Results - OME Assembly
Thirty-nine (39) failure modes were analyzed in the OME assembly,
of which twenty-seven (27) are identified as PCIs. All of the 27
PCIs are single point failures resulting in the leakage of
propellant, loss of propellant flow path, engine explosion, or
loss of engine on-off control.
These critical failures are caused by structural failure of
components and propellant lines, seal failures, contamination,
failure to open or close of the bipropellant valves, inadequate
engine cooling, and structural failures of the injector assembly,
combustion chamber, and nozzle extension.
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4.3.2 Analysis Results - OMEGN2 Pressurization Subsystem
Seventy-five (75) failure modes were analyzed in the GN2
pressurization subsystem and thirty-seven (37) are found to be
PCIs. Thirty (30) of the 37 PCIs are single point failures which
could result in possible shrapnel damage to surrounding pod
components or inability to actuate the bipropellant valves. The
remaining seven (7) PCIs could produce the same result after the
loss of all redundancy.
These critical failures are caused by storage tank, accumulator,
and actuator ruptures, leakage of GN2 due to structural failures
of components, lines, and seal failures, loss of GN2 flow path
due to failure to open of components or system contamination, and
structural failures of the actuator and rack-and-pinion
assemblies. The accumulator is considered redundant for upstream
pressurization loss failures because of its remaining single
engine start capability.
The loss of purge capability is a critical failure for the Manual
TAL procedure, which is considered a contingency abort mode.
4.3.3 Analysis Results - OME Thrust Vector Control Subsystem
Of the twenty-two (22) failure modes analyzed in the TVC
subsystem, ten (i0) are identified as PCIs. All of the i0 PCIs
are single point failures which could result in possible
propellant leakage, engine burn-through, or possible loss of
vehicle control.
These critical failures are caused by structural failures in the
gimbal actuators and engine-to-vehicle attachments.
Loss of TVC control of one engine is also a critical failure for
the Manual TAL procedure, which is considered a contingency abort
mode.
4.4 Analysis Results - Electrical Power Distribution and
Control Subsystem
4.4.1 Analysis Results - Controls
Two hundred and eighty-one (281) failure modes have been
analyzed in the EPD&C controls subsystem and ninety-four (94) are
PCIs. Of the 94 PCIs, eighteen (18) are single point failures
since their failure resulted in critical valves being stuck open
or closed. Another thirty-one (31) of the 94 PCIs could result
in loss of vehicle/life if all redundancy were lost. The
remaining forty-five (45) PCIs could result in loss of mission if
all redundancy were lost.
Criticalities assigned to EDP&C failure modes were derived from
the effect the failure had on the component being controlled
(valve or TVC actuator). The majority of the EPD&C items
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controlled valves. Therefore, critical EPD&Cfailure modes
caused critical valves to be stuck open or closed resulting in
overpressurization of lines, underpressurization of lines, mixing
of hypergolic propellants, loss of crossfeed, or loss of bi-
propellant valve control.
4.4.2 Analysis Results - Instrumentation
Forty-one (41) failure modes have been analyzed in the EPD&C
instrumentation subsystem and four (4) are PCIs. All four of the
PCIs are single point failures. Three (3) are false indications
of low propellant temperature in either the TK or engine inlet
line. The remaining one (i) PCI is a false sensor indication in
the GN2 assembly. The effect is OMEengine failure criticalities
assigned to instrumentation (pressure, position, and temperature
sensors) failure modes are based on the ability to discern
between the failure of the sensor and a real failure of the
system. Also taken into account was the time available in which
a decision, based on instrument indication, must be made.
4.4.3 Analysis Results - Thermal Control
Three hundred forty-five (345) failure modes have been analyzed
in the thermal control subsystem and one hundred eighteen (118)
are PCIs. Forty-nine (49) of the 118 are single point failures
leading to possible pod structural damage, an unplanned change in
vehicle attitude, or early mission termination. The remaining
sixty-nine (69) PCIs result in the pod or crossfeed HTR system
failed "off" once all redundancy has failed. The effects of
losing the thermal system are unplanned change in vehicle
attitude, loss of crossfeed/interconnect, or early mission
termination.
59
5.0 REFERENCES
Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
I. JSC 10588, Flight Procedures Handbook, OMS/RCS Operations,
Preliminary, November 1980.
2. JSC 12770, 8C-OMS, Shuttle Flight Operations Manual,
Preliminary, 6-6-80.
3. JSC 18958, OMS/RCS Systems Briefs Handbook, Basic, 10-1-84.
4. JSC 19950, OMS 2102, Orbiter Systems Training Manual, March
84.
5. NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL,
October i0, 1986.
6. Reliability Desk Instruction, No. 100-2G, Flight Hardware
FMEA & CIL, 1-31-84.
7. OMS OMRSD, V43 File III, 6-13-86.
8. OMS FPR, Report M4001002, 7-22-86.
9. OMS Single Barrier Failures, MDAC-HOU TM I.I.-TM-ES86009-
43., 7-17-86.
i0. Orbiter Actuation Subsystem Presentation Charts, J. Vernon.
ii. JSC 11174, Rev C, DCN-5, Space Shuttle Subsystems Handbook,
Vols. 1 & 2, Secs. 1-20, 9-13-85.
12. MB0160-007, Rev M, 3-11-80, Steel Tubing, Mat'l spec., RI.
13. MB0160-035, Rev G, 7-5-77, Steel Tubing, Mat'l spec., RI.
14. MC276-0017, Rev D, 6-23-84, Helium High Pressure Coupling,
Proc. spec., RI.
15. MC276-0018, Rev B, 2-14-84, Hypergolic Service Coupling,
Proc. spec., RI.
16. MC282-0082, Rev D, 3-17-82, Pressurant Storage Tank, Proc.
spec., RI.
17. MC284-0421, Rev E, 5-3-82, Pressure Relief Valve, Proc.
spec., RI.
18. MC284-0430, Rev E, 6-22-81, AC Motor Valve, Proc. spec., RI.
19. MC284-0480, Rev C, 5-3-82, Manual Operated Valve, Proc.
spec., RI.
6O
MC284-0481, Rev B, 6-23-84, Quad Check Valve, Proc. spec., RI
MC363-0031, Rev C, 3-15-78, Electrical Heater, Detail Proc.
spec., RI.
22. MC621-0009, Rev E, 7-7-82, OMS Engine, Proc. spec., RI.
23. MC621-0059, Rev E, 6-4-82, APS, Proc. spec., RI.
24. ME271-0092, Rev D, 4-1-80 (?), Gimbal Joint, Spec. Control
Dwg., RI.
25. ME276-0032, Rev B, 7-20-79, Test Point Coupling, Spec.
Control Dwg., RI.
26. ME449-0177, Rev F, 7-15-74 (?), Pressure Transducer, Low,
Med., & High Range, Spec. Control Dwg., RI.
27. MF0004-400, EEE Orbital Parts List
28. AMS5562A, 7-15-80, Steel Tubing, Mat'l spec., SAE.
29. 73A000014, Rev J, 1-13-83, APS Fluid Schematics, 4 sheets,
MDAC.
30. 73A620096, 2-3-77, Regulator Sensing Port Drawing, MDAC.
31. 73A740000, Rev H, 9-13-82, OMS Tank Assembly Drawings, MDAC.
32. 73A740066, Rev C, 3-15-85, Tank Acq. System Gallery Assembly
Drawings, MDAC.
33. 73B740001, Rev D, Communication Screen Assy., Source Dwg.,
MDAC.
34. 73B740002, Rev D, Band Screen Assy., Source Dwg., MDAC.
35. 73B740003, Rev C, Arresting Screen Assy., Source Dwg., MDAC.
36. 73B740004, Rev C, Gallery Screen Assy., Source Dwg., MDAC.
37. 73P550003, Rev B, 3-22-82, Alignment Bellows, Proc. spec.,
MDAC.
38. 73P550013, Revs A,B,C,D, 3-9-82, Propellant Tank, Proc.
spec., MDAC.
39. 73P550015, Rev B, 3-22-82, Gimbal Bellows, Proc. spec.,
MDAC.
40. 73P620001, Rev B, 3-19-82, DC Solenoid valve, High Pressure,
Proc. spec., MDAC.
61
41. 73P620002, Rev D, 10-20-82, Helium Pressure Regulator, Proc.
spec., MDAC.
42. 73P620004, Rev A, 4-27-79, DC Solenoid valve, Low Pressure,
Proc. spec., MDAC.
43. 73P880001, Rev D, 9-9-83, Propellant Quantity Gaging Assy.,
Proc. spec., RI.
44. 73P880001-1001, CR # 12-880001-I01D, 9-3-82, OMSGaging
Subsystem, MDAC.
45. VS70-430202, Rev E, 6-30-84, OMSSubsystem Control
Schematic, Right Pod.
46. vS70-430209, Rev B, 8-17-82, OMSSubsystem Control
Schematic, Right Pod.
47. VS70-430302, Rev D, 7-12-84, OMSSubsystem Control
Schematic, Left Pod.
48. VS70-430309, Rev D, 6-29-84, OMS Subsystem Control
Schematic, Left Pod.
49. VS70-430402, Rev A, 6-10-81, OMS Subsystem Control
Schematic, OMS Kit.
50. VS70-430409, 8-8-81, OMS Subsystem Control Schematic, OMS
Kit
51. VS70-431001, Rev E, 9-19-79, APS Schematic, (102 only).
52. VS70-431099, Rev D, 7-29-85, APS Schematic, RI.
53. VS70-943099, Rev A, 3-1-82, OMS/RCS Integrated System
Schematics, 099, 103, 104, RI Level III.
54. VS70-943102, Rev C, 10-29-80, OMS/RCS Integrated System
Schematics, 102, RI Level III.
55. V070-435011, Rev B, 7-15-84, Crossfeed Lines Installation,
OMS Propellant, Installations drawings.
56. JSC 20923, STS Operational Flight Rules Rationale, PCN-I,
2-14-86.
73A550001, Rev E, OMS Fuel Feed System Installation drawings
73A550002, Rev G, OMS Oxidizer Feed System Installation
drawings.
73A800001, Rev E, Equipment Installation Pod DFI.
73A801001, Rev C, Equipment Inst_llation RCS Housing DFI.
62
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
i181220, Rev A, 8-23-74(?), Injector, Thrust Chamber Detail,
5 sheets, Aerojet.
1181700, 2-27-75, Series Valve (Biprop valve) Assembly
Detail, 3 sheets, Aerojet.
1181710, 2-24-75, Actuator Assembly, Bipropellant Valve, 2
sheets, AeroJet.
i181900, Rev D, Date?, Nozzle Extension Detail, 4 sheets,
Aerojet.
1186895, Rev H, 7-23-83(?), Controller, Gimbal Actuator,
Source Control Drawing, 1 sheet, Aerojet.
JSC 17952, Orbiter Crash and Rescue Information, March 1982.
621-0009-2161, 1-5-82, As-Built Configuration Record, OMS
Gimbal Actuator Parts List, AiResearch.
JSC 19413, Rev H, January 1986, Shuttle Flight Data and
Inflight Anomaly List.
73A550128, 11-2-79, Flange Assy - Crossfeed Interface Detail
Dwg., MDAC.
73P760001, Rev B, 2-26-82, APS Procurement Spec for
Electrical Heaters.
STS83-0010A, 6-30-85, Sec 4.10, pp4-169 through 4-182, Space
Shuttle Operational Level C FSSR Document, GN&C, Part D, RM,
RI.
JSC 08934, Rev D, 10-84, Vol. i, pp 3.4.3.3-1 through -6,
Shuttle Systems Performance and Constraints Data.
73A760210, Rev E, Electrical Installation POD Operational
drawing.
74. 73A760060, Rev A, Marker, Wire harnesses drawing.
63

APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
Ac
ac
Ae
AOA
At
ASSY
ATO
ATT
BFS
CIL
CL
CRIT
CRT
C&W
D/C
DAP
dc
DISP
DPS
EPD&C
EPDCS
F
FC
FDA
FM
FMEA
FRCS
FSSR
ft
FU
G
GFE
GN2
GNC
GPC
GSE
He
HW
Hz
IOA
Isol
JSC
LPS
LRU
LVDT
MCA
MCC
MDAC
- Nozzle inlet plane area
- Alternating Current
- Nozzle exit plane area
- Abort Once Around
- Nozzle throat area
- Assembly
- Abort to Orbit
- Attitude
- Backup Flight System
- Critical Items List
- Close (Closed)
- Criticality
- Cathode Ray Tube
- Caution and Warning System
- Displays and Controls
- Digital Autopilot
- direct current
- Display
- Data Processing System
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control System
- Functional, Fahrenheit
- Flight Critical
- Fault Detection Annunciation
- Failure Mode
- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
- Forward Reaction Control System
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Feet
- Fuel
- Gravity
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- Guidance Navigation and Control
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Helium
- Hardware
- Hertz (cycles per second)
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Isolation
- Johnson Space Center
- Launch Processing System
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Linear variable Differential Transformer
- Motor Control Assembly
- Mission Control Center (JSC)
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
A-I
MDM
MECO
MM
MMH
MNVR
MOD
MSEC
N204
NA
NASA
NSTS
NTO
O.D.
OI
OMRSD
OME
OMS
OP
OPS
0X
OXID
PASS
PBI
Pc
PCI
PCMMU
PLS
PRESS
psi
psia
psid
psig
RCS
RHC
RI
RM
RPC
RTLS
scfm
SFOM
SM
SPEC
STS
SSSH
SW
TAL
TCA
TD
TK
TPS
TVC
V
VLV
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Cutoff
- Major Mode
- Monomethyl Hydrazine
- Maneuver
- Mission Operations Directorate
- millisecond
- Nitrogen Tetroxide
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Nitrogen Tetroxide
- Outside Diameter
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
- Orbital Maneuvering Engine
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Open
- Operations
- Oxidizer
- Oxidizer
- Primary Avionics Software System
- Push-Button Indicator
- Chamber Pressure
- Potential Critical Item
- Pulse Code Modulator Master Unit
- Primary Landing Site
- Pressure
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
- Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
- Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
- Reaction Control System
- Rotational Hand Controller
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Power Controller
- Return to Launch Site
- Standard Cubic Feet per Minute
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Systems Management
- Specification
- Space Transportation System
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Software
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thrust Chamber Assembly
- Touch Down
- Tank
- Thermal Protection System
- Thrust Vector Control
- Velocity, volts
- Valve
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the _6_lowing
amplifications and additi--o-_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
t-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-r-ansition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
pa-I_ed end of" mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payl0ad/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up 'an--d-_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00--_ober 1986, was employe--_-with the
following amp-[ifications _d addition-s_
l •
•
•
,
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance•
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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,
,
I0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 OMSGround Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly
level. The analysis considered the worst case effects of the
hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety.
. Top level redundancy will be considered in determining
functional criticality. The 0MS function is to provide
delta-V for orbit insertion, on-orbit ops, and deorbit.
From a top down system analysis approach, the OMS has
redundancy via the left and right subsystems. In
determining redundancy for hardware items downstream of
the crossfeed line, items which perform the same
function in each pod may be considered redundant to
each other, depending on the failure mode.
• No RCS backup deorbit capability exists in the event of
loss of OMS deorbit capability. It cannot be ensured
that enough OMS propellant will remain to complete an
RCS deorbit burn since the RCS jets have a lower Isp.
However, OMS through RCS can be used to achieve orbit
insertion• An AOA abort can be accomplished without
OMS engines•
• Loss of an OME is, at a minimum, a loss of mission
during the on-orbit phase. Loss of the first OME is
possible loss of mission objectives (ref. flight rule
6-48), and loss of the next OME will lead to loss of
deorbit capability (no RCS deorbit assumed) and loss of
life/vehicle. An OMS engine which will be used only
for critical burns is not considered lost.
• OMS blowdown capability to use/deplete OMS prop will be
determined by MOD HP9825 Blowdown program.
• The OMS payload bay kit hardware will not be addressed
in this analysis.
• Flight rules and Flight Systems Software Requirements
(FSSR) will not be used to downgrade criticalities,
only to upgrade and provide better system
understanding.
. Redundant seals are considered in analyzing internal
and external leakage of components.
B-6
•,
i0.
ii.
12.
13.
14.
15.
An OMS TVC failure (inability to control position of
OMS engine) does not affect the ability to perform an
OMS dump before MECO.
Analysis of component filters are covered in the
analysis of the component. Filters which are not
integral to other components are analyzed seperately.
For the thermal control analysis it is assumed that, at
the time of vehicle liftoff, all areas of the thermal
environment are within redlines.
If applicable, the redundancy and criticalities
assigned to an electrical component shall be tied to
those assigned to mechanical parts affected by the
failure of the electrical component.
Electrical components which enable and inhibit
operation (e.g., allows a valve to be opened and
closed) shall not be redundant to electrical components
which control the operation (e.g., actually opens and
closes the valve)•
Instrumentation passage of screen B does not require
the ability to discern between sensor or hardware
failure, but on detection of the measurement being out
of a predefined limit• The ability to differentiate
between sensor and hardware failure will be reflected
in the criticality assignment.
Two OMS engines are required to ensure the successful
completion of RTLS and TAL pre-MECO OMS dumps• Loss of
one engine may result in the inability to complete the
planned dump before MECO leading to violations of
propellant tank landing constraints and/or Orbiter mass
properties constraints.
The Manual TAL procedure is considered a contingency
abort mode. The Manual TAL is different from the
normal intact TAL abort, as defined in STS 22206, due
to the Manual TAL requirement of a post-MECO OMS dump.
Criticalities assigned for a Manual TAL are not
considered in the final abort criticality assignment,
but are included in the Effects/Rationale portion of
the analysis sheets as additional information. In
assigning Manual TAL criticalities, the following
assumptions were made: (i) two OMS engines are
required to perform the post-MECO OMS dump to avoid
Orbiter mass properties violations, (2) both engines
must, therefore, have successful purges between the pre
and post-MECO dumps, and (3) loss of TVC control of one
engine will result in either inability to use the
affected engine or loss of vehicle control•
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16. The crew will manually shut down an OMSengine in
response to an OMSFDA caused by the violation of
engine operating limits before the effects become
life/vehlcle threatening (e.g., engine explosion).
However, this action may not preclude damage to and
loss of the engine. This assumption does not apply to
failures which lead directly to catastrophic effects
(e.g., engine structural failures).
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DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the item being analyzed and the parent
assembly. For each failure mode, the possible causes are
outlined, and the assessed hardware and functional criticality
for each mission phase is listed, as described in the NSTS 22206,
Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986.
Finally, effects are entered _ the bo--_-tom o-_ each sheet, _ the
worst case criticality is entered at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: I00 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
i/i
ITEM: TANK, HELIUM STORAGE
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM STORAGE TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB I T: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC282-0082-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH TEMPERATURE, HIGH PRESSURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POD
STRUCTURAL AND/OR TPS DAMAGE FROM POSSIBLE POD
OVERPRESSURIZATION, AND DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURANT AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) MC282-0082 2) 73A000014, #201 3) VS70-431099
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC
19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: i01 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK, HELIUM STORAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HELIUM STORAGE TANK
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC282-0082-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH TEMPERATURE, HIGH PRESSURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE
TO LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: 1) MC282-0082 2) 73A000014, #201 3) VS70-431099
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC
19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: COUPLING, HELIUM FILL
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0017-0601
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MATERIAL DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURANT AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) MC276-0017 2) 73A000014, #202 3) VS70-431099
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-I,A,
6-40,A,B
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
103 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING, HELIUM FILL
FAILS TO COUPLE/UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0017-0601
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: i) MC276-0017 2) 73A000014 #202
JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-954099,43AA, BA
3) vs70-431099 4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
104 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING, HELIUM FILL
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0017-0601
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) MC276-0017 2) 73A000014 #202
JSC 11174,11.3 5) VST0-943099,43AA, BA
3) VS70-431099 4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 105 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
I/1
ITEM: LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, WELD
FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TANK TO ISOL VALVES; REGS TO QUAD CHECK VALVES. FIRST FAILURE IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURANT AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
106 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TANK TO ISOL VALVES; REGS TO QUAD CHECK VALVES. FIRST FAILURE IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO
REPRESSURIZE PROP TANK AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 2) VS70-431099
5622 5) MB0160-007 6) FLIGHT RULE 6-I,B
3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620001
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE TO OPEN OF ONE TANK ISOL VALVE, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE
TO OPEN OF THE REDUNDANT ISOL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION SOURCE
AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #203-204 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620001
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 7)
FLIGHT RULE 6-1,B 8) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
108 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/ia
3/IS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ IR RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620001
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS AND LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND
HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES:
4) JSC 12770
19950
I) 73A000014 #203-204 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620001
5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VST0-943099,43AA, BA 7) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 109 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ I] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL DEFECT, SEAL FAILURE, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS AND LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND
HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES:
4) JSC 12770
19950
i) 73A000014 #203-204 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620001
5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 7) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-11
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
Ii0 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620001
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BELLOWS AND SEAL FAILURES, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE
TO LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES:
4) JSC 12770
19950
i) 73A000014 #203-204 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620001
5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 7) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
iii ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620001
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN ONE TANK ISOL VALVE, ONE FAILURE
(RESTRICTED FLOW IN THE REDUNDANT ISOL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION
SOURCE AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #203-204 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620001
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 7) JSC
19950 8) FLIGHT RULE 6-I,B
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
112 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE ISOL A & B VLVS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCAT I ON :
PART NUMBER: 73P620001
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT BURN WHILE
VALVE OPENING. WORST CASE OF FAILURE MODE IS "FAILS TO OPEN".
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #203-204 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620001
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 7) JSC
19950 8) FLIGHT RULE 6-I,B
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0019
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST SEAL IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURANT AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LEAKAGE OF ONE LEG CAN BE ISOLATED AND
OTHER LEG UTILIZED.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #225-1, 225-2 2) VS70-431099
MC621-0059 4) ME276-0032 5) JSC Ii174,11.3 6) VS70-
943099,43AA,BA
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
114 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] s[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0019
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #225-1, 225-2 2) VS070-431099
MC621-0059 4) ME276-0032 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 115 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING-TEST PORT, HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0019
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #225-1, 225-2 2) VS070-431099
MC621-0059 4) ME276-0032 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-
943099,43AA,BA
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-IT
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
116 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iS
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2 R TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, WELD
FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TANK ISOL VALVES TO REGS; TEST PORT LINES. WITH FAILURE OF ONE
LINE, ONE FAILURE (REDUNDANT LEG LINE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
PROP TANK STRUCTURALAND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
LEAKAGE IN ONE LINE CAN BE ISOLATED AND REDUNDANT LINE UTILIZED.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562
5622 5) MB0160-007
4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TANK ISOL VALVES TO REGS; VAPOR ISOL VALVE LEGS. WITH RESTRICTED
FLOW IN ONE LEG, ONE FAILURE (RESTRICTION IN REDUNDANT LEG) AWAY
FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY
TO REPRESSURIZE PROP TANKS AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 2) VS70-431099
5622 5) MB0160-007 6) FLIGHT RULE 6-I,B
3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 118 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: REGULATOR ASSY, HELIUM PRESSURE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REGULATE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE, HIGH OUTPUT,
FAILS TO LOCKUP, FAILS TO CLOSE)
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 73P620002
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, SEAL FAILURE, PRESSURE SURGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SERIES REG) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS AND LINES RESULTING IN LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF
PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
OVERPRESSURIZATION EFFECTS MAY OCCUR BEFORE CORRECTIVE ACTION
(CLOSING OF TANK ISOL VALVE) CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: 1) JSC 11174,11.3 2) 73A000014 #205, #206 3) VS70-
431099 4) JSC 12770 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) JSC 19950 7)
73P620002
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-20 C -___
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
119 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ I] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FIRST REGULATOR FAILED CLOSED, ONE FAILURE (FAILED CLOSED
PARALLEL REG) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING
ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE PROP TANK AND SUBSEQUENT
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174,11.3 2) 73A000014 #205, #206 3) VS70-
431099 4) JSC 12770 5) VS70-943099,43AA,BA 6) FLIGHT RULE 6-
I,B 7) JSC 19950 8) 73P620002
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 120 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, LOW OUTPUT, REGULATES AT
LOWER THAN NORMAL PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620002
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH LOW OUTPUT (<158 PSIA) FROM ONE REGULATOR, ONE FAILURE (LOW
OUTPUT OR FAILED CLOSED PARALLEL PEG) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE PROP
TANK AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC Ii174,11.3 2) 73A000014 #205, #206 3) VS70-
431099 4) JSC 12770 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) FLIGHT RULE 6-2
7) 73P620002
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 121 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620002
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN FIRST REGULATOR, ONE FAILURE (RESTRICTED
FLOW IN PARALLEL REG) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE PROP TANK AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174,11.3 2) 73A000014 #205, #206 3) VS70-
431099 4) JSC 12770 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) FLIGHT RULE 6-
I,B 7) JSC 19950 8) 73P620002
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/07/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620002
SIP] C[P]
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, AMBIENT PORT BELLOWS
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
SEAL FAILURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH REGULATOR, ONE FAILURE (EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE IN PARALLEL REG) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN TANK PRESSURE, AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. SINGLE LEAK CAN BE ISOLATED
AND OTHER LEG UTILIZED.
REFERENCES: i) JSC Ii174,11.3 2) 73A000014 #205, #206 3) VS70-
431099 4) JSC 12770 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) JSC 19950 7)
73P620002 8) 73A620096
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: COUPLING-TEST PORT, VAPOR ISOLATION CHECKOUT
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOLATION CHECK TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0005,-0007
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST SEAL IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURANT AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A00014 #223, 224 2) MC621-0059 3) VS70-431099
4) ME276-0032 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 124 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
COUPLING-TEST PORT, VAPOR ISOLATION CHECKOUT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAULLEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOLATION CHECK TEST PORT COUPLING
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HDW/nmc
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
] c [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0005, -0007
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #223, 224 2) MC621-0059 3) VS70-431099
4) ME276-0032 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
125 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, VAPOR ISOLATION CHECKOUT
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOLATION CHECK TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0005, -0007
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #223, 224 2) MC621-0059 3) VS70-431099
4) ME276-0032 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
C-27REPORT DATE 02/05/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 126 ABORT:
ITEM: VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 73P620004
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE TO OPEN OF FIRST VALVE, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN
OF OTHER VAPOR ISOL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE OXID
TANK AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #207-1,-2 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620004
4) JSC 12770 5) FLIGHT RULE 6-I,B 6) JSC 11174,11.3 7) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA 8) TM-ES86009-43 9) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 73P620004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO MIXING OF PROP OR PROP VAPORS IN
HELIUM LINES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION AND RUPTURE OF
LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #207-I,-2 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620004
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VST0-943099,43AA,BA 7) TM-
ES86009-43 8) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, REVERSE FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620004
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL DEFECT, SEAL FAILURE, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO MIXING OF PROP OR PROP VAPORS IN
HELIUM LINES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION AND RUPTURE OF
LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #207-1,-2 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620004
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC Ii174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 7) TM-
ES86009-43 8) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
129 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620004
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BELLOWS AND SEAL FAILURES, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE
TO LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE PROP
TANKS, AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A00014 #207-1,-2 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620004
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 7) TM-
ES86009-43 8) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
130 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
5)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620004
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN FIRST VALVE, ONE FAILURE (RESTRICTED FLOW
IN OTHER VAPOR ISOL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE OXID
TANK AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #207-1,-2 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620004
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VST0-943099,43AA, BA 7) TM-
ES86009-43 8) JSC 19950 9) FLIGHT RULE 6-I,B
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-32
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
FAILURE MODE: DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: 73P620004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT BURN WHILE
VALVE OPENING. WORST CASE OF FAILURE MODE IS "FAILS TO OPEN".
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #207-1,-2 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P620004
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 7) TM-
ES86009-43 8) JSC 19950 9) FLIGHT RULE 6-I,B
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
132 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0481-0001,-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, POPPET BINDS IN GUIDE,
VAPOR FREEZES UNIT, MANUFACTURE FLAW, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE TO OPEN OF ONE POPPET, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN
OF PARALLEL POPPET) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF TANK REPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #209 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-0481
JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC
18958 8) FLIGHT RULE 6-1,B
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-34
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 133 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES, FUEL
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, REVERSE FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY, FUEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/ 1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBI T: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0481-0001,-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, POPPE.T OR POPPET SPRING BINDS, SEAT OR
SEAL FRACTURE, MANUFACTURE FLAW
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A FAILURE TO CLOSE OF ONE FUEL VALVE POPPET, ONE FAILURE
(FAILURE TO CLOSE OF THE SERIES POPPET) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING OMS ENGINE OPERATIONAL PHASES. FUEL
VAPORS OR LIQUID COULD MIGRATE TO UPSTREAM SIDE OF VAPOR ISLN
VALVES WHERE, UPON USE OF SYSTEM, FUEL LOCATED BETWEEN REGULATOR
AND VAPOR ISLN VALVES WOULD BE FORCED INTO OXID LINES AND TANK
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION AND RUPTURE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY ALLOWS MIXING OF PROP OR VAPORS IN LINES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE EXPLOSION AND RUPTURE OF LINES.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #209 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-0481
JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC
18958
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 134 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES, OXIDIZER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, REVERSE FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY, OXIDIZER
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0481-0001,-0002
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, POPPET OR POPPET SPRING BINDS, SEAT OR
SEAL FRACTURE, MANUFACTURE FLAW
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE MIXING OF PROP VAPORS OR
LIQUID IN HELIUM LINES RESULTING IN EXPLOSION AND RUPTURE.
REFERENCES: 1) 73A000014 #209 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-0481
JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA,BA 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC
18958
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 135 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC284-0481-0001,-0002
] c [ ]
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE
TO LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT AND INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK
PRESSURE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. MAY ALSO ALLOW LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #209 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-0481
JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC
18958
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
136 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0481-0001,-0002
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TOTAL BLOCKAGE OF SINGLE INLET FILTER RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY. LOSS OF ABILITY TO PRESSURIZE TANK
AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP WOULD RESULT IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #209 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-0481
JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC
18958 8) FLIGHT RULE 6-I,B
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 137 ABORT:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, QUAD CHECK VALVEITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBSYS LEAD:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0005,-0007
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST SEAL IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS
OF HELIUM PRESSURANT AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A00014 #215-1,-2, 216-1,-2
MC621-0059 4) ME276-0032 5) JSC 11174,11.3
2) VS70-431099
6) VS70-943099
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 138 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, QUAD CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0005,-0007
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #215-1,-2, 216-1,-2
MC621-0059 4) ME276-0032 5) JSC 11174,11.3
2) VS70-431099
6) VS70-943099
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-40
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
139 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, QUAD CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0005,-0007
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #215-1,-2, 216-1,-2
MC621-0059 4) ME276-0032 5) JSC 11174,11.3
2) VS70-431099
6) VS70-943099
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
140 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HELIUM PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
] B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COUPLING LINES. NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: I/1
MDAC ID: 141 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, FAILS TO OPEN, BURST DISK
FAILS TO RUPTURE, RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBI T: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421-0015,-0016
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS AND LINES
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #213, 214 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-
0421 4) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 142 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, BURST DISK RUPTURES AT
LOWER THAN BURST PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421-0015,-0016
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PRESSURE SURGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH PREMATURE RUPTURE OF BURST DISK, ONE FAILURE (PREMATURE
OPENING, FAILURE TO CLOSE, OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF RELIEF VALVE)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF
PROP AND HELIUM THROUGH ASSY. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT,
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK PRESSURE, AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULT IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LEAKAGE OF
PROP RESULTS IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #213, 214 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-
0421 4) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-44
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
143 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
BURST DISK LEAK, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421-0015,-0016
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH LEAKAGE OF BURST DISK, ONE FAILURE (PREMATURE OPENING OR
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF RELIEF VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP AND HELIUM THROUGH
ASSEMBLY. LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK
PRESSURE, AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULT IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTS IN
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #213, 214 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-
0421 4) VS70-943099,43AA,BA 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 144 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
ITEM: VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO RESEAT
(OPENS AFTER BURST DISK RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421-0015,-0016
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
AND LEAKAGE OF PROPELLANT AND HELIUM PRESSURANT RESULTING IN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK PRESSURE AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY
TO USE/DEPLETE PROP CAUSING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LEAKAGE OF
PROP RESULTS IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #213, 214 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-
0421 4) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-46
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 145 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421-0015,-0016
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
AND LEAKAGE OF PROPELLANT AND HELIUM PRESSURANT RESULTING IN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK PRESSURE AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY
TO USE/DEPLETE PROP CAUSING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LEAKAGE OF
PROP RESULTS IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #213, 214 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-
0421 4) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
146 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0005,-0007
c[p]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST SEAL IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP AND
J
HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK PRESSURE, AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY. LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTS IN
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #215-3, 216-3 2) VS70-431099
MC621-0059 4) ME276-0032 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-
943099,43AA,BA
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
147 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0005,-0007
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #215-3, 216-3 2) VS70-431099
MC621-0059 4) ME276-0032 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 148 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING-TEST PORT, PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0005,-0007
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #215-3, 216-3 2) VS70-431099
MC621-0059 4) ME276-0032 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-50
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NTO
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: I/1
149 ABORT: i/1
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMHAND
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MMH AND NTO PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB I T: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELIEF VALVE INLET AND OUTLET LINES. FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF PROP TANK AND LINES RESULTING IN LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF
PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
150 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3801,-3851
c[p]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF FIRST SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP AND
HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE,
AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY. LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTS IN
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #217, 218 2) VS70-431099 3) MC621-
0059 4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
151 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3801,-3851
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #217, 218 2) VS70-431099 3) MC621-
0059 4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 152 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING-TEST PORT, PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3801,-3851
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #217, 218 2) VS70-431099 3) MC621-
0059 4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
153 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GROUND, MANUAL ISOLATION
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORB I T:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: I/I
2/2 TAL: i/i
2/2 AOA: i/i
I/1 ATO: i/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC284-0480-0001,-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING
ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE PROP TANK AND INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #211, #212 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-
480 4) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 154 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: VALVE-GROUND, MANUAL ISOLATION
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED, FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0480-0001,-0002
] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #211, #212 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-
480 4) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-56
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 155 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
i/i
ITEM: VALVE-GROUND, MANUAL ISOLATION
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0480-0001,-0002
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BELLOWS FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE
TO LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT AND INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK
PRESSURE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. MAY ALSO ALLOW LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #211, #212 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-
480 4) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 5) JSC Ii174,11.3 6) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 156 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TANKVENT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3802,-3852
c[P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF FIRST SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP AND
HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK PRESSURE, AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY. LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTS IN
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #219, 220 2) VS70-431099 3) MC276-
0018 4)JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) MC621-0059
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
157 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TANK VENT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3802,-3852
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDWIFUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #219, 220 2) VS70-431099 3) MC276-
0018 4)JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) MC621-0059
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-59
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
158 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TANK VENT
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3802,-3852
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: 1) 73A000014 #219, 220 2) VS70-431099 3) MC276-
0018 4)JSC ii174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,43AA, BA 6) MC621-0059
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-60
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: I/1
159 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
NTO
FAILURE MODE:
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMHAND
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MMHAND NTO PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
QUAD CHECK VALVES TO TANK; TANK TO ISOL VALVE LEGS; ISOL VALVE
LEGS TO XFEED LINE CONNECTION. FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 160 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/i TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCATED BETWEEN GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVE AND PROP TANK. FIRST
FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE
OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #267 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA 4) 73P550015
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 161 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR DEFLECTION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCATED BETWEEN GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVE AND PROP TANK. FAILURE
OF A BELLOWS TO PROVIDE ANGULAR COMPENSATION FOR LINE MOVEMENTS
COULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE LINE RUPTURE RESULTING IN LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #267
943099,43AA, BA 4) 73P550015
2) VS70-431099 3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-63
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
162 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GIMBAL BELLOWS
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCATED BETWEEN GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVE AND PROP TANK. FLOW
RESTRICTION IN BELLOWS AT THIS LOCATION IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK
PRESSURE AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #267 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA 4) 73P550015 5) FLIGHT RULE 6-1,B
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
163 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROPELLANT TANK
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550013
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HIGH PRESSURE, SEAL FAILURES, WELD
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PROP LOAD DURING ENTRY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. RUPTURE RESULTS
IN LOSS OF PROPELLANT, POSSIBLE POD STRUCTURAL DAMAGE, CORROSIVE
EFFECTS ON POD COMPONENTS, POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND
HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #251, 252 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550013
4) MC621-0059 5) 73A740000 6) JSC 11174,11.3 7) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA 8) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
164 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PROPELLANT TANK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: I/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550013
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HIGH PRESSURE, SEAL FAILURES, WELD
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PROP LOAD DURING ENTRY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. RUPTURE RESULTS
IN LOSS OF PROPELLANT, CORROSIVE EFFECTS ON POD COMPONENTS,
POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #251, 252 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550013
4) MC621-0059 5) 73A740000 6) JSC 11174,11.3 7) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA 8) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
165 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-PROP TANK, HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/ 1R RTLS: 2 / IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3801,-3851
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP AND
HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE,
AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY. LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTS IN
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #237, 238 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550003
4) MC621-0059 5) MC276-0018 6) JSC Ii174,11.3 7) VS70-
943099,43AA,BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
166 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-PROP TANK, HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3801,-3851
] c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 #237, 238 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550003
4) MC621-0059 5) MC276-0018 6) JSC 11174,11.3 7) VS70-
943099,43AA,BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
167 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-PROP TANK, HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3801,-3851
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #237, 238 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550003
4) MC621-0059 5) MC276-0018 6) JSC 11174,11.3 7) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-69
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 168 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3403,-3453
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
AND LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT CAUSING INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK
PRESSURE AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY. LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTS IN
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A00014 #239, 240 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550013
4) MC276-0018 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
169 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3403,-3453
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILS"RE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #239, 240 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550013
4) MC276-0018 5) JSC Ii174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 170 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3403,-3453
] c[ ]
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: I) 73A00014 #239, 240 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550013
4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-72
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
171 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
TANK ACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3403,-3453
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
AND LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT CAUSING INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TANK
PRESSURE AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY. LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTS IN
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #226, 227 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550013
4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 172 ABORT:
ITEM: COUPLING-TANKACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
TANK ACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3403,-3453
] c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #226, 227 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550013
4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VST0-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-74
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
173 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
2)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
TANK ACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LI FTO F F: / NA TAL: / NA
ONORB I T: / NA AOA: / NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3403,-3453
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A00014 #226, 227 2) VS70-431099 3) 73P550013
4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,43AA, BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 174 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM: COUPLING-PROPELLANT, TANK TEST PORT
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK TEST PORT COUPLING
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/1R RTLS : 2/1R
2/1R TAL: 2/1R
2/1R AOA: 2/1R
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3401,-3451
c[P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #215-4, 216-4 2) VS70-431099
MC621-0059 4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-76
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
175 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-PROPELLANT, TANK TEST PORT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3401,-3451
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #215-4, 216-4 2) VS70-431099
MC621-0059 4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
176 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-PROPELLANT, TANK TEST PORT
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANK TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3401,-3451
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 #215-4, 216-4 2) VS70-431099
MC621-0059 4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VST0-
943099,43AA,BA
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
177 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAGING PROBE, FORWARD COMPARMENT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
FORWARD COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATIQN, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MISHANDLING, LOSS OF INPUT POWER, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL
DEFECT, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IS NO EFFECT. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY ABILITY
TO USE PVT METHOD TO DETERMINE TOTAL PROP QUANTITY. OMS
PROPELLANT QUANTITIES ARE ALSO TRACKED BY GROUND PERSONNEL BASED
ON ENGINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS AND FIRING DURATION.
REFERENCES:
4) JSC 19950
TM-ES86009-43
i) VS70-431099 #253, 254 2) 73A000014 3) 73P880001
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC ii174,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 178 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAGING PROBE, FORWARD COMPARMENT
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
FORWARD COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MISHANDLING, IMPROPER INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL
DEFECT, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION IS NO EFFECT. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY
ABILITY TO USE PVT METHOD TO DETERMINE TOTAL PROP QUANTITY.
OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITIES ARE ALSO TRACKED BY GROUND PERSONNEL
BASED ON ENGINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS AND FIRING DURATION.
REFERENCES:
4) JSC 19950
TM-ES86009-43
i) VS70-431099 #253, 254 2) 73A000014 3) 73P880001
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC ii174,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
179 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAGING PROBE, FORWARD COMPARMENT
ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
FORWARD COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MISHANDLING, IMPROPER INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL
DEFECT, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC OPERATION IS NO EFFECT. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY
ABILITY TO USE PVT METHOD TO DETERMINE TOTAL PROP QUANTITY.
OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITIES ARE ALSO TRACKED BY GROUND PERSONNEL
BASED ON ENGINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS AND FIRING DURATION.
REFERENCES:
4) JSC 19950
TM-ES86009-43
i) VS70-431099 #253, 254 2) 73A000014 3) 73P880001
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 11174,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
180 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAGING PROBE, FORWARD COMPARMENT, FUEL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, GLASS TUBE FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
FORWARD COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE, FUEL
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3 / 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES:
DEFECT
IMPROPER INSTALLATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. FULL SCALE HIGH READING. GLASS FRAGMENTS NOT
SUFFICIENT TO RESTRICT FLOW OF PROP THROUGH COMMUNICATION SCREEN.
CONFINEMENT OF ALL BUT SMALL GLASS FRAGMENTS WITHIN PROBE HOUSING
AND LOW G FORCES PRECLUDE DAMAGE TO COMMUNICATION SCREENS.
REFERENCES:
4) JSC 19950
TM-ES86009-43
I) VS70-431099 #253, 254 2) 73A000014 3) 73P880001
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 11174,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-82
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 181 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: GAGINGPROBE, FORWARDCOMPARMENT
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
FORWARD COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES: BELLOWS FAILURE, BARRIER AND SEAL FAILURES,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE THROUGH SEAL ALLOWS LEAKAGE OF PROP INTO ELECTRICAL
CAVITY RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF OR ERRONEOUS PROBE OUTPUT.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY ABILITY TO USE PVT METHOD TO DETERMINE
TOTAL PROP QUANTITY. OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITIES ARE ALSO TRACKED
BY GROUND PERSONNEL BASED ON ENGINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS AND
FIRING DURATION.
REFERENCES:
4) JSC 19950
TM-ES86009-43
i) VS70-431099 #253, 254 2) 73A000014 3) 73P880001
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 11174,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-83
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
182 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
AFT COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MISHANDLING, LOSS OF INPUT POWER, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL
DEFECT, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF LOW QUANTITY WARNING COULD
ALLOW HELIUM INGESTION AND PROP DEPLETION, HOWEVER PROP
MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING IS SUCH THAT UNEXPECTED/UNDESIRED
DEPLETION OF PROP IS UNCREDIBLE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD ALLOW
FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION SCREENAND PASSAGE OF HELIUM INTO AFT
COMPARTMENT TO GO UNDETECTED (REQUIRES MULTIPLE FAILURES).
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PVT METHOD AND GROUND TRACKING.
REFERENCES:
4) 73A00014
TM-ES86009-43
i) VS70-431099 #250, 249 2) 73P880001 3) JSC 19950
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC ill74,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-84
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 183 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
AFT COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MISHANDLING, IMPROPER INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL
DEFECT, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF PROP QUANTITY OR LOW LEVEL QUANTITY IS NO
EFFECT. PROP MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING IS SUCH THAT ACTUAL PROP
QUANTITY IS KNOWN. ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF COMMUNICATION SCREEN
FAILURE AND HELIUM PASSAGE (LESS THAN FULL AFT COMPARTMENT
READING WITH PROP REMAINING IN FORWARD COMPARTMENT) MAY RESULT IN
PERFORMANCE OF ULLAGE BURNS PRIOR TO OMS BURNS AND POSSIBLE LOSS
OF ON-ORBIT INTERCONNECT FROM AFFECTED TANK.
REFERENCES:
4) 73A00014
TM-ES86009-43
i) VS70-431099 #250, 249 2) 73P880001 3) JSC 19950
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 11174,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-85
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 184 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: GAGING PROBE,AFT COMPARTMENT
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
AFT COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MISHANDLING, IMPROPER INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL
DEFECT, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC OPERATION IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF LOW QUANTITY WARNING
COULD ALLOW HELIUM INGESTIONAND PROP DEPLETION, HOWEVER PROP
MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING IS SUCH THAT UNEXPECTED/UNDESIRED
DEPLETION OF PROP IS UNCREDIBLE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD ALLOW
FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION SCREEN AND PASSAGE OF HELIUM INTO AFT
COMPARTMENT TO GO UNDETECTED (REQUIRES MULTIPLE FAILURES).
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PVT METHOD AND GROUND TRACKING.
REFERENCES:
4) 73A00014
TM-ES86009-43
i) VS70-431099 #250, 249 2) 73P880001 3) JSC 19950
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 11174,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
185 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT, FUEL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, GLASS TUBE FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
AFT COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE, FUEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES:
DEFECT
IMPROPER INSTALLATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. FULL SCALE HIGH READING. GLASS FRAGMENTS NOT
SUFFICIENT TO RESTRICT FLOW OF PROP THROUGH GALLERY SCREENS.
CONFINEMENT OF ALL BUT SMALL GLASS FRAGMENTS WITHIN PROBE OUTER
HOUSING AND LOW G FORCES PRECLUDE DAMAGE TO SCREENS.
REFERENCES:
4) 73A00014
TM-ES86009-43
I) VS70-431099 #250, 249 2) 73P880001 3) JSC 19950
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 11174,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 186 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAGING PROBE, AFT COMPARTMENT
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
AFT COMPARTMENT GAGING PROBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: BELLOWS FAILURE, BARRIER AND SEAL FAILURES,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE THROUGH SEAL ALLOWS LEAKAGE OF PROP INTO ELECTRICAL
CAVITY RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF OR ERRONEOUS PROBE OUTPUT.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY ABILITY TO USE PVT METHOD TO DETERMINE
TOTAL PROP QUANTITY. OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITIES ARE ALSO TRACKED
BY GROUND PERSONNEL BASED ON ENGINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS AND
FIRING DURATION.
REFERENCES:
4) 73A00014
TM-ES86009-43
i) VS70-431099 #250, 249 2) 73P880001 3) JSC 19950
5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 11174,11.2 8)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-88
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 187 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOTALIZER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
TOTALIZER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT POWER, CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING
DEFECT, MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF LOW QUANTITY WARNING COULD
ALLOW HELIUM INGESTION AND PROP DEPLETION, HOWEVER PROP
MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING IS SUCH THAT UNEXPEXTED/UNDESIRED
DEPLETION OF PROP IS UNCREDIBLE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD ALLOW
FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION SCREEN AND PASSAGE OF HELIUM INTO AFT
COMPARTMENT TO GO UNDETECTED (REQUIRES MULTIPLE FAILURES).
REFERENCES: i) 73P880001
JSC 19950 5) JSC 18958
2) JSC 12770 3) JSC 11174,11.2 4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-89
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 188
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOTALIZER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
TOTALIZER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
] B [ ] C C ]
CAUSES: IMPROPER INPUT, CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS INDICATIONS OF PROP QUANTITY OR LOW LEVEL QUANTITY ARE
NO EFFECT. PROP MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING IS SUCH THAT ACTUAL PROP
QUANTITY IS KNOWN. ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF COMMUNICATION SCREEN
FAILURE AND PASSAGE OF HELIUM WOULD RESULT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
ULLAGE BURNS PRIOR TO OMS BURNS AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF INTERCONNECT
CAPABILITY FROM AFFECTED TANK.
REFERENCES: i) 73P880001 2) JSC 12770
JSC 19950 5) JSC 18958
3) JSC ii174,11.2 4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-90
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
189 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOTALIZER
ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
TOTALIZER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES: IMPROPER INPUT, CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC OPERATION IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF LOW QUANTITY WARNING
COULD ALLOW HELIUM INGESTIONAND PROP DEPLETION, HOWEVER PROP
MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING IS SUCH THAT UNEXPECTED/UNDESIRED
DEPLETION OF PROP IS UNCREDIBLE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD ALLOW
FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION SCREEN AND PASSAGE OF HELIUM INTO AFT
COMPARTMENT TO GO UNDETECTED (REQUIRES MULTIPLE FAILURES).
REFERENCES: I) 73P880001
JSC 19950 5) JSC 18958
2) JSC 12770 3) JSC 11174,11.2 4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 190 ABORT: 2/2
ITEM: COMMUNICATIONSCREEN
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF RETENTION CAPABILITY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
COMMUNICATION SCREEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73B740001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. MIGRATION OF PROP OUT
OF AFT COMPARTMENT COULD RESULT IN HELIUM INGESTION UPON ENGINE
START CAUSING POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE. SETTLING
BURN REQUIRED PRIOR TO FURTHER USE OF AFFECTED SYSTEM. NO EFFECT
FOR RTLS AND TAL SINCE PROP FORCED INTO AFT COMPARTMENT AT START
OF PROP DUMP.
REFERENCES: i) 73B740001 2) 73A740000 3) JSC 12770
18958 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-2,C, 6-44 7) JSC 19950
4) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-92
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
191 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMUNICATION SCREEN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM PASSAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
COMMUNICATION SCREEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73B740001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNANCY RESULTS IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF
ONE ENGINE. A SETTLING BURN WOULD BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO FURTHER
USE OF AFFECTED TANK. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS OR TAL
ABORT IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF
ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73B740001 2) 73A740000 3) JSC 12770
18958 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-2,C, 6-44 7) JSC 19950
4) Jsc
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-93
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 192 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: GALLERY LEGS
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM PASSAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
GALLERY LEGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73B740004
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF
ONE ENGINE. A SETTLING BURN WOULD BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO FURTHER
USE OF AFFECTED TANK. WITH FAILURE OF GALLERY LEG SCREEN DURING
RTLS OR TAL ONE FAILURE (MANIFOLD SCREEN) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A740066 2) 73B740004 3) 73A740000 4) JSC
12770 5) JSC 18958 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-2,C, 6-44
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-94
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
193 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLLECTOR MANIFOLD
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM PASSAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION ASSEMBLY
COLLECTOR MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73B740003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF
ONE ENGINE. A SETTLING BURN WOULD BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO FURTHER
USE OF AFFECTED TANK. WITH FAILURE OF MANIFOLD SCREEN DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (GALLERY LEG SCREEN) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A740066 2) 73B740004 3) 73A740000
12770 5) JSC 18958 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-2,C, 6-44
4) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-95
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 1/1
194 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
NTO
FAILURE MODE:
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMHAND
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MMH AND NTO PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, WELD
FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL PROP LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS. FIRST FAILURE IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
INTO POD RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-96
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 195 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/I
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCATED BETWEEN PROP TANK AND TANK ISOL VALVES. FIRST FAILURE IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #268 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AA, BA 4) 73P550015
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBS YSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: I/1
MDAC ID: 196 ABORT: i/1
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR DEFLECTION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCATED BETWEEN PROP TANK AND TANK ISOL VALVES. FAILURE OF A
BELLOWS TO PROVIDE ANGULAR COMPENSATION FOR PROP LINE MOVEMENTS
COULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE LINE RUPTURE, LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
INTO POD, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #268
943099,43AA,BA 4) 73P550015
2) VS70-431099 3) VSTO-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-98
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
197 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GIMBALBELLOWS
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOCATED BETWEEN PROP TANK AND TANK ISOL VALVES. RESTRICTION IN
BELLOWS AT THIS LOCATION IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING
ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #268 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AA, BA 4) 73P550015
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-99
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
198 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0023,-0024
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE TO OPEN OF ONE TANK ISLN VALVE, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE
TO OPEN OF OTHER VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #257-1,-2, 258-1,-2
3) MC284-0430 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 11174,11.3
943099,43AB,BB 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
2,B
2) VS70-431099
6) VS70-
9) FLIGHT RULE 6-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 199 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0023,-0024
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN DURING ALL PHASES. A FAILED
OPEN VALVE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CROSSFEED CAPABILITY TO
AFFECTED POD (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS).
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #257-1,-2, 258-1,-2
3) MC284-0430 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 11174,11.3
943099,43AB,BB 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
2) vs70-431099
6) vs70-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
200 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
FAILS MIDTRAVEL, PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3 / 2R AOA: 2/ 1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0023,-0024
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH ONE VALVE FAILED MIDTRAVEL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN OF
OTHER VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY
DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS. FLOW RATE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT BURN MAKES PROP
IN AFFECTED TANK UNUSABLE. VALVE FAILED PARTIALLY OPEN COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CROSSFEED CAPABILITY TO AFFECTED POD (TO AVOID
DIRECT CONNECTION TO TANKS).
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #257-1,-2, 258-1,-2
3) MC284-0430 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 11174,11.3
943099,43AB, BA 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
2,B,D
2) VS70-431099
6) VS70-
9) FLIGHT RULE 6-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I02
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FORWARD/REVERSE LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0023,-0024
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BALL SEAL FAILURES,
RELIEF VALVE SEAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF VALVE MAY ALLOW CONNECTION OF
TANKS AT DIFFERENT PRESSURES DURING CROSSFEED OPS HOWEVER
CONNECTION THROUGH CLOSED LEAKING VALVE PRECLUDES DAMAGE TO TANK
FROM PRESSURE SURGE.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #257-1,-2, 258-1,-2
3) MC284-0430 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 11174,11.3
943099,43AB,BA 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
2) vs70-431099
6) vs70-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-103
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 202 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/I
ITEM: VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0023,-0024
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BELLOWS AND SEAL FAILURES,
MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP INTO POD RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND
HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #257-1,-2, 258-1,-2
3) MC284-0430 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 11174,11.3
943099,43AB,BB 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
2) VS70-431099
6) VS70-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I04
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN ONE VALVE, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN
OR RESTRICTED FLOW IN OTHER VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. FLOW RATE INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT BURN MAKES PROP IN AFFECTED TANK UNUSABLE.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #257-1,-2, 258-1,-2
3) MC284-0430 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 11174,11.3
943099,43AB, BB 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
2) vs70-431099
6) vs70-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I05
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
204 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-PROPELLANTTANKISOLATION
DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0023,-0024
CAUSES: IMPROPER INPUT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVES ARE NORMALLY IN OPEN POSITION. FIRST FAILURE IS NO
EFFECT. WITH VALVE SWITCH IN GPC POSITION (TO OPEN VALVE AT
START OF BURN), LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. INITIAL LOW PROP
FLOW RATE COULD LEAD TO POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE.
PROP FROM AFFECTED TANK CAN BE USED BY OTHER ENGINE WHEN VALVE
REACHES OPEN POSITION. VALVES OPEN FOR ABORT DUMPS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #257-1,-2, 258-1,-2
3) MC284-0430 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 11174,11.3
943099,43AB, BB 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
2) VS70-431099
6) VS70-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I06
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 205 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEVE
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0023,-0024
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF RELIEF DEVICE IN ONE VALVE, ONE FAILURE (RELIEF
DEVICE IN PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES AND LOSS AND LEAKAGE
OF PROP INTO POD RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW. VALVES OPEN FOR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #257-1,-2, 258-1,-2
3) MC284-0430 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC ii174,11.3
943099,43AB, BB 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
2) VS70-431099
6) VS70-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I07
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/1R
206 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
NTO
FAILURE MODE:
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMHAND
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MMH AND NTO PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TANK ISOL VALVE LEGS. WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN ONE LEG, ONE
FAILURE (REDUNDANT LEG RESTRICTION) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I08
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM: COUPLING - PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN COUPLING
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORB I T:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/1R RTLS: 2/1R
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/1R AOA: 2/IR
2/1R ATO: 2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3401,-3451
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: l) MC621-0059 2) MC276-0018 3) JSC Ill74,11.3
VS70-943099,AC,BC
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I09
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
208 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3401,-3451
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0059
VS70-943099,AC,BC
2) MC276-0018 3) JSC 11174,11.3 4_
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-110
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
209 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3401,-3451
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0059
VS70-943099,AC,BC
2) MC276-0018 3) JSC ii174,11.3 4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-111
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: COUPLING-OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-2601,-2651
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) VS70-431099 2) MC276-0018 3) JSC 11174,11.3
VS70-943099, 43AC, BC 5) MC621-0059 6) 73A000014, #119,120
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
211 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-2601,-2651
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: i) VS70-431099 2) MC276-0018 3) JSC 11174,11.3
VS70-943099, 43AC, BC 5) 73A000014, #119,120 6) MC621-0059
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-i13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 212 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING-OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ 3 C[ 3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-2601,-2651
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) VS70-431099 2) MC276-0018 3) JSC 11174,11.3
VS70-943099, 43AC, BC 5) 73A000014, #119,120 6) MC621-0059
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 213 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: COUPLING - PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3803,-3853
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #235, 236 2) VS70-431099 3) MC621-
0059 4) MC276-0018 5) JSC Ii174,11.3 6) VST0-943099,AC,BC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-115
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 214 ABORT:
ITEM: COUPLING - PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3803,-3853
] c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #235, 236 2) VS70-431099 3) MC621-
0059 4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,AC,BC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I16
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
215 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3803,-3853
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #235, 236 2) VS70-431099 3) MC621-
0059 4) MC276-0018 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) VS70-943099,AC, BC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-I17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 216 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
1/1 RTLS: 1/i
i/i TAL: i/i
I/1 AOA: i/1
i/1 ATO: i/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME271-0092-0004,-0005
] c[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW. LOCATED ON CROSSFEED LINE IN AFT BODY.
REFERENCES: i) VS70-431099, #345-348 2) ME271-0092
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-118
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: I/I
MDAC ID: 217 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR DEFLECTION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: I/I ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME271-0092-0004,-0005
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BELLOWS TO PROVIDE ANGULAR COMPENSATION FOR PROP LINE
MOVEMENTS COULD RESULT IN LINE RUPTURE, LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. LOCATED ON
CROSSFEED LINE IN AFT BODY.
REFERENCES: I) VS70-431099, #345-348 2) ME271-0092
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-119
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 218 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/l
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME271-0092-0004,-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. RESTRICTED FLOW
IN CROSSFEED PATH DURING A CROSSFEED OMS BURN COULD REULT IN
DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE DUE TO IMPROPER MIXTURE
RATIO. PROP IN POD WITH AFFECTED ENGINE SUBSEQUENTLY STRANDED
DUE TO LOSS OF CROSSFEED PATH RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
DURING ENTRY. FAILURE NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL EFFECTS MANIFESTED.
LOCATED ON XFEED LINE IN AFT BODY.
REFERENCES:
RULE 6-95,C
I) VS70-431099, #345-348 2) ME271-0092 3) FLIGHT
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-120
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 219 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
ITEM: FLEXIBLE LINE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FLEXIBLE LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC271-0082-0001,-0002,-0003,-0004
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW. LOCATED ON CROSSFEED LINE IN AFT BODY.
REFERENCES:
VO70-435011
i) 73A000014, #345-348 2) VS70-943099,43AJ 3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-121
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 220 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: FLEXIBLE LINE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FLEXIBLE LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC271-0082-0001,-0002,-0003,-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. RESTRICTED FLOW
IN CROSSFEED PATH DURING A CROSSFEED OMS BURN COULD REULT IN
DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE DUE TO IMPROPER MIXTURE
RATIO. PROP IN POD WITH AFFECTED ENGINE SUBSEQUENTLY STRANDED
DUE TO LOSS OF CROSSFEED PATH RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
DURING ENTRY. FAILURE NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL EFFECTS MANIFESTED.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #345-348
V070-435011 4) FLIGHT RULE 6-95,C
2) VS70-943099,43AJ 3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-122
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 221 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
XFEED VALVE LEGS; INTERCONNECT VALVE LEGS. FIRST FAILURE IS NO
EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF ENGINE
REDUNDANCY. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(RESTRICTION IN REDUNDANT LEG) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT CAPABILITY AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014 2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562
5622 5) MB0160-007 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-9,B, 6-95,B
4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: I/1
222 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/ 2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
XFEED LINES. FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
RESTRICTED FLOW IN CROSSFEED PATH DURING A CROSSFEED OMS BURN
COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE DUE TO IMPROPER
MIXTURE RATIO. PROP IN POD WITH AFFECTED ENGINE SUBSEQUENTLY
STRANDED DUE TO LOSS OF CROSSFEED PATH RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY. FAILURE UNDETECTABLE UNTIL EFFECTS
MANIFESTED.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562
5622 5) MB0160-007 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-9,B, 6-95,C
4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-124
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 223 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0011,-0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT (PRIORITY FLIGHT INVOKED). LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF OMS
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY.
WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (PARALLEL
VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #259-1,-2, 260,-1,-2 2) VS70-431099
3) MC284-0430 4)JSC ii174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,AC,BC 6) JSC
12770 7) JSC 18958 8) TM-ES86009-43 9) FLIGHT RULES 6-9,B, 6-
95,B,C
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-125
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 224 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VALVE- CROSS FEED
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0011,-0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT (POSSIBLE LOSS OF RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING OMS
BURN TO AVOID BURNING RCS PROP THROUGH OMS).
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #259-1,-2, 260,-1,-2 2) VS70-431099
3) MC284-0430 4)JSC ii174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,AC, BC 6) JSC
12770 7) JSC 18958 8) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-126
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 225 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
FAILURE MODE: FAILS MIDTRAVEL, PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0011,-0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY
AND LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY (DUE TO LOSS OF ADEQUATE FLOW
PATH). WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(FAILURE TO OPEN OF PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS
AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: 1) 73A000014, #259-1,-2, 260,-1,-2 2) VS70-431099
3) MC284-0430 4)JSC 11174,11.3 5) VST0-943099,AC,BC 6) JSC
12770 7) JSC 18958 8) TM-ES86009-43 9) FLIGHT RULES 6-9,B, 6-
95,B,C
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 226 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FORWARD/REVERSE LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0011,-0012
] c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BALL SEAL FAILURES,
RELIEF VALVE SEAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING OMS
BURN TO AVOID BURNING RCS PROP THROUGH OMS.
REFERENCES: 1) 73A000014, #259-1,-2, 260,-1,-2 2) VS70-431099
3) MC284-0430 4)JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,AC,BC 6) JSC
12770 7) JSC 18958 8) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-128
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 227 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0011,-0012
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BELLOWS AND SEAL FAILURES,
MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. STRUCTURAL
FAILURE OF HOUSING ALLOWS LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP INTO POD
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #259-1,-2, 260,-1,-2 2) VS70-431099
3) MC284-0430 4)JSC 11174,11.3 5) VSTO-943099,AB, BB 6) JSC
12770 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 228 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0011,-0012
CAUSES: .FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY
AND LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY. PROP FLOW RATE THROUGH CROSSFEED
VALVES INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OPS. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP
THROUGH RCS JETS AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL
OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #259-1,-2, 260,-1,-2 2) VS70-431099
3) MC284-0430 4)JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,AB,BB 6) JSC
12770 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43 9) FLIGHT RULE 6-9,B, 6-
95,B,C
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-130
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 229 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: VALVE-CROSSFEED
FAILURE MODE: DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0011,-0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. WITH VALVE SWITCH IN GPC POSITION
(TO OPEN VALVE AT START OF BURN), LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ENGINE DURING
CROSSFEED OPS. INITIAL PROP FLOW RATE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
BURN COULD LEAD TO DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE. WITH FIRST
FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN OF
PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #259-1,-2, 260,-1,-2 2) VS70-431099
3) MC284-0430 4)JSC ii174,11.3 5) VST0-943099,AB,BB 6) JSC
12770 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43 9) FLIGHT RULE 6-9,B, 6-
95,B,C
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
230 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEVE
VALVE-CROSSFEED
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A & B VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3 / IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430-0011,-0012
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF CROSSFEED LINES RESULTING IN LOSS OF LEAKAGE OF
PROP INTO ORBITER, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW.
REFERENCES: l) 73A000014, #259-1,-2, 260,-1,-2 2) VS70-431099
3) MC284-0430 4)JSC ii174,11.3 5) VS70-943099,AB, BB 6) JSC
12770 7) JSC 12770 8) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-132
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
231 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
HIGH-POINT BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-2402,-2452
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #327, 328 2) VS70-431099 3) MC276-
0018 4) VST0-943099,43AJ 5) JSC 11174,11.4
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
232 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
HIGH-POINT BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-2402,-2452
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #327, 328 2) VS70-431099 3) MC276-
0018 4) VS70-943099,43AJ 5) JSC ii174,11.4
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-134
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 233 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
HIGH-POINT BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-2402,-2452
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #327, 328 2) VS70-431099 3) MC276-
0018 4) VS70-943099,43AJ 5) JSC 11174,11.4
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 234 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: COUPLING-CROSSFEED DRAIN
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
ABORT
RTLS :
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDWIFUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-2401,-2451
c[P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #381-384 2) VS70-431099 3) MC276-
0018 4) VS70-943099,43AJ 5) JSC ii174,11.4
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-136
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 235 ABORT:
ITEM: COUPLING-CROSSFEED DRAIN
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-2401,-2451
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #381-384 2) VS70-431099
0018 4) VS70-943099,43AJ 5) JSC 11174,11.4
3) MC276-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-137
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
236 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-CROSSFEED DRAIN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CROSSFEED DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORB I T: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWIFUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-2401,-2451
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #381-384 2) VS70-431099
0018 4) VS70-943099,43AJ 5) JSC 11174,11.4
3) MC276-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-138
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
237 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
NTO
FAILURE MODE:
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMHAND
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MMHAND NTO PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL COUPLING LINES. NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
238 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
NTO
FAILURE MODE:
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMHAND
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MMH AND NTO PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
XFEED CONN TO ENG CONN; ENG LINES. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS
OF ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (RESTRICTION IN OTHER
POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL RESULTS IN INABILITY
TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: 1) 73A000014 2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562
5622 5) MB0160-007
4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-140
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 239 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: l/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: l/1
ONORBI T: l/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: 1/l
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW. LOCATED BETWEEN CROSSFEED LINE CONNECTION AND
ENGINE INTERFACE CONNECTION.
REFERENCES: l) 73A000014, #266 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AD,BD 4) 73P550015
3) vsvo-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-141
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 240 ABORT: I/i
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR DEFLECTION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1
ONORBI T: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : i/1
TAL: I/1
AOA: I/1
ATO: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A BELLOWS TO PROVIDE ANGULAR COMPENSATION FOR PROP
LINE MOVEMENTS COULD RESULT IN LINE RUPTURE, LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF
PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. LOCATED
BETWEEN CROSSFEED LINE CONNECTION AND ENGINE INTERFACE
CONNECTION.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #266 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) 73P550015
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-142
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 241 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/1
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOW RESTRICTION IN BELLOWS AT THIS LOCATION RESULTS IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. PROP IN AFFECTED POD
STILL USABLE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (RESTRICTION IN
BELLOWS IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURALAND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LOCATED BETWEEN CROSSFEED LINE
CONNECTION AND ENGINE INTERFACE CONNECTION.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #266 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AD, BD 4) 73P550015
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 242 ABORT:
HDW/_JNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW. LOCATED BETWEEN CROSSFEED LINE CONNECTION AND
ENGINE INTERFACE CONNECTION.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #265 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AD, BD 4) 73P550015
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 243 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR DEFLECTION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A BELLOWS TO PROVIDE ANGULAR DEFLECTION FOR PROP LINE
MOVEMENTS COULD RESULT IN LINE RUPTURE, LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. LOCATED
BETWEEN CROSSFEED LINE CONNECTION AND ENGINE INTERFACE
CONNECTION.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #265 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AD, BD 4) 73P550015
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
244 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GIMBAL BELLOWS
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/l
3/3
2/IR
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550015
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCATED BETWEEN CROSSFEED LINE CONNECTION AND ENGINE INTERFACE
CONNECTION. FLOW RESTRICTION IN BELLOWS AT THIS LOCATION RESULTS
IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE. PROP IN
AFFECTED POD STILL USABLE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE
(RESTRICTION IN BELLOWS IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #265 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AD, BD 4) 73P550015
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-146
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
245 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW. LOCATED ON FUEL LINE BETWEEN CROSSFEED LINE
CONNECTION AND ENGINE INTERFACE CONNECTION.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #263 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AC,BC 4) 73P550003
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-147
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 246 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR DEFLECTION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBI T: i/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550003
CAUSES:" PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BELLOWS TO PROVIDE ANGULAR OR AXIAL COMPENSATION FOR
PROP LINE MOVEMENTS COULD RESULT IN RUPTURE OF LINE, LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW. LOCATED ON FUEL LINE BETWEEN CROSSFEED LINE CONNECTION AND
ENGINE INTERFACE CONNECTION.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #263
943099,43AC, BC 4) 73P550003
2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-148
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
247 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P550003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCATED ON FUEL LINE BETWEEN XFEED LINE CONNECTION AND ENGINE
INTERFACE CONNECTION. FLOW RESTRICTION IN BELLOWS AT THIS
LOCATION RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
ENGINE. PROP IN AFFECTED POD STILL USABLE. WITH FIRST FAILURE,
ONE FAILURE (RESTRICTION IN BELLOWS IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST
FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) 73A000014, #263
943099,43AC, BC 4) 73P550003
2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
248 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE INLET FILTER AND ORIFICE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION PASSAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
ENGINE INLET FILTER AND ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2 / 2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE INTRODUCES CONTAMINATION IN ENGINE LINES WHERE
DAMAGE TO BI-PROP VALVES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE.
WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (INLET FILTER IN OTHER POD) AWAY
FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES.
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES:
431099,SH3
i) JSC ii174,11.3 2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD 3) VS70-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-150
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
249 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE INLET FILTER AND ORIFICE
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
ENGINE INLET FILTER AND ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
WITH FIRST FAILURE AND RESULTING LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE, ONE
FAILURE (INLET FILTER IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ENGINE AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES:
431099, SH3
i) JSC 11174,11.3 2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD 3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-151
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 250 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
I/i
ITEM: BELLOWS-TVC GIMBAL
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) OME ASSEMBLY
5) TVC GIMBAL BELLOWS
6)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
i/1 RTLS : I/1
1/1 TAL: 1/1
I/1 AOA: I/1
I/I ATO: i/i
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP AND RESULTING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW. LOCATED BETWEEN ENGINE INTERFACE CONNECTION AND BI-
PROP VALVES.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-152
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 251 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: BELLOWS-TVC GIMBAL
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR DEFLECTION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) OME ASSEMBLY
5) TVC GIMBAL BELLOWS
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBI T: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BELLOWS TO PROVIDE ANGULAR COMPENSATION FOR ENGINE AND
PROP LINE MOVEMENTS COULD RESULT IN RUPTURE OF LINE, LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW. LOCATED BETWEEN ENGINE INTERFACE CONNECTION AND BIPROP
VALVES.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
252 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BELLOWS-TVC GIMBAL
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
TVC GIMBAL BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTION AT THIS LOCATION RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION
DUE TO LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. PROP IN AFFECTED POD STILL USABLE.
NEXT FAILURE (RESTRICTION IN BELLOWS IN OTHER POD) IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE
DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LOCATED BETWEEN ENGINE
INTFC CONN AND BIPROP VLVS.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-154
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
253 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3403,-3453
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #221, 222 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) MC276-0018, 5) MC621-0059 6) JSC Ii174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-155
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
254 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3403,-3453
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #221, 222 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD,BD 4) MC276-0018, 5) MC621-0059 6) JSC ii174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-156
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 255 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3403,-3453
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #221, 222 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD,BD 4) MC276-0018, 5) MC621-0059 6) JSC ii174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-157
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
256 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, RESTRICTED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) OME ASSEMBLY
5) BIPROP VLV
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHAS E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2 R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181700
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A FAILED CLOSED BIPROP VALVE RESULTING IN LOSS OF ONE
ENGINE, ONE FAILURE (BIPROP VALVE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST
FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ONE ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #456 2) JSC 18958 3) MC621-0009
VST0-943099,43AD, BD 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 11174,11.3 7) JSC
19950 8) 1181700 9) 1181710
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-158
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 257 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) OME ASSEMBLY
5) BIPROP VLV
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181700
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN SAVING OF AFFECTED ENGINE FOR DEORBIT.
WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SERIES VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. CLOSE TANK ISOL VALVES TO SHUTDOWN ENGINE.
ATTEMPTING TO RESTART ENGINE WITH TANK ISOL VALVES RESULTS IN
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROP IN AFFECTED POD. ANY USE OF PROP IN POD
INITIATES FLOW THROUGH AFFECTED ENGINE. POSSIBLE HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW. INABILITY TO STOP DUMP DURING RTLS OR TAL RESULTS
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF SINGLE ENGINE ROLL CONTROL AND ORBITER
MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #456 2) JSC 18958 3) MC621-0009
VS70-943099,43AD, BD 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 11174,11.3 7) JSC
19950 8) 1181700 9) 1181710 I0) FLIGHT RULES 6-6, 6-26
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-159
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 258 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM: VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS MID TRAVEL, PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
OMEASSEMBLY
BIPROP VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBI T: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBI T: 2/1R ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181700
A[1] B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST
FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (BIPROP VALVE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE
DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. SUBSEQUENT LEAK OR
FAILURE TO CLOSE OF SERIES VALVE RESULTS IN HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW, USE OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO SHUTDOWN ENGINE, AND INABILITY
TO USE/DEPLETE PROP IN AFFECTED POD TO AVOID FLOW THROUGH
AFFECTED ENGINE.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #456 2) JSC 18958 3) MC621-0009
VS70-943099,43AD,BD 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC Ii174,11.3 7) JSC
19950 8) 1181700 9) 1181710 i0) FLIGHT RULE 6-3,H
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-160
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 259 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORB I T: 2/ IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181700
A[ I] B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH LEAKAGE PAST ONE BALL VALVE, ONE FAILURE (LEAKAGE PAST
SERIES VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. MIGRATION
INTO ENGINE AND FREEZING OF PROP MAY LEAD TO ENGINE DAMAGE OR
EXPLOSION UPON START ATTEMPT RESULTING IN FIRE HAZARD AND
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO POD COMPONENTS AND VEHICLE STRUCTURE. LEAKAGE
PAST BOTH VALVES ALSO PRESENTS HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #456 2) JSC 18958 3) MC621-0009
VS70-943099,43AD,BD 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC ii174,11.3 7) JSC
19950 8) 1181700 9) 1181710
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 260 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/l
ITEM: VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2 ) AS SEMBLIES
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
OMEASSEMBLY
BIPROP VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181700
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL
DEFECT, WELD FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #456
VS70-943099,43AD, BD 5) JSC 12770
19950 8) 1181700 9) 1181710
2) JSC 18958 3) MC621-0009
6) JSC 11174,11.3 7) JSC
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-162
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 261 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/i
ITEM: VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
FAILURE MODE: DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) OME ASSEMBLY
5) BIPROP VLV
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: I/1
ONORB I T: 2/ 2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181700
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOW INITIAL FUEL AND OX FLOW RATES TO
ENGINE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE. WITH
FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (BIPROP VALVE IN REDUNDANT POD) AWAY
FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES.
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #456
VS70-943099,43AD, BD 5) JSC 12770
19950 8) 1181700 9) 1181710
2) JSC 18958 3) MC621-0009
6) JSC 11174,11.3 7) JSC
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-163
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
262 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE - BIPROPCAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN AT SPECIFIED PSID
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN INABILITY TO RELIEVE OVERPRESSURIZATION,
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO BIPROP VALVES, AND LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE.
WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FUNCTION IN OTHER POD)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS. FIRST FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LEAKAGE OF PROP.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009
943099,43AD,BD
2) JSC 11174,11.3 3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-164
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
263 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
FAILS TO CLOSE, VALVE FAILS TO RESEAT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT OTHER THAN LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
FAILURE OF A NONREDUNDANT ITEM REQUIRED FOR EFFECTS TO BE
MANIFESTED. A FAILED OPEN RELIEF VALVE ALLOWS PROP TO BYPASS
FIRST BIPROP VALVE AND, THEREFORE, RESULTS IN LOSS OF BIPROP
VALVE SERIES REDUNDANCY. FAILURE TO CLOSE OR LEAKAGE OF SERIES
BIPROP VALVE WOULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
(CRIT 2/1R FOR NOMINAL AND ABORTS)
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009
943099,43AD,BD
2) JSC ii174,11.3 3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-165
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
264 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT OTHER THAN LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
FAILURE OF A NON-REDUNDANT ITEM REQUIRED FOR EFFECTS TO BE
MANIFESTED. A LEAKING RELIEF VALVE ALLOWS PROP TO BYPASS FIRST
BIPROP VALVE AND, THEREFORE, RESULTS IN LOSS OF BIPROP VALVE
SERIES REDUNDANCY. FAILURE TO CLOSE OR LEAKAGE OF SERIES
BIPROP VALVE WOULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
(CRIT 2/IR FOR NOMINAL AND ABORTS)
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009
943099,43AD,BD
2) JSC 11174,11.3 3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-166
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
265 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL
DEFECT, WELD FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009
943099,43AD,BD
2) JSC 11174,11.3 3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
266 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NORMAL PSID
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, OPERATES AT LOWER THAN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] sc ] c[ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT IF VALVE OPENS AND CLOSES AT LOWER THAN SPECIFIED PSID.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) JSC 11174,11.3
943099,43AD,BD
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-168
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 267 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST PORT
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3402,-3452
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #231, 234 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) MC276-0018, 5) MC621-0059 6) JSC 11174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 268 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST PORT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3402,-3452
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #231, 234 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) MC276-0018, 5) MC621-0059 6) JSC 11174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-170
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 269 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST PORT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3402,-3452
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: l) 73A000014, #231, 234 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) MC276-0018, 5) MC621-0059 6) JSC 11174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-171
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
270 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
i/1 RTLS : i/1
i/i TAL: i/i
i/i AOA: I/I
i/1 ATO: i/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, WELD
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSIVE HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW. LOCATED BETWEEN BI-PROP VALVES AND ENGINE INLET.
REFERENCES: i) VS70-943099,43AD,BD 2) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-172
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 271 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR DEFLECTION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
LOCATED BETWEEN BI-PROP VALVES AND ENGINE INLET.
REFERENCES: I) VST0-943099,43AD,BD 2) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-173
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
272 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FIRST FAILURE AND RESULTING LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE, ONE
FAILURE (RESTRICTION IN ALIGNMENT BELLOWS IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST
FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LOCATED BETWEEN BI-PROP
VALVES AND ENGINE INLET.
REFERENCES: i) VS70-943099,43AD,BD 2) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-174
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
273 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-0402,-0452
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES:
MC621-0059
11174, ii. 3
i) 73A000014, #232,232A,233,233A 2) VS70-431099
4) MC276-0018 5) VS70-943099,43AD, BD 6) JSC
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-175
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
274 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] CC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-0402,-0452
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES:
MC621-0059
11174,11.3
i) 73A000014,
4) MC276-0018
#232,232A,233,233A 2) VS70-431099
5) VS70-943099,43AD,BD 6) JSC
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-176
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 275 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-0402,-0452
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES:
MC621-0059
11174,11.3
I) 73A000014,
4) MC276-0018
#232,232A,233,233A 2) VS70-431099
5) VS70-943099,43AD, BD 6) JSC
3)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/1R
276 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
NTO
FAILURE MODE:
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMHAND
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
MMH AND NTO PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0059
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BIPROP PRESSURE RELIEF PATH LINE. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN
INABILITY TO RELIEVE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND ALLOWS POSSIBLE
DAMAGE TO BIPROP VALVES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF AFFECTED
ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FUNCTION IN OTHER
POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FIRST FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LEAKAGE OF PROP.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-178
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
277 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3401,-3451
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL, ONE FAILURE (CAP SEAL) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #229, 230 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) MC276-0018, 5) MC621-0059 6) JSC 11174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
278 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3401,-3451
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #229, 230 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) MC276-0018, 5) MC621-0059 6) JSC ii174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-180
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
279 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0018-3401,-3451
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #229, 230 2) VS70-431099 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) MC276-0018, 5) MC621-0059 6) JSC ii174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
280 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BURN THROUGH
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITI CALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: I/1
I/1 TAL: I/1
I/i AOA: i/i
i/1 ATO: i/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181220
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HIGH TEMPERATURE,
COMBUSTION ANOMALIES, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION, FIRE, AND DAMAGE TO SURROUNDING COMPONENTS AND VEHICLE
STRUCTURE.
REFERENCES: 1) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) 1181220 4) JSC
12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-182
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 281 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : l/1
i/1 TAL: l/1
i/1 AOA: l/1
1/1 ATO: 1/l
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181220
CAUSES: DETONATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO MIXING OF
HYPERGOLIC PROPELLANTS WITHIN INJECTOR RESULTING IN EXPLOSION,
FIRE, AND POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO SURROUNDING COMPONENTS AND VEHICLE
STRUCTURE.
REFERENCES:
12770
l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) 1181220 4) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 282 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181220
A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST
FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (RESTRICTION IN ASSEMBY IN OTHER POD) AWAY
FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES.
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES:
12770
i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) 1181220 4) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-184
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 283 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
I/i
ITEM: COMBUSTION CHAMBER
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BURN THROUGH
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HIGH TEMPERATURE,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, COMBUSTION ANOMALIES,
INADEQUATE COOLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION, FIRE, AND DAMAGE TO SURROUNDING COMPONENTS AND VEHICLE
STRUCTURE.
REFERENCES: 1) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) JSC 19950 4) JSC
12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-185
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 284 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: COMBUSTION CHAMBER
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) OME ASSEMBLY
5) COMBUSTION CHAMBER
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION, FIRE, AND DAMAGE TO SURROUNDING COMPONENTS AND VEHICLE
STRUCTURE.
REFERENCES:
12770
I) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) JSC 19950 4) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-186
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 285 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/1
ITEM: NOZZLE EXTENSION
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (BURN THROUGH, FRACTURE,
DEFORMATION, FLANGE LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) OME ASSEMBLY
5) NOZZLE EXTENSION
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 1181900
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, SEAL
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO IMPINGEMENT
OF EXHAUST GASES ONTO ORBITER SURFACES (ARCS HOUSING, ACCESS
PANELS, VERTICAL STABILIZER) RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION,
FIRE, AND/OR VEHICLE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE DURING ENGINE FIRING OR
UPON ENGINE START.
REFERENCES: I) 1181900 2) JSC 18958
VS70-431099,43AE,BE
3) 73A000014, #459 4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-187
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 286 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NOZZLE EXTENSION
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BUCKLING (DURING ASCENT)
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) OME ASSEMBLY
5) NOZZLE EXTENSION
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTO F F: 3/ 2R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181900
CAUSES: TVC FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE DURING ASCENT DETECTABLE THROUGH TVC POSITION SENSORS.
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST
FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (OTHER NOZZLE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 1181900 2) JSC 18958 3) 73A000014, #459
VS70-431099,43AE, BE 5) FLIGHT RULE (TVC)
4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-188
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 287 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 TANK FILL/VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0017-0401
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST SEAL IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL GN2 PRESSURANT
AND LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE
PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #459 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AD,BD 4) MC276-0017 5) MC621-0009
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-189
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 288 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 TANK FILL/VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0017-0401
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: 1) 73A000014, #459 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AD,BD 4) MC276-0017 5) MC621-0009
3) vsvo-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-190
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
289 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 TANK FILL/VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC276-0017-0401
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PROCEDURAL ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014, #459 2) VS70-431099
943099,43AD, BD 4) MC276-0017 5) MC621-0009
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-191
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 290 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, WELD
FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FILL PORT TO FILL VALVE. FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ALL GN2 PRESSURANTS AND LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH
ENGINES. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM
FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT. CRIT 2/1R FOR MANUAL TAL
CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
291 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ]
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FILL PORT TO TANK. NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014 2) VS70-431099
5622 5) MB0160-007
3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
292 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 TANK FILL/VENT VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 12770
3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-194
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
293 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
VALVE-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 TANK FILL/VENT VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, WELD FAILURE,
MATERIAL DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH LOSS OF GN2 IN TANK, REMAINING ENGINE START (IN ACCUMULATOR)
SAVED FOR DEORBIT. NO EFFECT ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF START CAPABILITY
FOR BOTH ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE
FAILURE (ACCUMULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES
FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED
REDUNDANT. CRIT I/i FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) FLIGHT RULE 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
294 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 TANK FILL/VENT VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SEAL FAILURE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF POPPET SEAL IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL GN2 PRESSURE AND
LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES
FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED
REDUNDANT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) FLIGHT RULE 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-196
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 295 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/I
ITEM: TANK-GN2 STORAGE
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 STORAGE TANK
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HIGH PRESSURE, HIGH
TEMPERATURE, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POTENTIAL
SHRAPNEL DAMAGE TO SURROUNDING COMPONENTS AND VEHICLE STRUCTURE.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) JSC 18958 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: ii/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 296 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM: TANK-GN2 STORAGE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 STORAGE TANK
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] SiP] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HIGH PRESSURE, HIGH
TEMPERATURE, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH LOSS OF GN2 TANK, REMAINING ENGINE START (IN ACCUMULATOR)
SAVED FOR DEORBIT. NO EFFECT ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF START CAPABILITY
FOR BOTH ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE
FAILURE (ACCUMULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES
FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED
REDUNDANT. CRIT i/i FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) JSC 18958 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 19950 7) FLIGHT RULE 6-
2O
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-198
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/07/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 297
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC PACK ASSEMBLY HOUSING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
PNEUMATIC PACK ASSEMBLY HOUSING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, SEAL
FAILURES, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. REMAINING ENGINE START (IN
ACCUMULATOR) SAVED FOR DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR
BOTH ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(ACCUMULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ONE ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL
OMS DUMP. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR
UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT. CRIT i/i FOR
MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT. ALL
COMPONENTS ASSEMBLED ON HOUSING ATTACHED WITH AT LEAST ONE SEAL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) JSC 18958 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 19950 7) FLIGHT RULE 6-
20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-199
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
298 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING ASSEMBLY
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
2/2 AOA: 3/3
2/IR ATO: 2/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ENGINE AFTER ACCUMULATOR
DEPLETION DUE TO INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATOR. FAILURE
NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL ENGINE IS LOST. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE
FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. CRIT i/I FOR MANUAL
TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-200
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
299 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT, REMAINING ENGINE START (IN
ACCUMULATOR) SAVED FOR DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS START CAPABILITY FOR
BOTH ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(ACCUMULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-
SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED
REDUNDANT. CRIT 1/1 FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: 1) JSC 11174,11.3 2) VST0-943099,43AD,BD 3) JSC
19950 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 12770 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-5,D, 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
300 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT, REGULATOR LOCKS UP AND STOPS FLOW.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF ALL GN2 AND LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES.
ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES
AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL
CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174,11.3 2) VS70-943099,43AD,BD
19950 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 12770
3) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-202
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
301 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SEAL FAILURE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT, REGULATOR LOCKS UP AND STOPS FLOW.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF ALL GN2 AND LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES.
ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES
AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT. CRIT 2/1R FOR MANUAL TAL
CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174,11.3 2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
19950 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 12770
3) Jsc
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-203
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
302 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, WELD FAILURE,
MATERIAL DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH LOSS OF GN2 IN TANK, REMAINING ENGINE START (IN ACCUMULATOR)
SAVED FOR DEORBIT. NO EFFECT ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF START CAPABILITY
FOR BOTH ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE
FAILURE (ACCUMULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES
FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED
REDUNDANT. CRIT i/I FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174,11.3 2) VS70-943099,43AD,BD 3) JSC
19950 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-204
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
303 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/1R
2/2 AOA: 3/3
2/IR ATO: 2/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN VALVE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER
POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATOR AND LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH
ENGINES. FAILURE UNDETECTABLE UNTIL ENGINE LOST. CRIT i/i FOR
MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: I) JSC Ill74,11.3 2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD 3) JSC
19950 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 12770 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-5,D, 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-205
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/07/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
DELAYED OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL DEFECT, IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. ACCUMULATOR CAN BE REPRESSURIZED WHEN VALVE OPENS.
WORST CASE OF FAILURE MODE IS "FAILS TO OPEN".
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174,11.3 2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD 3) JSC
19950 4) JSC 18958 5) JSC 12770 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-5,D, 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-206
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
305 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE TO OPEN OF REGULATOR, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN
OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATORS AND LOSS OF START
CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES. FAILURE UNDETECTABLE UNTIL ENGINE
LOST. CRIT i/I FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5)JSC 19950 6) JSC 12770 7) FLIGHT RULES 6-
5.B, 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-207
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 306 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REGULATE (FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
LOCKUP, HIGH OUTPUT, INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT THROUGH
RELIEF VALVE WOULD RESULT IN SAVING OF REMAINING ENGINE START (IN
ACCUMULATOR) FOR DEORBIT BURN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES OR COMPONENTS RESULTING IN
LOSS OF ENGINES. WITH FAILURE OF REG DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE
FAILURE (RELIEF VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES OR COMPONENTS
RESULTING IN LOSS OF ENGINE. CRIT i/i FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY
OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 19950 6) JSC 12770 7) FLIGHT RULE 6-
20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-208
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
307 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, WELD FAILURE,
MATERIAL DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. REMAINING ENGINE START (IN
ACCUMULATOR) SAVED FOR DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR
BOTH ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(ACCUMULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ONE ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL
OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES
FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED
REDUNDANT. CRIT I/i FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) FLIGHT RULE 6-20
3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
308 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, REGULATES AT LOW PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B[P] c[P]
CAUSES : MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE
RESTART CAPABILITY. WITH LOSS OF ONE ENGINE DUE TO FAILURE OF
REGULATOR, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES.
SUBSEQUENT REGULATOR OUTPUT PRESSURE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
ENGINE USAGE. CRIT 1/1 FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5)JSC 19950 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-210
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 309 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN REGULATOR, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN
OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATORS AND LOSS OF START
CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES. FAILURE UNDETECTABLE UNTIL ENGINE
LOST. CRIT i/i FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 4) FLIGHT RULES 6-5,B, 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-211
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
310 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC.Ti[RAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, WELD
FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REG TEST PORT LINE. FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL
GN2 PRESSURANTS AND LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES.
WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (ACCUMULATOR)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMPRESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER
MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE
PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.
CRIT i/I FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MBO160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-212
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 311 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
] B C ] c [ ]
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REG TEST PORT LINE. NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-213
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
312 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING, GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT COUPLING
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0009
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, PROCEDURAL ERROR, MISHANDLING, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST SEAL IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL GN2 PRESSURANT
AND LOSS OF BOTH ENGINGES. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE
PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.
REFERENCES: I) VS70-431099,SH3
4) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
2) ME276-0032 3) JSC Ii174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-214
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
313 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING, GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: l) VS70-431099,SH3
4) VS70-943099,43AD,BD
2) ME276-0032 3) JSC 11174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
314 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING, GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0009
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: i) VS70-431099,SH3
4) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
2) ME276-0032 3) JSC 11174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-216
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 315 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO RELIEVE PRESSURE,
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. REGULATOR MUST FAIL HIGH FOR RELIEF
VALVE FAILURE EFFECTS TO BE MANIFESTED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES.
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF SUBSYSTEM COULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE RUPTURE
OF LINES CAUSING LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT AND LOSS OF ENGINE START
CAPABILITY. WITH FAILURE OF RELIEF VALVE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE
FAILURE (REGULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF GN2 LINES, LOSS OF ENGINE START
CAPABILITY, AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009
4) JSC Ill74,11.3 5) JSC 19950
3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-217
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 316 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO RESEAT (AFTER REG
FAILURE), FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. REGULATOR MUST FAIL FOR EFFECTS OF
FAILED OPEN RELIEF VALVE TO BE MANIFESTED. REMAINING START (IN
ACCUMULATOR) SAVED FOR DEORBIT BURN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT IN
TANKS AND ACCUMULATORS, AND LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH
ENGINES. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM
FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL
CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC ii174,11.3 5) JSC 19950 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-4,B, 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-218
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. REMAINING ENGINE START (IN
ACCUMULATOR) SAVED FOR DEORBIT BURN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT IN
TANKS AND ACCUMULATORS AND LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH
ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(ACCUMULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP. CRIT i/I FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR
UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 19950 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-4,B, 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
318 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, OPENS AT LOW PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. REMAINING ENGINE START (IN
ACCUMULATOR) SAVED FOR DEORBIT BURN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT IN
TANKS AND ACCUMULATORS AND LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH
ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(ACCUMULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP. CRIT i/i FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION FOR
UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 19950 6) FLIGHT RULES 6-4,B, 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-220
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
319 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE-GN2
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 CHECK VALVE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE TO OPEN OF CHECK VALVE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN
OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
BOTH ENGINES. INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATOR RESULTS
IN LOSS OF ENGINE. FAILURE NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL ENGINE LOST.
CRIT I/1 FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099-43AD, BD
4) JSC ii174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 19950 7) FLIGHT RULES 6-
5,C, 6-20
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 320 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE-GN2
FAILS TO CLOSE, VALVE FAILS TO RESEAT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 CHECK VALVE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ACCUMULATOR FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION
AGAINST LEAK UPSTREAM OF CHECK VALVE. WITH CHECK VALVE FAILED
OPEN, A SUBSEQUENT SINGLE LEAK RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED
ENGINE. FAILURE NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OCCURS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL,
ONE FAILURE, (GN2 LEAK) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009
11174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 19950
3) VS70-943099 4) Jsc
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-222
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
321 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE-GN2
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 CHECK VALVE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SEAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ACCUMULATOR FAIL-SAFE PROTECTION
AGAINST LEAK UPSTREAM OF CHECK VALVE. WITH CHECK VALVE FAILED
OPEN, A SUBSEQUENT SINGLE LEAK RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED
ENGINE. FAILURE NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OCCURS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL,
ONE FAILURE, (GN2 LEAK) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009
11174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 19950
3) VS70-943099 4) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-223
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 322 ABORT:
ITEM: GN2 ACCUMULATOR
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/1
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE, HIGH TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POTENTIAL
SHRAPNEL DAMAGE TO SURROUNDING COMPONENTS, AND VEHICLE STRUCTURE,
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC Ii174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-224
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
323 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 ACCUMULATOR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, WELD FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE, HIGH TEMPERATURE,
SEAL FAILURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST
FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (ACCUMULATOR IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES.
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) JSC 12770 6) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-225
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
324 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, WELD
FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHECK VALVE TO ENG CONTROL VALVES AND PURGE VALVE ASSY. FIRST
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE,
ONE FAULIRE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE
DURING RTLS OR TAL RESULTS IN LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP LEADING TO POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-226
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
325 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 2R TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ACCUMULATOR TO ENG CONTROL VALVES. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS
OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME
FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURALAND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-227
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
326 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 1/1
3/2R TAL: I/1
2/2 AOA: 3/3
2/1R ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST
FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (CONTROL VALVE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST
FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABIITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL
OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 2) VS70-943099,43AD,BD
4) 1181700 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-228
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
327 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN SAVING OF AFFECTED ENGINE FOR DEORBIT.
WITH FAILURE TO CLOSE OF ONE ENGINE CONTROL VALVE, ONE FAILURE
(FAILURE TO CLOSE OF REDUNDANT VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. CLOSE TANK ISOL VALVES TO SHUTDOWN ENGINE.
ATTEMPTING TO RESTART ENGINE WITH PROP TANK ISOLATION VALVES
COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PORP IN AFFECTED POD. ANY USE OF PROP IN AFFECTED
POD INITIATES FLOW THROUGH AFFECTED ENGINE. POSSIBLE HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) 1181700 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) FLIGHT RULE 6-26
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-229
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 328 ABORT:
ITEM: VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/l
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE (WITH VALVE IN EITHER OPENED OR CLOSED POSITION)
RESULTS IN LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT THROUGH VENT PORT AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN ACTUATOR OPEN POSITION RESULTING IN LOSS OF
AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE
IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL RESULTS IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) I181700 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-230
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
329 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 2/ 2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, WELD FAILURE,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GN2 PRESSLq%ANT AND INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN ACTUATOR OPEN POSITION RESULTING IN LOSS OF AFFECTED
ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER
POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL RESULTS IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009
4) i181700 5) JSC 11174,11.3
2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
330 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBI T: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST
FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (CONTROL VALVE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST
FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) 1181700 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770 7) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-232
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 331 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
i/I
ITEM: VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: l/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOW INITIAL FUEL AND OXID FLOW RATES TO
ENGINE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE. WITH
FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (VALVE IN REDUNDANT POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST
FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009
4) i181700 5) JSC 11174,11.3
3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-233
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 332 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/l
ITEM: ORIFICE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE INLET
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
"1)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL VLV INLET ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH RESTRICTED FLOW INTO ONE ENGINE CONTROL VALVE AND RESULTING
LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE, ONE FAILURE (LOSS OF VALVE IN OTHER POD)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF START
CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURALAND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) MC621-0009 2) JSC ii174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-234
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 333 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: ORIFICE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW, INABILITY TO VENT GN2 TO AMBIENT.
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL VLV VENT ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO CLOSE BI-PROP
VALVES. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (ENGINE CONTROL VALVE IN
SAME POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CLOSE ALL BI-PROP VALVES IN AFFECTED POD. CLOSE
TANK ISOL VALVES TO SHUTDOWN ENGINES. ATTEMPTING TO RESTART
ENGINES WITH PROP TANK ISOL VALVES COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE TO AND
LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP IN AFFECTED
POD. ANY USE OF PROP IN AFFECTED POD INITIATES FLOW THROUGH
ENGINE. POSSIBLE HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) JSC 11174,11.3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-235
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
334 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL VLV VENT CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO CLOSE BI-PROP
VALVES. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (ENGINE CONTROL VALVE IN
SAME POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CLOSE ALL BI-PROP VALVES IN AFFECTED POD. CLOSE
TANK ISOL VALVES TO SHUTDOWN ENGINES. ATTEMPTING TO RESTART
ENGINES WITH PROP TANK ISOL VALVES COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE TO AND
LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP IN AFFECTED
POD. ANY USE OF PROP IN AFFECTED POD INITIATES FLOW THROUGH
ENGINE. POSSIBLE HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) JSC 11174,11.3 3) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-236
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/07/87
SUBS YSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 335
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL VLV VENT CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE MAY ALLOW CONTAMINATION TO MIGRATE INTO VALVE AND
ACTUATOR RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE
IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY
TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) JSC 11174,11.3 3) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 336 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL VLV VENT CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SEAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE MAY ALLOW CONTAMINATION TO MIGRATE INTO VALVE AND
ACTUATOR RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE
IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY
TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) MC621-0009 2) JSC 11174,11.3 3) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-238
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 337 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
i/i
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO OPERATE, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/l
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 1181710
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE TO OPERATE OF ONE ACTUATOR AND RESULTING LOSS OF
AFFECTED ENGINE, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPERATE OF ACTUATOR IN
OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) 1181710 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-239
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
338 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
FAILS TO CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER: 1181710
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN SAVING OF ENGINE FOR DEORBIT BURN. WITH
FAILURE TO CLOSE OF ONE ACTUATOR, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO CLOSE
OF REDUNDANT ACTUATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE ALL BI-PROP VALVES IN AFFECTED POD.
CLOSE TANK ISOL VALVES TO SHUT DOWN ENGINE. ATTEMPTING TO
RESTART ENGINE WITH TANK ISOL VALVES COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE TO
AND LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP IN
AFFECTED POD. ANY USE OF PROP IN AFFECTED POD INITIATES FLOW
THROUGH ENGINE. POSSIBLE HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD,BD
4) i181710 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770 7) FLIGHT RULES 6-26
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-240
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 339 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS MIDTRAVEL, PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FAILURE TO OPERATE OF ONE ACTUATOR AND RESULTING LOSS OF
AFFECTED ENGINE, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPERATE OF ACTUATOR IN
OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES:
4) 1181710
26, 6-3,H
i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770 7) FLIGHT RULES 6-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
340 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, PISTON SEAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST PISTON SEAL IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. LEAKAGE OF GN2 AROUND PISTON INTO ACTUATOR CAVITY WILL
RESULT IN CLOSING OF BI-PROP VALVES WHEN GN2 PRESSURE IN CAVITY
PLUS SPRING FORCE OVERCOME PISTON FACE GN2 PRESSURE. WITH
FAILURE OF FIRST SEAL DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (REDUNDANT
SEAL) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) 1181710 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770 7) FLIGHT RULE 6-26
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-242
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
341 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HIGH PRESSURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
SHRAPNEL DAMAGE TO SURROUNDING POD COMPONENTS AND VEHICLE
STRUCTURE, AND FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) 1181710 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-243
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 342 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (PROPELLANT)
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, HIGH PRESSURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL SEALS IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
AND LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD
TO GROUND CREW. LEAK PATH IS BY BI-PROP BALL VALVE SEALS AND
ACTUATOR SHAFT SEALS, INTO ACTUATOR CAVITY, AND OUT ACTUATOR VENT
PORT. FAILURE OF ACTUATOR CAVITY SEPARATION SEALS COULD ALLOW
MIXING OF HYPERGOLIC PROPELLANTS IN ACTUATOR AFTER FAILURE OF
OTHER SEALS.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) 1181710 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-244
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 343 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/1
ITEM: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (GN2)
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, WELD FAILURE,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE DUE TO INABILITY
TO OPEN ONE SET OF BI-PROP VALVES. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE
FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) 1181710 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) JSC 12770 7) FLIGHT RULE 6-26
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 344 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, IMPROPER INPUT, BINDING,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOW INITIAL FUEL AND OXID FLOW RATES TO
ENGINE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE. WITH
FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (ACTUATOR IN REDUNDANT POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST
FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) i181710 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6) JSC 12770 7) FLIGHT RULE 6-26
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-246
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 345 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: COUPLING, VENT PORT ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VALVE ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL VENT PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. ACTUATOR SHAFT SEALS EXPOSED TO AMBIENT.
REFERENCES: I) 1181700
943099,43AD,BD
2) VS70-431099,SH.3 3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-247
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 346 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUPLING, VENT PORT ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL
FAILS TO COUPLE, FAILS TO UNCOUPLE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VALVE ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL VENT PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: l) I181700 2) VS70-431099,SH. 3
943099,43AD,BD
3) vs7o-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-248
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 347 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: COUPLING, VENT PORT ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
BIPROP VALVE ACTUATOR SHAFT SEAL VENT PORT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL ERROR,
MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY ONLY.
REFERENCES: l) I181700
943099,43AD,BD
2) VS70-431099,SH.3 3) vsvo-
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-249
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 348 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO OPERATE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, INADEQUATE LUBRICATION,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECTS WITH FAILURE WHILE BI-PROPS CLOSED. WITH
FAILURE TO OPERATE OF ONE ASSEMBLY AND RESULTING LOSS OF AFFECTED
ENGINE, ONE FAILURE (ASSEMBLY IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE
DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS
DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174,11.3 2) MC621-0009
JSC 18958 5) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
3)JSC 12770 4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-250
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
349 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN INABILITY TO CONTROL BI-PROP VALVE.
WORST CASE EFFECTS WITH FAILURE WHILE BI-PROP VALVES CLOSED OR IN
MID-TRAVEL. WITH FAILURE OF ONE GEAR/SHAFT ASSEMBLY AND LOSS OF
AFFECTED ENGINE, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE OF GEAR/SHAFT ASSEMBLY IN
EITHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174,11.3 2) MC621-0009
JSC 18958 5) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
3)JSC 12770 4)
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
350 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PURGE VALVE ASSY LEG. FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. AFFECTED
ENGINE LOST FOR i0 MIN AFTER SHUTDOWN TO ALLOW FOR SUBLIMATION OF
FROZEN FUEL IN LINES. OTHER ENGINE AVAILABLE IF BURN REQUIRED
WITHIN l0 MIN PERIOD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES FOR i0 MINUTES.
CRIT I/1 FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: l) 73A000014
5622 5) MB0160-007
2) VS70-431099 3) AMS 5562 4) SAE
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-252
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
351 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PURGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 1186775
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. AFFECTED ENGINE LOST FOR I0 MINUTES
AFTER SHUTDOWN TO ALLOW FOR SUBLIMATION OF FROZEN PROP IN ENGINE
LINES. OTHER ENGINE AVAILABLE IF BURN REQUIRED WITHIN l0
MINUTES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES FOR i0 MINUTES AFTER
BURNS. CRIT 1/l FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE
REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009,P.71 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-431099,SH3
12770 7) JSC19950 8) TM-ES86009-43
6)JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-253
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 352 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PURGE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1186775
A [ 1] B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL GN2 PRESSURANT, INABILITY
TO MAINTAIN OPEN BI-PROP VALVES, AND LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. WITH
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE OF SERIES
VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT IN ONE POD, LOSS OF AFFECTED
ENGINE, AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009,P.71 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) JSC Ii174,11.3 5) VS70-431099,SH3 6)JSC
12770 7) JSC19950 8) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-254
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 353 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PURGE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2 R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1186775
A[ I] B [F] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL DEFECT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST VALVE SEAL IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL GN2
PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO MAINTAIN OPEN BI-PROP VALVES, AND
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS
OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (SERIES VALVE SEAL) AWAY FROM LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT IN ONE POD, LOSS OF
AFFECTED ENGINE, AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL
OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009,P.71 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-431099,SH3
12770 7) JSC19950 8) TM-ES86009-43
6)JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 354 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PURGE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (DOWNSTREAM
OF FIRST VALVE)
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 1186775
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURES, MATERIAL
DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN POSSIBLE INADEQUATE PURGE. SUCCESS OF
PURGE DETECTABLE THROUGH PC AND INJECTOR TEMP READINGS.
AFFECTED ENGINE LOST FOR 10 MIN AFTER EACH BURN TO ALLOW FOR
SUBLIMATION OF FROZEN FUEL IN ENGINE LINES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES DUE TO LOSS
OF ENGINES FOR i0 MIN AFTER BURNS. CRIT 1/1 FOR MANUAL TAL
CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009,P.71 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-431099,SH3 6) JSC
12770 7) JSC19950 8) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-256
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
355 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE-GN2 PURGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1186775
A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS LOSS OF PURGE. SUCCESS OF PURGE DETECTABLE
THROUGH PC AND INJECTOR TEMP READINGS. AFFECTED ENGINE LOST FOR
i0 MIN AFTER EACH USE TO ALLOW FOR SUBLIMATION OF FROZEN PROP IN
ENGINE LINES. OTHER ENGINE AVAILABLE IF BURN REQUIRED WITHIN i0
MIN PERIOD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES DUE TO LOSS OF EACH ENGINE FOR lO MIN AFTER EACH BURN.
CRIT I/i FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: l) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009,P.71 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) JSC ii174,11.3 5) VS70-431099,SH3
12770 7) JSC19950 8) TM-ES86009-43
6)JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-257
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 356 ABORT:
ITEM: VALVE-GN2 PURGE
FAILURE MODE: DELAYED OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
312R
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1186775
A[ i] B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, IMPROPER INPUT, BINDING, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF PURGE CAPABILITY. SUCCESS OF
PURGE DETECTABLE THROUGH PC AND INJECTOR TEMPERATURE READINGS.
AFFECTED ENGINE LOST FOR i0 MINUTES AFTER SHUTDOWN TO ALLOW FOR
SUBLIMATION OF FROZEN PROP IN ENGINE LINES. OTHER ENGINE
AVAILABLE IF BURN REQUIRED WITHIN i0 MINUTES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES DUE TO LOSS OF
ENGINES FOR I0 MINUTES AFTER BURNS. CRIT I/i FOR MANUAL TAL
CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 18958 2) MC621-O009,P.71 3) VS70-
943099,43AD, BD 4) JSC 11174,11.3 5) VS70-431099,SH3 6)JSC
12770 7) JSC19950 8) TM-ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-258
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
357 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE-GN2 PURGE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BINDING,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. AFFECTED ENGINE LOST FOR i0 MIN
AFTER SHUTDOWN TO ALLOW FOR SUBLIMATION OF FROZEN FUEL IN ENGINE
LINES. OTHER ENGINE AVAILABLE IF BURN REQUIRED WITHIN i0 MIN
PERIOD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINES FOR i0 MIN AFTER BURNS. CRIT
1/l FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) VS70-431099,SH3 5) JSC 11174,11.3 6)JSC 12770 7) TM-
ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-259
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
358 ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE-GN2 PURGE
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PURGE CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BINDING,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE UNDETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT. FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT.
FUEL WILL FLOW TO DOWNSTREAM PURGE VALVE DURING ENGINE BURN, BUT
WILL BE FORCED OUT BY NOMINALLY PERFORMED PURGE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS
OF BOTH ENGINES. PASSAGE OF FUEL INTO PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF SUBSYSTEM AND ENGINE.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) VS70-431099,SH3 5) JSC ii174,11.3 6)JSC 12770 7) TM-
ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-260
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
359 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/Ia
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE-GN2 PURGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PURGE CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ I] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT, CONTAMINATION,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE UNDETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT. FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT.
FUEL WILL FLOW TO DOWNSTREAM PURGE VALVE DURING ENGINE BURN, BUT
WILL BE FORCED OUT BY NOMINALLY PERFORMED PURGE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS
OF BOTH ENGINES. PASSAGE OF FUEL INTO PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF SUBSYSTEM AND ENGINE.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099,43AD, BD
4) VS70-431099,SH3 5) JSC Ii174,11.3 6)JSC 12770 7) TM-
ES86009-43
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-261
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 360 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: ORIFICE-GN2 PURGE
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 PURGE ORIFICE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. AFFECTED ENGINE LOST FOR i0 MIN
AFTER SHUTDOWN TO ALLOW FOR SUBLIMATION OF FROZEN FUEL IN ENGINE
LINES. OTHER ENGINE AVAILABLE IF BURN REQUIRED WITHIN i0 MIN
PERIOD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINES FOR i0 MINUTES AFTER BURNS.
CRIT I/I FOR MANUAL TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) JSC 11174,11.3
4) VS70-943099, 43AD, BD 5) TM-ESB6009-43
3) VS70-431099,SH3
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
361 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PURGE VALVES TEST PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 PURGE VALVES TEST PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL
DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN POSSIBLE INADEQUATE PURGE. SUCCESS OF
PURGE DETECTABLE THROUGH PC AND INJECTOR TEMP READINGS.
AFFECTED ENGINE LOST FOR I0 MIN AFTER EACH BURN TO ALLOW FOR
SUBLIMATION OF FROZEN FUEL IN ENGINE LINES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES DUE TO LOSS OF
ENGINES FOR i0 MIN AFTER BURNS. CRIT i/i FOR MANUAL TAL
CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: I) VS70-431099,SH3
11174,11.3 4) TM-ES86009-43
2) VS70-943099,43AD, BD 3) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-263
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
362 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GIMBAL RING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) GIMBALRING
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUN CH: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 1/1
TAL: I/1
AOA: i/1
ATO: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO EXCESSIVE
MOVEMENT OF ENGINE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF CONNECTING
PROP LINES ALLOWING LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES:
18958
I) MC621-0009 2) MC621-0059 3) JSC 12770 4) JSC
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-264
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
363 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BEARING-GIMBAL RING
FAILS TO FUNCTION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) GIMBAL RING BEARING
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, INADEQUATE LUBRICATION,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF ENGINE DUE TO LOSS OF ENGINE
CONTROL. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (GIMBAL BEARING IN
OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ORBITER CONTROL DURING OMS ENGINE FIRING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF
BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT i/i FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) JSC 12770 3) JSC 18958
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-265
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 364 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
EXCESSIVE MOVEMENT OF ENGINE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
CONNECTING PROP LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) MC621-0059, P.118 3) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-266
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
365 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
MOTOR-GIMBAL DRIVE
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO OPERATE
C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) ACTUATOR
6) GIMBAL DRIVE MOTOR
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[1] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, BINDING, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST CHANNEL MOTOR IS NO EFFECT; SWITCH TO REDUNDANT
CHANNEL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE
CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS
DUMP DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-267
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 366 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MOTOR-GIMBAL DRIVE
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION (DELAYED OPERATION, SLOW
RESPONSE, INADVERTENT/PREMATURE OPERATION, FAILS TO STOP)
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) ACTUATOR
6) GIMBAL DRIVE MOTOR
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: IMPROPER INPUT, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BINDING, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MATERIAL
DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST CHANNEL MOTOR IS NO EFFECT; SWITCH TO REDUNDANT
CHANNEL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE
CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/1R FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS
DUMP DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-268
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 367 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPERATE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING BETWEEN
ACME SCREW AND NUT TUBE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) ACTUATOR
6) ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN INABILITY TO ROTATE ACME SCREW OR NUT
TUBE AND, THEREFORE, LOSS OF ACTUATOR. WITH FIRST FAILURE AND
RESULTING LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN
OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT i/i FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-269
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 368 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) ACTUATOR
6) ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC CONTROL OF ENGINE AND,
THEREFORE, LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. FIRST FAILURE MAY ALSO
RESULT IN LOSS OF ENGINE RESTRAINT ALLOWING INADVERTENT FULL
RANGE DEFLECTIONS OF ENGINE WITHIN GIMBALRING CONSTRAINTS
(DETECTABLE THROUGH ACTUATOR LVDTS). WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE
FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR
VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE. CRIT i/i FOR MANUAL TAL POST-
MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-270
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
369 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REDUCTION GEAR
FAILS TO OPERATE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) ACTUATOR
6) REDUCTION GEAR
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, INADEQUATE
LUBRICATION, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT; SWITCH TO REDUNDANT CHANNEL. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161 3) JSC 11174,9.13
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
370 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REDUCTION GEAR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) ACTUATOR
6) REDUCTION GEAR
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT; SWITCH TO REDUNDANT CHANNEL. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161 3) JSC 11174,9.13
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-272
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 371 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: ANTIBACK DEVICE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ROTATE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) ACTUATOR
6) ANTIBACK DEVICE
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, INADEQUATE
LUBRICATION, MATERICAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT; SWITCH TO REDUNDANT CHANNEL. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-273
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
372 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANTIBACK DEVICE
FAILS TO STOP ROTATION OF UNUSED CHANNEL
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR
ANTIBACK DEVICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT; SWITCH TO REDUNDANT CHANNEL. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
4) JSC 12770
i) MC621-0009
5) JSC 18958
2) 621-0009-2161
6) JSC 19950
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-274
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 373 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: ANTIBACK DEVICE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) ACTUATOR
6) ANTIBACK DEVICE
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 2/ 2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, LOSS OF
GEAR MESHING, STRIPPING, TOOTH FRACTURES, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OR FRACTURE OF ONE ANTIBACK DEVICE SUCH THAT
DEVICE CAN NEITHER TRANSMIT MOTOR TORQUE FOR ACTIVE CHANNEL
OPERATION OR STOP ROTATION OF UNUSED CHANNEL (LOSS OF GEAR
MESHING, TOOTH FRACTURES, STRIPPING) RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC
CONTROL OF ENGINE AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH
FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS
USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE. CRIT i/i
FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161 3) JSC 11174,9.13
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-275
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 374 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BEARING-GIMBAL THRUST DRIVE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVCASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR
GIMBAL DRIVE THRUST BEARING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES POSSIBLE JAMMING OF CHANNEL; SWITCH TO
SECONDARY CHANNEL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING
AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR
VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-276
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 375 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BEARING-GIMBAL THRUST DRIVE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR
GIMBAL DRIVE THRUST BEARING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, INADEQUATE LUBRICATION,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT; SWITCH TO SECONDARY CHANNEL. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO ONS DUMP DUE TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
376 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BEARING-SPHERICAL ROD END
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR
SPHERICAL ROD END BEARING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, INADEQUATE LUBRICATION,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO MOVE ENGINE AND
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE
FAILURE (BEARING IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING
AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR
VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE. CRIT 1/1 FOR MANUAL TAL POST-
MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) MC621-0059, P.II8 5) JSC 12770
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-278
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
377 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BEARING-SPHERICAL ROD END
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR
SPHERICAL ROD END BEARING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO MOVE ENGINE AND
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE
FAILURE (BEARING IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING
AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR
VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE. CRIT i/I FOR MANUAL TAL
POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) MC621-0059, P.118 5) JSC 12770
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-279
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
378 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MECHANICAL STOP-SNUBBER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR
SNUBBER, MECHANICAL STOP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/ 2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBI T: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF ACTUATOR POSITION ADJUSTMENT
OR POSSIBLE JAMMING OF ACTUATOR AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF TVC FOR
AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE AND RESULTING LOSS OF
AFFECTED ENGINE, ONE FAILURE (SNUBBER IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL
DURING ENGINE FIRING AND LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE
REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE. CRIT I/I FOR
MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) MC621-0059, P.II8 5) JSC 12770
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-280
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 379 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BEARING-NUT TUBE/OUTPUT SHAFT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR
NUT TUBE/OUTPUT SHAFT BEARING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, INADEQUATE LUBRICATION,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF SECONDARY CHANNEL DUE TO
INABILITY OF NUT TUBE TO ROTATE AROUND STATIONARY INNER OUTPUT
SHAFT; SWITCH TO PRIMARY CHANNEL (NUT TUBE DOES NOT ROTATE).
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS
OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) MC621-0059, P. II8 5) JSC 12770
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
380 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BEARING-NUT TUBE/OUTPUT SHAFT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR
NUT TUBE/OUTPUT SHAFT BEARING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF SECONDARY CHANNEL DUE TO
INABILITY OF NUT TUBE TO ROTATE AROUND STATIONARY INNER OUTPUT
SHAFT; SWITCH TO PRIMARY CHANNEL (NUT TUBE DOES NOT ROTATE).
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS
OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP DUE TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) MC621-0059, P.II8 5) JSC 12770
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-282
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 381 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: OUTPUT SHAFT
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE, DISATTACHMENT OF
ACTUATOR TO ENGINE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2) ASSEMBLIES
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) TVC ASSEMBLY
5) ACTUATOR
6) OUTPUT SHAFT
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BE ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING INSERTION
BURN OR ABORT DUMP. STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF SHAFT MAY ALLOW
MOVEMENT (>1.5 DEG) OF NOZZLE INTO MAX Q FLOWSTREAMWHERE
BUCKLING COULD OCCUR. FAILURE MAY NOT CAUSE DEFLECTION OF
ACTUATOR ARM AND, THEREFORE, MAY NOT BE DETECTED BY ACTUATOR
LVDT. SUBSEQUENT FIRING OF ENGINE WITH UNDETECTED DAMAGE MAY
CAUSE POD/VEHICLE DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THROAT/NOZZLE BURN
THROUGH.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161 3) JSC 11174,9.13
4) MC621-0059, P.II8 5) JSC 12770 6) FLIGHT RULE 6-57 7) JSC
18958
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-283
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 382 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GIMBAL ACTUATOR CONTROLLER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HARDWARE COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
GIMBAL ACTUATOR CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT POWER, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST CHANNEL IS NO EFFECT; SWITCH TO REDUNDANT
CHANNEL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE
CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/1R FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS
DUMP DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161 3) JSC 11174,9.13
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-284
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/07/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 383
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GIMBAL ACTUATOR CONTROLLER
ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT, FAILS TO STOP
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
GIMBAL ACTUATOR CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES:
DEFECT
ELECTRICAL FAILURE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, MANUFACTURING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF FIRST CHANNEL IS NO EFFECT; SWITCH TO REDUNDANT
CHANNEL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF ORBITER CONTROL DURING ENGINE FIRING AND
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE
CONTROL MAY BE EXCESSIVE. CRIT 2/IR FOR MANUAL TAL POST-MECO OMS
DUMP DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) 621-0009-2161
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958 6) JSC 19950
3) JSC 11174,9.13
REPORT DATE 02/05/87 C-285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 384 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI31RPC37, 35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN HE ISOL A VALVE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED USING SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE THE
SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-286
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 385 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA l; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A131RPC37, 35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN HE ISOLA VALVE FAILED OPEN, NO EFFECT
ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
PROP TANKS OR LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GND
CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-287
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 386 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC35; 55V76AI32RPC42
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC VALVE HE ISOL A CLOSE CMD. VALVE
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED
RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-288
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 387 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76A133RPC35; 55V76A132RPC42
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN HE ISOLA VALVE FAILED OPEN, NO EFFECT
ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
PROP TANKS OR LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GND
CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-289
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 388 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
55V76AI32RPC37, 56V76AI33RPC30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN HE ISOL B VALVE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED USING SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE THE
SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-290
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 389
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32RPC37, 56V76AI33RPC30
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN HE ISOLVALVE B FAILED OPEN, NO EFFECT
ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
PROP TANKS OR LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GND
CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-291
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 390 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33RPC32, 55V76AI32RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC HE ISOL B VALVE CLOSE CMD. VALVE
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
THE EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME AS HE ISOL B VALVE FAILED CLOSE
RESULTING IN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-292
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 391 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33RPC32, 55V76AI32RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN HE ISOLVALVE B FAILED OPEN, NO EFFECT
ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
PROP TANKS OR LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GND
CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-293
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 392 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1 VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPC36; 131RPC34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE i. VALVE CAN STILL
BE FULLY OPERATED BY CREW SWITCH A OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVE FAILED CLOSE RESULTING IN AN
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-294
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 393 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1 VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPC36; 131RPC34
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN VAPOR ISOL 1 VALVE FAILED OPEN, NO
EFFECT ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (IN ANY PHASE) IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO MIXING OF PROP OR PROP
VAPORS IN HELIUM LINES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION AND
RUPTURE OF LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-295
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 394
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1 VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI35RPC34; 132RPC41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY SELECT VAPOR ISOL VALVE 1 OPEN.
VALVE IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL BY GPC CMD. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVE FAILING CLOSED
RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-296
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1112187
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 395
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1 VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORB I T:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76A133RPC34; 132RPC41
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN VAPOR ISOL 1 VALVE FAILED OPEN, NO
EFFECT ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (IN ANY PHASE) IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO MIXING OF PROP OR PROP
VAPORS IN HELIUM LINES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION AND
RUPTURE OF LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-297
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 396 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER"
FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 2 VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32RPC38; 133RPC31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE i. VALVE CAN STILL
BE FULLY OPERATED BY CREW SWITCH A OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVES FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-298
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12 / 87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 397
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER"
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 2 VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32RPC38; 133RPC31
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN VAPOR ISOL 2 VALVE FAILED OPEN, NO
EFFECT ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (IN ANY PHASE) IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO MIXING OF PROP OR PROP
VAPORS IN HELIUM LINES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION AND
RUPTURE OF LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-299
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 398 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER"
FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 2 VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC33; 132RPC40
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE 2. VALVE CAN
STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC CMDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY SAME
AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVES FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-300
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 399
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER"
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 2 VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
311R
A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC33; 132RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN VAPOR ISOL 2 VALVE FAILED OPEN, NO
EFFECT ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (IN ANY PHASE) IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO MIXING OF PROP OR PROP
VAPORS IN HELIUM LINES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION AND
RUPTURE OF LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-301
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 400 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
311R
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A3CRI6; AICRI4
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GNC HE ISOL A CLOSE CMD. VALVE CAN
STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY THE
EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED
RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-302
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
401 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A131A3CR16; AICR14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GNC HE ISOL A CLOSE CMD. VALVE CAN
STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY THE
EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED
RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 402 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
DIODE
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A3CRI5; AICRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN HE ISOL A VALVE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED USING SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE THE
SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-304
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 403 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2 R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A3CRI5; AICRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN HE ISOL A VALVE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED USING SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE THE
SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-305
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 404 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWIFUNC
311R
3/1R
3/1R
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CRI2, 56V76AI33A3CR4
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC HE ISOL B VALVE CLOSE CMD. VALVE
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS HE ISOL A & B VALVE FAILED CLOSE
RESULTING IN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-306
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
405 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CRI2, 56V76AI33A3CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC HE ISOL B VALVE CLOSE CMD. VALVE
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS HE ISOL A & B VALVE FAILED CLOSE
RESULTING IN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-307
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 406 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
Z)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/ZR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CR4; 56V76AI33A3CR3
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN HE ISOL B VALVE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED USING SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE THE
SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-308
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 407 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CR4; 56V76AI33A3CR3
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN HE ISOL B VALVE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED USING SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE THE
SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-309
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 408 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL I VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A3CRI3; 131A2CRII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE i. VALVE CAN STILL
BE FULLY OPERATED BY CREW SWITCH A OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVE FAILED CLOSE RESULTING IN AN
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-310
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 409 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A3CRI3; 131A2CRII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE i. VALVE CAN STILL
BE FULLY OPERATED BY CREW SWITCH A OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVE FAILED CLOSE RESULTING IN AN
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-311
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
410 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/1R
311R
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3;AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICR5; 55V76AI32AICR5
C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN OX VAPOR ISOL VALVES 1 & 2 UTILIZING HE
PRESS/VAPOR ISOL SWITCH B. VALVES STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING
SWITCH A OR GPC CMDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN VAPOR
ISOL VALVES 1 & 2 FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN SUBSEQUENT INABILITY
TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-312
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 411
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3;AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76A133AICR5; 55V76AI32AICR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF BOTH HE PRESS/VAPOR ISOL SWITCHES A & B TO OPEN
VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVES. GPC CMD OF ALL VALVES STILL FULLY
OPERATIONAL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS THE SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1
& 2 VALVES FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP
TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITAL MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-313
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 412 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"1)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A3CRI4; A2CRI2
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY SELECT VAPOR ISOL VALVE 1 OPEN.
VALVE IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL BY GPC CMD. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVE FAILING CLOSED
RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-314
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 413 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CRI4; A2CRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY SELECT VAPOR ISOL VALVE 1 OPEN.
VALVE IS STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL BY GPC CMD. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVE FAILING CLOSED
RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 414 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICR6; 55V76AI32AICR6
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN OX VAPOR ISOL VALVES 1 & 2 UTILIZING HE
PRESS/VAPOR ISOL SWITCH A. VALVES STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL USING
SWITCH B OR GPC CMDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS THE SAME AS
VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVES FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY
TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITAL MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-316
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 415 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76A133AICR6; 55V76A132AICR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF BOTH HE PRESS/VAPOR ISOL SWITCHES A & B TO OPEN
VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVES. GPC CMD OF ALL VALVES STILL FULLY
OPERATIONAL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS THE SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1
& 2 VALVES FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP
TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITAL MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-317
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 416 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3 / IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CR3; 133A2CR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE 2. VALVE CAN STILL
BE FULLY OPERATED BY CREW SWITCH A OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
SAME AS VAPOR ISOL i & 2 VALVES FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-318
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 417
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CR3; 133A2CR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE 2. VALVE CAN STILL
BE FULLY OPERATED BY CREW WITH SWITCH A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY SAME AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVES FAILED CLOSED
RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-319
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 418 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CRII; 56V76AI33A2CRI4
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE 2. VALVE CAN
STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC CMDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY SAME
AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVES FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-320
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 419 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
VAPOR ISOL 2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CRII; 56V76AI33A2CRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE 2. VALVE CAN
STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC CMDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY SAME
AS VAPOR ISOL 1 & 2 VALVES FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-321
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 420 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J8-33 TYPE i; J8-23 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN HE ISOL A VALVE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED USING SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE
THE SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN AN
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-322
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 421 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-33 TYPE i; J8-23 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN HE ISOLAVALVE FAILED OPEN, NO EFFECT
ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
PROP TANKS OR LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GND
CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-323
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 422 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN (NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J8-23 TYPE i; 123AR J8-23 (128) TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN HE ISOL B VALVE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED USING SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE THE
SAME AS HE ISOL A & B FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION
OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-324
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 423
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J8-23 TYPE i; 123AR J8-23 (128) TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN HE ISOL VALVE B FAILED OPEN, NO EFFECT
ON MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
PROP TANKS OR LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GND
CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-325
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 424
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS & VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3 / IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 08, S12; S14
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8F34; F3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC HE ISOL & VAPOR ISOL A VALVE
CMDS. VALVE CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WORST CASE RESULTS IN HE ISOL A & B, AND VAPOR ISOL
1 & 2 VALVES FAILED OPEN. THE RESULT IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
PROP TANKS AND LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GND
CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV E EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-326
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 425 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS & VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PNL 08, S13; S15
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8F21; F22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC HE ISOL & VAPOR ISOL B VALVE
CMDS. VALVE CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WORST CASE RESULTS IN HE ISOL A & B, AND VAPOR ISOL
1 & 2 FAILED OPEN. THE RESULT IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS AND
LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GND CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-327
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 426 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J8-29; J8-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE TALKBACKRESULTS IN LT/RT HE VAPOR ISOL VALVE
MISCOMPARE, V90X8274X/V90X8275X CREW ALERT (CLASS 3) AT TIG.
THE CREW WILL RESPOND BY PLACING THE APPROPRIATE HE PRESS/VAPOR
ISOL SWITCH TO THE OPEN POSITION, ALERT WILL CONTINUE AND THE
BURN WILL CONTINUE AS PLANNED WITH ASSOCIATED VALVES SUSPECT.
REFERENCES: SEQ FSSR STS 81-0026, CR29378A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-328
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12A87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 427
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J8-29; J8-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK TO GPC STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 428 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-10; 54V76AI21 J2-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK V43S4184E FOR HE PRESS/VAPOR ISOL SWITCH A IN CLOSE
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM HE ISOL VALVE
TALKBACK V43X4152X.
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY SWITCH A & B OPERATION CAN BE
DETERMINED FROM VALVE TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-330
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 429 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-10; 54V76AI21 J2-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-331
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 430 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS & VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR28; 132AIR34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK V43S4186E FOR HE PRESS/VAPOR ISOL SWITCH A IN OPEN
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM HE ISOL AND
VAPOR ISOL VALVE TALKBACKS V43X4152X & V43X4156X.
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY SWITCH A OR B OPERATION CAN BE
DETERMINED FROM VALVE TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-332
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 431 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL A VLVS & VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR28; 132AIR34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-333
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 432
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J8-29; 56V76AI23 J8-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE TALKBACK RESULTS IN LT/RT HE VAPOR ISOL VALVE
MISCOMPARE, vg0x8274X/V90X8275X CREW ALERT (CLASS 3) AT TIG.
THE CREW WILL RESPOND BY PLACING THE APPROPRIATE HE PRESS/VAPOR
ISOL SWITCH TO THE OPEN POSITION, ALERT WILL CONTINUE AND THE
BURN WILL CONTINUE AS PLANNED WITH VALVES SUSPECT.
REFERENCES:
CR29378A
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; SEQ FSSR STS 81-0026,
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-334
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 433 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J8-29; 56V76AI23 J8-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK TO GPC STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-335
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 434 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ) B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J2-2; 56V76AI23 J2-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK V43S4185E FOR HE PRESS/VAPOR ISOL SWITCH A IN CLOSE
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM HE ISOL VALVE
TALKBACK V43X4154X.
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY SWITCH A & B OPERATION CAN BE
DETERMINED FROM VALVE TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-336
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 435 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J2-2; 56V76AI23 J2-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK TO GPC STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-337
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
I/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
436 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS & VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR25; 132AIR33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK V43S4187E FOR HE PRESS/VAPOR ISOL SWITCH B IN OPEN
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM HE ISOL AND
VAPOR ISOL VALVE TALKBACKS V43X4154X & V43X4158X.
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY SWITCH A OR B OPERATION CAN BE
DETERMINED FROM VALVE TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-338
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 437 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE ISOL B VLVS & VAPOR ISOL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR25; 132AIR33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, TALKBACK TO GPC STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-339
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/IR
438 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV A
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS ISOL A VLVS AND OX TK VAPOR ISOL A&B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-SI2 ; S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE HE ISOLA & VAPOR ISOLA&B VALVE STUCK IN
OPEN POSITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS AND LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND
HAZARD TO GND CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-340
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
439 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV A
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE CLOSE POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS ISOL A VLVS AND OX TK VAPOR ISOL A&B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VALVE A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8-SI2 ; S14
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULT IN TANK ISOL A VALVE STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION.
RESULTING IN ONE FAILURE (REDUNDANT ISOL VALVE FAILS TO OPEN)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS
OF PRESSURIZATION SOURCE AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP
TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 440
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV A
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE GPC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS ISOL A VLVS AND OX TK VAPOR ISOL A&B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VALVE A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/2 R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-SI2 ; S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC HE ISOL A & VAPOR ISOL A&B VALVE
CMDS. VALVE CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WORST CASE IS THE SAME AS THE HE ISOL A VLV FAILED
CLOSED. RESULTING IN ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION SOURCE
AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-342
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 441
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV B
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE CLOSE POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS ISOL B VLVS AND OX TK VAPOR ISOL A&B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VALVE B
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORB I T:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/1R ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-SI3, S15
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE RESULTS IN TANK ISOL B VALVE STUCK IN CLOSED POSITON.
RESULTING IN ONE FAILURE (REDUNDANT ISOL VALVE FAILS TO OPEN)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS
OF PRESSURIZATION SOURCE AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP
TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 442 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV B
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS ISOL B VLVS AND OX TK VAPOR ISOL A&B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VALVE B
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 08
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8-SI3, S15
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN HE ISOL VALVE B AND BOTH VAPOR ISOL
VALVES FAILED OPEN, NO MISSION EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS OR LINES, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD,
AND HAZARD TO GND CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-344
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 443 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV B
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE GPC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE PRESS ISOL B VLVS AND OX TK VAPOR ISOL A&B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VALVE B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PNL 08
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8-SI3, S15
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC HE ISOL B & VAPOR ISOL A&B VALVE
CMDS. VALVE CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WORST CASE IS THE SAME AS THE HE ISOL B VLV FAILED
CLOSED. RESULTING IN ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION SOURCE
AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT. TRAPPED
PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-345
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
444 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, OMS PRESSURE N2/HE TK
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
METER, OMS PRESSURE N2/HE TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: PNL F7A5 M2
PART NUMBER: 34V73A7A5-M2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAGE M2 PROVIDES A FALSE INDICATION OF LT/RT HE OR N2 PRESSURE
(ALSO PAYLOAD KIT HE PRESSURE). THERE ARE STILL TWO OTHER
REDUNDANT MEASUREMENT PATHS AVAILABLE FOR EACH LT/RT HE AND N2
PRESSURE THROUGH THE GPC.
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST (FAILS LOW INDICATING LOSS OF N2 OR HE)
THE REAL STATUS OF THE OME N2 TANK WILL BE UNAVAILABLE OR
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (LOSS OF N2) AND CAN RESULT IN FAILING 10MS
HE OR 2 0MS GN2 TANKS LEAKING/FAILED; THEREFORE MISSION
CAPABILITIES ARE LOST OR ATO COULD BE CALLED (SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-
i).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-346
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
445 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, HE TANK NO.I
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR PRESSURE, HE TANK NO.I
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HELIUM TANK
51V43PT401, 52V43PTSOI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO UTILIZE PT401/PT501 FOR PRESSURE MEASUREMENT
OF LT/RT OMS HE TK. A REDUNDANT LT/RT PRESSURE MEASUREMENT IS
AVAILABLE UTLIZING PT402/PT502 MEASUREMENT V43P4122C/V43PSI22C.
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST (FAILS LOW INDICATING LOSS OF HE) THE
REAL STATUS OF THE OMS HE TK WILL BE UNAVAILABLE OR ERRONEOUS
INDICATION AND CAN RESULT IN FAILING LT/RT OMS HE TK (SEE FLIGHT
RULE 6-1) DURING ASCENT REQUIRING AN ATO BE CALLED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-347
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
446 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, HE TANK NO.2
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR PRESSURE, HE TANK NO.2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HELIUM TANK
51V43PT402, 52V43PT502
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO UTILIZE PT402/PT502 FOR PRESSURE MEASUREMENT
OF LT/RT OMS HE TK. A REDUNDANT LT/RT PRESSURE MEASUREMENT IS
AVAILABLE UTILIZING PT401/PTS01 MEASUREMENT V43P4121C/V43P5121C.
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST (FAILS LOW INDICATING LOSS OF HE) THE
REAL STATUS OF THE OMS HE TK WILL BE UNAVAILABLE OR ERRONEOUS
INDICATION AND CAN RESULT IN FAILING LT/RT OMS HE TK (SEE FLIGHT
RULE 6-1) DURING ASCENT REQUIRING AN ATO BE CALLED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-348
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
447 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OMS HE TANK UPPER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OMS HE TANK UPPER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: OMS, HE TANK
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT403, 52V43TT501
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALIDITY OF TEMP MEASUREMENT CAN BE DETERMINED FROM THE
PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS V43P4122C & V43P4211C/V43P5122C &
V43P5211C. IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST (PRESSURE SENSORS FAIL LOW
INDICATING LOSS OF HE) THE REAL STATUS OF THE OMS HE TK WILL BE
UNAVAILABLE OR ERRONEOUS INDICATION AND CAN RESULT IN FAILING
RT/LT OMS HE TK (REF FLIGHT RULE 6-1) DURING ASCENT REQUIRING AN
ATO BE CALLED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-349
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
448 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMP, OX/HE TEST PORT FITTING TEMP 1 & TEMP
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Sl
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX/HE TEST PORT FITTING TEMP 1 & TEMP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OX/HE TEST PORT
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT408, 51V43TT417, 52V43TT508, 52V43TT517
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SENSOR FAILURE CAN BE DETERMINED BY MONITORING REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT AND OTHER KEELWEB HTR SYSTEM TEMP MEASUREMENTS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO INCORRECTLY FAILING HTR
51V43HRI91/52V43HRI92 AND SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT HTR GROUP, AND
THEN FAILING HTR 51V43HRI91/52V43HRI92. THIS HEATER IS NOT
MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-350
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 449 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS N2/HE PRESSURE DISPLAY SELECT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (POLES STUCK IN ONE OF THREE
POSITIONS OR POLES FAIL TO MAKE CONTACT IN ANY POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS N2/HE PRESSURE DISPLAY SELECT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL F7A5 S1
PART NUMBER: 34V73A7A5-SI
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO UTILIZE GAGE M2 FOR MONITORING LT/RT HE OR N2
PRESSURE (ALSO PAYLOAD KIT HE PRESSURE). THERE ARE STILL TWO
PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS AVAILABLE FOR EACH LT/RT HE AND N2 THROUGH
THE GPC.
THE LOSS OF ALL SIGNAL PATHS FOR HE AND N2 PRESSURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY REASONS SINCE ACTUAL STATUS OF
EITHER SYSTEM WOULD BE UNAVAILABLE
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A E0 BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-351
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 450 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/2R TAL: 3/1R
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES; 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE 6 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE TK ISOL A VLV
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT
(POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-352
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 451 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES; 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN ONE OF THE TWO TK ISOL A VLV'S BEING STUCK PARTIALLY
OPEN/CLOSED WHEN
COMMANDED OPEN WHICH IS THE WORST CASE. WITH ONE VALVE FAILED
MIDTRAVEL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN OTHER VALVE) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT
(POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION). FLOW RATE
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT BURN THIS MAKES PROPELLANT IN AFFECTED
TANK UNUSABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-353
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 452 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES; 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE 6 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE TK ISOL B VLV
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT
(POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-354
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 453 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES; 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN ONE OF THE TWO TK ISOL B VLV'S BEING STUCK PARTIALLY
OPEN/CLOSED WHEN
COMMANDED OPEN WHICH IS THE WORST CASE. WITH ONE VALVE FAILED
MIDTRAVEL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN OTHER VALVE) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT
(POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION). FLOW RATE
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT BURN THIS MAKES PROPELLANT IN AFFECTED
TANK UNUSABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-355
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87
SUBSYSTEM" OMS
MDAC ID: 454
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK XFEED A VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/iR
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/2R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES; 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE 6 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE TK ISOL A VLV.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF OMS
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY.
FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO
INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-356
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 455 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK XFEED A VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES; 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICALSHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN ONE OF THE TWO TK ISOL A VLV'S
BEING STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED OPEN WHICH IS THE
WORST CASE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS
OF OMS INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF ENGINE
REDUNDANCY. FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO
INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-357
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK XFEED B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5-ALL DIODES; 55V76AII5-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE 6 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE TK ISOL B VLV
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF OMS
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY.
FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO
INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-358
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 457 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK XFEED B VLVS
DIODE
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5-ALL DIODES; 55V76AIIS-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN ONE OF THE TWO TK ISOL B VLV'S
BEING STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED OPEN WHICH IS THE
WORST CASE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS
OF OMS INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF ENGINE
REDUNDANCY. FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO
INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-359
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 458 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI9 TYPE I; 56V76AII6AR25 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES EITHER THE OX VLV
A, THE FU VLV A OR BOTH VLV'S FAILED TO OPEN WHEN COMMANDED AND
HAVE FAILED PARTIALLY CLOSED.
WORST CASE IS VLV'S DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV'S
ARE USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD BE FALSELY FAILED CLOSED. THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-360
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 459
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI9 TYPE I; 56V76AII6AR25 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES EITHER OX VLV A, FU
VLV A OR BOTH VLVIS FAILED TO CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED AND HAVE
FAILED PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY CLOSED.
GPC TALKBACK TO CREW IS STILL OPERATIONAL AND REDUNDANT VLV'S ARE
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE XFEED LINE.
LOSS OF ALL TALKBACK INDICATION OF XFEED VLV'S CLOSING, WORST
CASE, WOULD RESULT IN FAILING THE CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN. THIS IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY TO RCS (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF TK'S).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-361
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 460 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI8 TYPE I; 56V76AII6AR26 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES EITHER OX VLV A, FU
VLV A OR BOTH VLV'S FAILED TO CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED AND HAVE
FAILED PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY CLOSED.
GPC TALKBACK TO CREW IS STILL OPERATIONAL AND REDUNDANT VLV'S ARE
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE XFEED LINE.
LOSS OF ALL TALKBACK INDICATION OF XFEED VLV'S CLOSING, WORST
CASE, WOULD RESULT IN FAILING THE CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN. THIS IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY TO RCS (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF TK'S).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-362
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
461 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI8 TYPE I; 56V76AII6AR26 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES EITHER THE OX VLV,
THE FU VLV OR BOTH VLV'S FAILED TO OPEN WHEN COMMANDED AND HAVE
FAILED PARTIALLY CLOSED.
WORST CASE IS VLV'S DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV'S
ARE USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-363
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 462 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5ARI8 TYPE i; AR20 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES EITHER OX VLV A, FU
VLV A OR BOTH VLV'S FAILED TO CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED AND HAVE
FAILED PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY CLOSED.
GPC TALKBACK TO CREW IS STILL OPERATIONAL AND REDUNDANT VLV'S ARE
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE XFEED LINE.
LOSS OF ALL TALKBACK INDICATION OF XFEED VLV'S CLOSING, WORST
CASE, WOULD RESULT IN FAILING THE CROSSFEED VALVE OPEN RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY TO RCS (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF TK'S).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-364
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 463 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5ARI8 TYPE i; AR20 TYPE 1
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES EITHER THE OX VLV,
THE FU VLV OR BOTH VLV'S FAILED TO OPEN WHEN COMMANDED AND HAVE
FAILED PARTIALLY CLOSED.
WORST CASE IS VLV'S DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV'S
ARE USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-365
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 464
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5ARI7 TYPE i; ARI9 TYPE 1
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES EITHER THE OX VLV,
THE FU VLV OR BOTH VLV'S FAILED TO OPEN WHEN COMMANDED AND HAVE
FAILED PARTIALLY CLOSED.
WORST CASE IS VLV'S DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV'S
ARE USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-366
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 465 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5ARI7 TYPE i; ARI9 TYPE 1
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES EITHER OX VLV A, FU
VLV A OR BOTH VLV'S FAILED TO CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED AND HAVE
FAILED PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY CLOSED.
GPC TALKBACK TO CREW IS STILL OPERATIONAL AND REDUNDANT VLV'S ARE
AVAILABLE TO CLOSE XFEED LINE.
LOSS OF ALL TALKBACK INDICATION OF XFEED VLVtS CLOSING, WORST
CASE, WOULD RESULT IN FAILING THE CROSSFEED VALVE OPEN RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY TO RCS (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF TK'S).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-367
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 466 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI7 TYPE I; AR21 TYPE 1
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL A POSITION INDICATION DSS/DS7 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "A" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-368
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 467 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI7 TYPE i; AR21 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL A POSITION INDICATION DS5/DS7 WOULD SHOW A
BARBER POLE WHEN THE OX AND FU TK ISOL A VALVES ARE COMMANDED
CLOSED FALSELY INDICATING THE FU OR OX "A" VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD FALSELY RESULT IN FAILING THE A OR B
VALVES OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN VALVE HAS IS AN
UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CONFIGURATION TO THE AFFECTED
POD.
XFEED STILL AVAILABLE, NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-369
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 468 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI6 TYPE I; AR20 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL A POSITION INDICATION DS5/DS7 WOULD SHOW A
BARBER POLE WHEN THE OX AND FU TK ISOL A VALVES ARE COMMANDED
CLOSED FALSELY INDICATING THE FU OR OX "A" VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD FALSELY RESULT IN FAILING THE A OR B
VALVES OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN VALVE HAS IS AN
UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CONFIGURATION TO THE AFFECTED
POD •
XFEED STILL AVAILABLE, NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-370
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 469 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI6 TYPE i; AR20 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL A POSITION INDICATION DS5/DS7 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "A" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-371
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 470 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 ° TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6AR23 TYPE i; AR21 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL B POSITION INDICATION DS6/DS8 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "B" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSE RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-372
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 471
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6AR23 TYPE i; AR21 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL B POSITION INDICATION DS6/DS8 WOULD SHOW A
BARBERPOLE WHEN THE OX AN FU TK ISOL B VALVES ARE COMMANDED
CLOSED FALSELY INDICATING THE FU OR OX B VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD FALSELY RESULT IN FAILING THE A OR B
VALVES OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN VALVE HAS IS AN
UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CONFIGURATION TO THE AFFECTED
POD. XFEED STILL AVAILABLE, NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-373
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 472 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6AR24 TYPE i; AR22 TYPE 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL B POSITION INDICATION DS6/DS8 WOULD SHOW A
BARBERPOLE WHEN THE OX OR FU TK ISOL B VALVES ARE COMMANDED
CLOSED FALSELY INDICATING THE FU OR OX B VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD FALSELY RESULT IN FAILING THE A OR B
VALVES OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN VALVE HAS IS AN
UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CONFIGURATION TO THE AFFECTED
POD. XFEED STILL AVAILABLE, NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-374
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 473 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6AR24 TYPE i; AR22 TYPE 1
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL B POSITION INDICATION DS6/DS8 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "B" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-375
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 474 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $26; $28
PART NUMBER: 33V73AA8FI7; FI8
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS (OR LOSE ONLY PATH) TO OVERRIDE
GPC AND OPEN (CLOSE) LT/RT OX TK XFEED VLV A. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS TK XFEED VLV'S LT/RT FAILING
CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION) RESULTING IN LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY,
LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES,
AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF
PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN OF PARALLEL VALVE)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP
OMS PROP THROUGH RCS AND COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE TK STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTY VIOLATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-376
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 475 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $26; $28
PART NUMBER: 33V73AA8F8; F9
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS (OR LOSE ONLY PATH) TO OVERRIDE
GPC AND OPEN (CLOSE) LT/RT OX TK XFEED VLV A. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS TK XFEED VLV'S LT/RT FAILING
CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION) RESULTING IN LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY,
LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES,
AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF
PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN OF PARALLEL VALVE)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP
OMS PROP THROUGH RCS AND COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE TK STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTY VIOLATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-377
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 476 ABORT:
HDW/ZUNC
3/2R
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3 / 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $27; $29
33V73A8F25; F26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS (OR LOSE ONLY PATH) TO OVERRIDE
GPC AND OPEN (CLOSE) LT/RT OX TK XFEED VLV B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS TK XFEED VLV'S LT/RT FAILING
CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION) RESULTING IN LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY,
LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES,
AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF
PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN OF PARALLEL VALVE)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP
OMS PROP THROUGH RCS AND COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE TK STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTY VIOLATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-378
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 477 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $27; $29
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8F30; F31
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS (OR LOSE ONLY PATH) TO OVERRIDE
GPC AND OPEN (CLOSE) LT/RT OX TK XFEED VLV B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS TK XFEED VLV'S LT/RT FAILING
CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION) RESULTING IN LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY,
LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES,
AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF
PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO OPEN OF PARALLEL VALVE)
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP
OMS PROP THROUGH RCS AND COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE TK STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTY VIOLATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-379
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 478 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PH_E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08, S19; $21
33V73A8FS; F6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC AND CMD LT/RT OMS OX AND FU ISOL
A VALVES CLOSED USING CREW SWITCH. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY
OPERATED BY GPC AND OPENED WITH CREW SWITCH.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH TK ISOL
VALVES A AND B FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE OMS PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF STRUCTURALAND MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-380
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 479 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08, S19; $21
33V73A8FI4; FI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC AND CMD LT/RT OMS OX AND FU ISOL
A VALVES CLOSED USING CREW SWITCH. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY
OPERATED BY GPC AND OPENED WITH CREW SWITCH.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH TK ISOL
VALVES A AND B FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE OMS PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-381
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 480 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08, $20; $22
33V73A8F29; F40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC AND CMD LT/RT OMS OX AND FU ISOL
B VALVES CLOSED USING CREW SWITCH. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY
OPERATED BY GPC AND OPENED WITH CREW SWITCH.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH THE TK ISOL
VALVES A AND B FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE OMS PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-382
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 481 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: PNL 08, $20; $22
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8F35; F24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OVERRIDE GPC AND CMD LT/RT OMS OX AND FU ISOL
B VALVES CLOSED USING CREW SWITCH. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY
OPERATED BY GPC AND OPENED WITH CREW SWITCH.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, RESULTS IN BOTH THE TK ISOL
VALVES A AND B FAILED CLOSED RESULTING IN AN INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE OMS PROPELLANT. TRAPPED PROPELLANT IS POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-383
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 482
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K49, K50; 56V76AII6K74, K76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU TK XFEED
"A" VALVE AND LOSS OF LT & RT RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN
OMS BURN TO AVOID A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS
TANKS). WITH ONE CROSSFEED VALVE FAILED OPEN, A SECOND FAILURE,
A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE WOULD REQUIRE THE USE OF TANK
ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-384
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 483
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS CLOSED (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K49, K50; 56V76AII6K74, 76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, REDUNDANT RELAY WILL MAINTAIN PROPER CONTROL TO CLOSE FU TK
XFEED VLV A.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, WOULD BE A MOMENTARY CLOSURE
OF XFEED VLVIS A & B (LT/RT) DURING A BURN.
PROPER XFEED OPERATION CAN BE RESTORED BY PLACING THE OMS XFEED A
OR B (LT/RT) SWITCH IN THE OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-385
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 484 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2 R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K51, K52; 56V76AII6K75, 77
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS TO OPEN FU TK XFEED VLV A
LT/RT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS THE SAME RESULT AS TK XFEED
VALVES LT/RT FAILING CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION) RESULTING IN LOSS
OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT
ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP
WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO
OPEN OF PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS AND COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE TK STRUCTURAL AND MASS
PROPERTY VIOLATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-386
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 485 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
312R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TA.L: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K51, K52; 56V76AII6K75, 77
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN FAILED OPEN FU TK XFEED "A" VAVLES AND
LOSS OF ANY RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN OMS BURN TO AVOID
A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF CROSSFEED CAPABILITY
TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
A SECOND FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE, WOULD
REQUIRE THE USE OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS
AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-387
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 486
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISK41, K42; K49, K50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CLOSE THE FU TK XFEED
"B" VALVE AND LOSS OF LT & RT RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN
OMS BURN TO AVOID A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF ALL OMS AND
RCS TANKS). WITH ONE OMS CROSSFEED VALVE FAILED OPEN, A SECOND
FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE WOULD REQUIRE THE USE
OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-388
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 487
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K41, K42; K49, K50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, REDUNDANT RELAY WILL MAINTAIN PROPER CONTROL OF CLOSING FU
TK XFEED VLV B.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WORST CASE WOULD BE A MOMENTARY CLOSURE OF
XFEED VLV'S A & B (LT/RT) DURING A BURN.
PROPER XFEED OPERATION CAN BE RESTORED BY PLACING THE OMS XFEED A
OR B (LT/RT) SWITCH IN THE OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-389
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 488
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5E40, K43; K48, K51
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS TO OPEN LT/RT FU TK XFEED
VLV B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS THE SAME RESULT AS LT/RT TK
XFEED VALVES FAILING CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION) RESULTING IN LOSS
OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT
ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP
WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO
OPEN OF PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS AND COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE TK STRUCTURAL AND MASS
PROPERTY VIOLATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-390
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 489 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/2R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISK40, K43; K48, K51
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN FAILED OPEN FU TK XFEED "B" VALVES AND
LOSS OF ANY RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN OMS BURN TO AVOID
A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF CROSSFEED CAPABILITY
TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
A SECOND FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE, WOULD
REQUIRE THE USE OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS
AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-391
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 490 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K41, 42; K57, 58
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE LT/RT FU TK ISOL A VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LT/RT FU TK ISOL A AND B VALVES FAILED
OPEN. VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN
VALVE COULD HAVE IS A UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CONFIGURATION TO AFFECTED POD (DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS). OMS
XFEED CAN STILL BE PERFORMED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4;
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-392
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 491 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K41, 42; K57, 58
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED CLOSED RELAY K41 OR 42/K57 OR 58 (LT/RT) HAS NO EFFECT
ON VALVE OPERATION. A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
CLOSURE OF FUEL TANK ISOL VALVE A & B (LT/RT).
THIS FAILURE CAN BE CORRECTED BY PLACEMENT OF LT/RT OMS TK ISOL
SWITCH A & B INTO THE OPEN POSITION. DURING TIME CRITICAL ABORT
DUMPS AN OME SHUT DOWN COULD OCCUR BEFORE PROPER ACTION IS
TAKEN AND RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4;
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-393
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 492 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K43, 44; K59, 60
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED OPEN RELAY K43 OR 44/K59 OR 60 (LT/RT) HAS NO EFFECT ON
VALVE OPERATION. A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO OPEN FU TK ISOL VALVE'S A & B (LT/RT).
THIS PRECLUDES USE/DEPLETION OF PROP RESULTING IN VIOLATION OF
STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4;
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-394
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 493 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K43, 44; K59, 60
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE LT/RT FU TK ISOL A VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LT/RT FU TK ISOL A AND B VALVES FAILED
OPEN. VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN
VALVE COULD HAVE IS AN UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CONFIGURATION TO AFFECTED POD (DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS). OMS
XFEED CAN STILL BE PERFORMED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4;
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-395
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 494 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K68, 69; K60, 61
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE LT/RT FU TK ISOL B VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LT/RT FU TK ISOL A & B (LT/RT) VALVES
FAILED OPEN. VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED
OPEN VALVE COULD HAVE IS AN UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CONFIGURATION TO AFFECTED POD (DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS). OMS
XFEED CAN STILL BE PERFORMED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4;
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-396
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 495
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS CLOSED (STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K68, 69; K60, 61
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED CLOSED RELAY K41 OR 42/K57 OR 58 (LT/RT) HAS NO EFFECT
ON VALVE OPERATION. A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN A
CLOSURE OF FUEL TANK ISOL VALVE A & B (LT/RT).
THIS FAILURE CAN BE CORRECTED BY PLACEMENT OF LT/RT OMS TK ISOL
SWITCH A & B INTO THE OPEN POSITION. DURING TIME CRITICAL ABORT
DUMPS AN OME SHUT DOWN COULD OCCUR BEFORE PROPER ACTION IS
TAKEN AND RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4;
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-397
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 496 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K66, 67; K58, 59
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED OPEN RELAY K66 OR 67/K58 OR 59 (LT/RT) HAS NO EFFECT ON
VALVE OPERATION. A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO OPEN FU TK ISOL VALVE'S A & B (LT/RT).
THIS PRECLUDES USE/DEPLETION OF OMS PROP RESULTING IN VIOLATION
OF STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4;
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-398
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 497
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K66, 67; K58, 59
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE LT/RT FU TK ISOL B VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LT/RT FU TK ISOL A & B VALVES FAILED OPEN.
VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN
VALVE COULD HAVE IS AN UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CONFIGURATION TO AFFECTED POD (DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS). OMS
XFEED CAN STILL BE PERFORMED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4;
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-399
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 498 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K53, K54; 56V76AII6K80, K81
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CLOSE THE OX TK XFEED
"A" VALVE AND LOSS OF LT & RT RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN
OMS BURN TO AVOID A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS
TANKS). WITH ONE OMS CROSSFEED VALVE FAILED OPEN, A SECOND
FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE WOULD REQUIRE THE USE
OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-400
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 499
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K53, K54; 56V76AII6K80, K81
CAUSES: •CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, REDUNDANT RELAY WILL MAINTAIN PROPER CONTROL TO CLOSE OX TK
XFEED VLV A.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, WOULD BE A MOMENTARY CLOSURE
OF XFEED VLV'S A & B (LT/RT) DURING A BURN.
PROPER XFEED OPERATION CAN BE RESTORED BY PLACING THE OMS XFEED A
OR B (LT/RT) SWITCH IN THE OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-401
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 500
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K55, K56; 56V76AII6K78, K79
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS TO OPEN LT/RT OX TK XFEED
VLV A. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS THE SAME RESULT AS LT/RT TK
XFEED VALVES FAILING CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION) RESULTING IN LOSS
OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT
ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP
WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO
OPEN OF PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS AND COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE TK STRUCTURAL AND MASS
PROPERTY VIOLATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-402
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K55, K56; 56V76AII6K78, K79
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN FAILED OPEN OX TK XFEED "A" VALVES AND
LOSS OF ANY RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN OMS BURN TO AVOID
A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF CROSSFEED CAPABILITY
TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
A SECOND FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE, WOULD
REQUIRE THE USE OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS
AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-403
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 502 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K47, 46; K55, K54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CLOSE THE OX TK XFEED
"B" VALVE AND LOSS OF LT & RT RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN
OMS BURN TO AVOID A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF ALL OMS AND
RCS TANKS). WITH ONE OMS CROSSFEED VALVE FAILED OPEN, A SECOND
FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE WOULD REQUIRE THE USE
OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-404
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 503 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS CLOSED (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
5) RELAY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K47, 46; K55, K54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, REDUNDANT RELAY WILL MAINTAIN PROPER CONTROL TO CLOSE OX TK
XFEED VLV B.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, WOULD BE A MOMENTARY CLOSURE
OF XFEED VLV'S A & B (LT/RT) DURING A BURN.
PROPER XFEED OPERATION CAN BE RESTORED BY PLACING THE OMS XFEED A
OR B (LT/RT) SWITCH IN THE OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-405
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 504 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K45, 44; K53, K52
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS TO OPEN LT/RT OX TK XFEED
VLV B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAS THE SAME RESULT AS LT/RT TK
XFEED VALVES FAILING CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION) RESULTING IN LOSS
OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT
ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP
WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO
TO OPEN OF PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS AND
COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE TK
STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTY VIOLATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-406
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 505 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K45, 44; K53, K52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN FAILED OPEN OX TK XFEED "B" VALVES AND
LOSS OF ANY RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN OMS BURN TO AVOID
A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF CROSSFEED CAPABILITY
TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
A SECOND FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE, WOULD
REQUIRE THE USE OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS
AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-407
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 506 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K45, 46; K61, 62
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE LT/RT OX TK ISO A VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LT/RT OX TK ISO A AND B VALVES FAILED OPEN.
VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN
VALVE COULD HAVE IS AN UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CONFIGURATION TO AFFECTED POD (DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS). OMS
XFEED CAN STILL BE PERFORMED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4,
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-408
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 507 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
S/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS CLOSED (STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
S)
4)
S)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K45, 46; K61, 62
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED CLOSED RELAY K45 OR 46/K61 OR 62 (LT/RT) HAS NO EFFECT
ON VALVE OPERATION. A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN A
CLOSURE OF OX TANK ISOL VALVE A & B (LT/RT).
THIS FAILURE CAN BE CORRECTED BY PLACEMENT OF LT/RT OMS TK ISOL
SWITCH A & B INTO THE OPEN POSITION. DURING TIME CRITICAL ABORT
DUMPS AN OME SHUT DOWN COULD OCCUR BEFORE PROPER ACTION IS
TAKEN AND RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4,
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-409
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 508 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K47, 48; K63, 64
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED OPEN RELAY K47 OR 48/K63 OR 64 (LT/RT) HAS NO EFFECT ON
VALVE OPERATION. A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO OPEN OX TANK ISOL VALVE A & B (LT/RT).
THIS PRECLUDES USE/DEPLETION OF OMS PROP RESULTING IN VIOLATION
OF STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4,
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-410
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 509 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS CLOSED (STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
k
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K47, 48; K63, 64
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE LT/RT OX TK ISO A VALVE (LT/RT). LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LT/RT OX TK ISO A AND B VALVES FAILED
OPEN. VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN
VALVE COULD HAVE IS ANUNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CONFIGURATION TO AFFECTED POD (DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS). OMS
XFEED CAN STILL BE PERFORMED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4,
MC284-0430 REV E AMENDMENT F-07
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-411
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K70, 71; K62, 63
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE LT/RT OX TK B VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LT/RT OX TK ISOL A AND B VALVES FAILED
OPEN. VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN
VALVE COULD HAVE IS AN UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CONFIGURATION TO AFFECTED POD (DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS). OMS
XFEED CAN STILL BE PERFORMED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-412
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 511 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K72, 73; K64, 65
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO CLOSE LT/RT OX TK B VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LT/RT OX TK ISOL A AND B VALVES FAILED
OPEN. VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN. THE ONLY EFFECT A FAILED OPEN
VALVE COULD HAVE IS AN UNDESIRABLE INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED
CONFIGURATION TO AFFECTED POD (DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS). OMS
XFEED CAN STILL BE PERFORMED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-413
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 512 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS CLOSED (STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RELAY
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/ 1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K72, 73; K64, 65
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
A FAILED CLOSED RELAY K72 OR 73/K65 OR 64 (LT/RT) HAS NO EFFECT
ON VALVE OPERATION. A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN A
CLOSURE OF OX TANK ISOL VALVE A & B (LT/RT).
THIS FAILURE CAN BE CORRECTED BY PLACEMENT OF LT/RT OMS TK ISOL
SWITCH A & B INTO THE OPEN POSITION. DURING TIME CRITICAL ABORT
DUMPS AN OME SHUT DOWN COULD OCCUR BEFORE PROPER ACTION IS
TAKEN AND RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-414
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 513 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K70, 71; K62, 63
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED OPEN RELAY K70 OR 71/K62 OR 63 (LT/RT) HAS NO EFFECT ON
VALVE OPERATION. A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO OPEN OX TANK ISOL VALVE A & B (LT/RT).
THIS PRECLUDES USE/DEPLETION OF OMS PROP RESULTING IN VIOLATION
OF STRUCTURAL AND MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-415
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 514 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-94; 56V76AII6 JI-38
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES THAT EITHER THE OX
VLV, FU VLV, OR BOTH VLV'S ARE FAILED PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY
CLOSED. GPC TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLVS DECLARED FAILED CLOSEDANDREDUNDANT VLVS ARE
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-416
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-94; 56V76AII6 JI-38
c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-417
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-43; 56V76AII6 J3-10
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-418
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 517 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/ 2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-43; 56V76AII6 J3-10
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATE LT/RT FU VALVE A DOES
NOT OPEN. BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLV DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV IS
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-419
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 518 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-43; 56V76AII6 J3-10
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATE LT/RT FU VALVE A DOES
NOT OPEN. BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLV DECLARED FAILED CLOSED ANDREDUNDANT VLV IS
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-420
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 519 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SA2ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-43; 56V76AII6 J3-10
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-421
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 520
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J2-52; J2-73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES THAT EITHER THE OX
VLV, FU VLV, OR BOTH VLV'S ARE FAILED PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY
CLOSED. GPC TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLVS DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLVS ARE
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-422
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 521 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J2-52; J2-73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-423
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 522 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J3-56; J3-41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-424
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 523 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J3-56; J3-41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATE LT/RT FU VALVE B DOES
NOT OPEN. BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLV DECLARED FAILED CLOSED ANDREDUNDANT VLV IS
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED CLOSE THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-425
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 524 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J3-56; J3-41
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATE LT/RT FU VALVE B DOES
NOT OPEN. BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLV DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV IS
USED TO COMPLETE XFEEDo LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-426
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 525 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J3-56; J3-41
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-427
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 526 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-24; Ji-21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL A POSITION INDICATION DS5/DS7 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "A" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-428
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 527 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTRO LS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 JI-24; Ji-21
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACKS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-429
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13 / 87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 528
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-28; J3-74
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBERPOLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS
OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-430
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
529 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-28; J3-74
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-431
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 530 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-28; J3-74
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBERPOLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-432
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 531 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-28; J3-74
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-433
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 532
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Ji-88; Ji-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL B POSITION INDICATION DS6/DS8 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "B" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-434
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 533 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 JI-88; Ji-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACKS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-435
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 534
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 JI-69; J3-54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-436
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 535 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 JI-69; J3-54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBERPOLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-437
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 536 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Ji-69; J3-54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-438
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 537 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Ji-69; J3-54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBERPOLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-439
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 538
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-60; 56V76AII6 JI-77
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATES LT/RT OX AND FU
VALVE A STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY CLOSED. BARBER POLE
TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLVS DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLVS ARE
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSELY BE FAILED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-440
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 539
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 JI-60; 56V76AII6 Ji-77
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-441
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 540 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-46; 56V76AII6 JI-57
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LT/RT XFEED A SWITCH CLOSED TALKBACK. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN HAVING TO RELY ON VLV TALKBACKS TO
DETERMINE SWITCH "CLOSE" OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-442
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 541 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-46; 56V76AII6 JI-57
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-443
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 542
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-35; 56V76AII6 JI-56
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WOULD FALSELY INDICATE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL
PATHS TO OVERRIDE THE GPC AND OPEN OX AND FU TK XFEED VLV'S A.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN HAVING TO RELY ON VLV
TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE SWITCH "OPEN" OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-444
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 543 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-35; 56V76AII6 JI-56
CAUSES: CONTA_IINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-445
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 544
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SA_ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J2-62; J2-68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATES LT/RT OX AND FU
VALVE B STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY CLOSED. BARBER POLE
TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLVS DECLARED FAILED CLOSEDANDREDUNDANT VLVS ARE
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD BE FALSELY FAILED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-446
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 545
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J2-62; J2-68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-447
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 546 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J2-30; J2-40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LT/RT XFEED B SWITCH CLOSED TALKBACK. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN HAVING TO RELY ON VLV TALKBACKS TO
DETERMINE SWITCH "CLOSE" OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-448
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 547 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J2-30; J2-40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-449
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 548 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3 / 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J2-21; J2-45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
WOULD FALSELY INDICATE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL
PATHS TO OVERRIDE THE GPC AND OPEN OX AND FU TK XFEED VLV'S B.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN HAVING TO RELY ON VLV
TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE SWITCH "OPEN" OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-450
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 549 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J2-21; J2-45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-451
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
550 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 JI-8; Ji-98
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE (LT/RT) OMS TK ISOL A SWITCH POSITION (CLOSE) TALKBACK.
SWITCH POSITION CAN BE DETERMINED UTILIZING A VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-452
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 551 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-8; Ji-98
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-453
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 552 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Jl-16; JI-95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE (LT/RT) OMS TK ISOL A SWITCH POSITION (OPEN) TALKBACK.
SWITCH POSITION CAN BE DETERMINED UTILIZING A VALVE POSITION
TALKBACK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-454
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 553 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Jl-16; Ji-95
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-455
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 554 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILUREMODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 _
LA/_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Jl-14; J3-12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE (LT/RT) OMS TK ISOL B SWITCH POSITION (CLOSE) TALKBACK.
SWITCH POSITION CAN BE DETERMINED UTILIZING B VALVE POSITION
TALKBACKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-456
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 555 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Jl-14; J3-12
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, VALVE TALKBACKS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-457
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 556 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTO FF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Jl-18; J3-11
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE (LT/RT) OMS TK ISOL B SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK. SWITCH
POSITION CAN BE DETERMINED UTILIZING B VALVE POSITION TALKBACK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-458
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 557 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Jl-18; J3-11
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-459
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 558 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 JI-67; 56V76AII6 Ji-28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES THAT EITHER THE OX
VLV, FU VLV, OR BOTH VLV'S ARE FAILED PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY
CLOSED. GPC TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLVS DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLVS ARE
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD BE FALSELY FAILED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-460
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 559
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"/)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-67; 56V76AII6 JI-28
c [ ].
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-461
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 560 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-42; 56V76AII6 J3-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-462
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 561 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-42; 56V76AII6 J3-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATE LT/RT OX VALVE A DOES
NOT OPEN. BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLV DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV IS
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD BE FALSELY FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-463
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 562 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-42; 56V76AII6 J3-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATES LT/RT OX VALVE A
DOES NOT OPEN. BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLV DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV IS
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD BE FALSELY FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-464
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 563
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, S.IK I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-42; 56V76AII6 J3-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-465
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 564 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A115 J2-65; J2-83
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSELY INDICATES THAT EITHER THE OX
VLV, FU VLV, OR BOTH VLV'S ARE FAILED PARTIALLY OPEN/PARTIALLY
CLOSED. GPC TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLVS DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLVS ARE
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD BE FALSELY BE FAILED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-466
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 565 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J2-65; J2-83
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-467
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 566 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
2)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J3-55; J3-40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-468
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 567 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J3-55; J3-40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATES LT/RT OX VALVE B
DOES NOT OPEN. BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLV DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV IS
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD BE FALSELY FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-469
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 568
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J3-55; J3-40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TALKBACK TO GPC CONTINUALLY INDICATES LT/RT OX VALVE B
DOES NOT OPEN. BARBER POLE TALKBACK TO CREW STILL OPERATIONAL.
WORST CASE IS VLV DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV IS
USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
FALSELY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD BE FALSELY FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-470
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 569 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 J3-55; J3-40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-471
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 570 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-6; JI-32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL A POSITION INDICATION DS5/DS7 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "A" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-472
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 571
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Ji-6; JI-32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACKS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-473
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 572 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 2 R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Jl-18; Ji-39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBER POLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-474
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 573 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3 / 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DE ORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 Jl-18; JI-39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-475
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 574 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3 / 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-27; J3-75
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-476
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 575 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/nmC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-27; J3-75
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBER POLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-477
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
576 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-27; J3-75
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBER POLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-478
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 577
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL A VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
,m
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-27; J3-75
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-479
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 578 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 JI-72; JI-40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBERPOLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-480
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 579
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 JI-72; JI-40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-481
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 580 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 JI-98; Ji-43
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL B POSITION INDICATION DS6/DS8 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "B" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-482
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 581 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Ji-98; Ji-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, VALVE TALKBACKS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-483
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 582 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Ji-46; J3-55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-484
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 583 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Ji-46; J3-55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBERPOLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-485
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 584
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWlFUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 JI-46; J3-55
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ASSOCIATED VALVE TALKBACK TO GPC (LT/RT), CREW BARBERPOLE
TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TALKBACK TO GPC AND CREW FOR OX TK ISOL VALVES A & B.
WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED
RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-486
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 585
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK ISOL B VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 Ji-46; J3-55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, VALVE TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-487
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 586 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN GPC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU CROSSFEED A VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-S26; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE THE GPC COMMANDS FOR LT/RT OMS XFEED A
VALVES. GPC COMMANDS AND REDUNDANT VALVES STILL AVAILABLE TO
SUPPORT XFEED FUNCTION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE,
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF XFEED CAPABILITY
(LOSE OMS ENGINE REDUNDANCY AND RCS PROP MGR TECHNIQUES). DURING
RTLS AND TAL LOSE THE ABILITY TO PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT
DUMPS THROUGH THE RCS JETS RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
974099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-488
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 587 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OPEN POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU CROSSFEED A VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-S26; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CLOSE THE OX TK XFEED
"A" VALVE AND LOSS OF LT & RT RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN
OMS BURN TO AVOID A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF ALL OMS AND
RCS TANKS). WITH ONE OMS CROSSFEED VALVE FAILED OPEN, A SECOND
FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE, WOULD REQUIRE THE USE
OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
974099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-489
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 588 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU CROSSFEED A VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-S26; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT (PRIORITY FLIGHT INVOKED). LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF OMS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST
SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES
SUCH ACTION. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(PARALLEL VALVE FAILS TO OPEN) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS
AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TK STRUCTURALAND ORBITAL
MASS PREPERTIES CONSTRAINS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
97099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-490
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 589
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN GPC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU CROSSFEED B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-S27; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE THE GPC COMMANDS FOR LT/RT OMS XFEED B
VALVES. GPC COMMANDS AND REDUNDANT VALVES STILL AVAILABLE TO
SUPPORT XFEED FUNCTION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WORST CASE WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF XFEED CAPABILITY (LOSE
OMS ENGINE REDUNDANCY AND RCS PROP MGR TECHNIQUES). DURING RTLS
AND TAL LOSE THE ABILITY TO PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROPELLANT
DUMPS THROUGH THE RCS JETS RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
97099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-491
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 590 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OPEN POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU CROSSFEED B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-S27; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CLOSE THE OX TK XFEED
"B" VALVE AND LOSS OF LT & RT RCS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY DURING AN
OMS BURN TO AVOID A DIRECT CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF ALL OMS AND
RCS TANKS). WITH ONE OMS CROSSFEED VALVE FAILED OPEN, A SECOND
FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE, WOULD REQUIRE THE USE
OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
97099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-492
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 591 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU CROSSFEED B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-S27; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT (PRIORITY FLIGHT INVOKED). LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF OMS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF PROTECTION AGAINST
SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRES
SUCH ACTION. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(PARALLEL VALVE FAILS TO OPEN) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS.
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITAL MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
97099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-493
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 592 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN GPC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-SI9; $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE THE GPC COMMANDS FOR LT/RT OMS TK ISOL A
VALVES. GPC COMMANDS AND REDUNDANT VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRANDED PROPELLANTS. INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANT CAN LEAD TO VIOLATION OF PROPELLANT TANK STRUCTURAL
AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
974099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-494
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 593
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OPEN POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-SI9; $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CLOSE THE OX & FU TK "A"
VALVE. NO EFFECT, VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN DURING ALL PHASES. A
FAILED VALVE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CROSSFEED TO AFFECTED POD
(TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS).
A SECOND FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE WOULD REQUIRE
THE USE OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS
TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
974099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-495
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 594 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTO FF: 3/ 2 R TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-SIg; $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE TANK ISOL A VALVE STUCK IN CLOSE
POSITION. WITH FAILURE TO OPEN ONE TANK ISOL VALVE, ONE FAILURE
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANT RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROPELLANT TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
97099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-496
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 595 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN GPC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-S20; $22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO OVERRIDE THE GPC COMMANDS FOR LT/RT OMS TK ISOL B
VALVES. GPC COMMANDS AND REDUNDANT VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE, WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO STRANDED PROPELLANTS. INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANT CAN LEAD TO VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
97099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-497
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 596 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OPEN POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ .] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-S20; $22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CLOSE THE OX & FU TK
ISOL "B" VALVE. NO EFFECT, VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN DURING ALL
PHASES. A FAILED OPEN VALVE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CROSSFEED TO
AFFECTED POD (TO AVOID DIRECT CONNECTION OF TANKS).
A SECOND FAILURE, A FAILED OPEN RCS CROSSFEED VALVE WOULD REQUIRE
THE USE OF TANK ISOL VALVES TO AVOID CONNECTION OF OMS AND RCS
TANKS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
97099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-498
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 597 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/2R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08
PART NUMBER: 33V73AS-S20; $22
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE TK ISOL "B" VALVE STUCK IN CLOSE
POSITION. WITH FAILURE TO OPEN ONE TANK ISOL VALVE, ONE FAILURE
AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MF0004-400 REV C, VS70-
97099 EO A09
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-499
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 598 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
TOTALIZER
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32FI7; 56V76AI33F9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE PRIMARY POWER SUPPLY FOR TOTALIZER, SECONDARY STILL
AVAILABLE. POWER SUPPLIES ARE CROSS-STRAPPED.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE SINCE IT WOULD
REQUIRE LOSS OF GROUND CALCULATIONS FROM FLOW RATE-BURN TIME DATA
THEREFORE THE WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF ALL QUANTITY
GAGE DATA EXCEPT GND CALCULATIONS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-500
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/06/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 599
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
TOTALIZER
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31FIS; FI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE SECONDARY POWER SUPPLY FOR TOTALIZER, PRIMARY STILL
AVAILABLE. POWER SUPPLIES ARE CROSS-STRAPPED.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE SINCE IT WOULD
REQUIRE LOSS OF GROUND CALCULATIONS FROM FLOW RATE-BURN TIME DATA
THEREFORE THE WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF ALL QUANTITY
GAGE DATA EXCEPT GND CALCULATIONS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-501
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 600
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED A VLVS
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[P]
LO CAT I0 N:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-DSI2; DSI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSLEY INDICATES EITHER THE OX VLV,
THE FU VLV OR BOTH VLV'S FAILED TO OPEN WHEN COMMANDED AND HAVE
FAILED PARTIALLY CLOSED.
WORST CASE IS VLV'S DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV'S
ARE USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSLY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSLY BE FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-502
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK CROSSFEED B VLVS
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/nmC
3/IR
3/IR
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[p]
LOCATION: PNL 08
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8-DSI3; DSI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO CREW FALSLEY INDICATES EITHER THE OX VLV,
THE FU VLV OR BOTH VLV'S FAILED TO OPEN WHEN COMMANDED AND HAVE
FAILED PARTIALLY CLOSED.
WORST CASE IS VLV'S DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VLV'S
ARE USED TO COMPLETE XFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSLY FAILING THE XFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
DURING ABORTS THE XFEED SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED FAILED AND THE
DUMP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF INDICATIONS, BUT SINCE THE
XFEED COULD FALSLY BE FAILED CLOSED THE RESULT IS LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE FOR RTLS & TAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-503
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL A VLVS
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-DS5; DS7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL A POSITION INDICATION DSS/DS7 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "A" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS
(ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-504
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
603 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL B VLVS
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/nmc
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08
33V73A8-DS6; DS8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW LT/RT OMS ISOL A POSITION INDICATION DS5/DS7 WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FUEL OR OX "A" VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONS I DERATIONS
(ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; VS70-976102 REV F EO GI4
....
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-505
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
604 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, FRCS/OMS KIT PRESSURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
METER, FRCS/OMS KIT PRESSURE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 03 MI0
33V76A3-MI0
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAGE MI0 PROVIDES A FALSE INDICATION OF RCS HE AND ULLAGE
PRESSURES (ALSO KIT ULLAGE PRESSURES). TWO OTHER REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT PATHS ARE AVAILABLE FOR EACH FRCS HE TKAND ONE
REDUNDANT PATH FOR FU/OX ULLAGE PRESSURES. RESPECTIVE MSID #'S
ARE V42PIII3C&V42PIII4C/V42PIIIOC & V42PIII2C AND
V42PIII6C/V42PIII5C. FOR ERRONEOUS INDICATIONS FROM ALL
REDUNDANCY; IST DUE TO THE TIME CRITICALITY DURING ASCENT, MCC
WOULD DECLARE FRCS FAILED (REF FLIGHT RULE 6-41) RESULTING IN
PROP MGR IN THE APS, THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION CAPABILITIES, 2ND
FOR OTHER PHASES IT IS ASSUMED MCC WOULD MONITOR FRCS PROP TK OUT
PRESSURE FOR HE TK HEALTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C E0 D01 ; JSC-20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-506
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
605 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, LT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
METER, LT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 03 M9
PART NUMBER: 33V73A3-M9
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAGE M9 PROVIDES A FALSE INDICATION OF LT OMS/RCS PROPELLANT
ULLAGE AND LT RCS HE TANK PRESSURES. REDUNDANT GPC MEASUREMENT
PATHS ARE AVAILABLE (LT OMS FU/OX V43P4321C/V43P4221C, LT RCS
FU/OX V42P2116C/V42P2115C, LT RCS HE TANK OX/FU V42P211OC,
V42P2112C/V42P2113C, V422114C). ERRONEOUS INDICATION FROM LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY IN PL & OO PHASES WOULD RESULT IN LTRCS HE TK
BEING DECLARED FAILED RESULTING IN A LOSS OF DELTA V AND LOSS OF
MISSION CAPABILITY (REF. FLIGHT RULE 6-41), UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
IS DETERMINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C E0 D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-507
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1 I/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 606 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 03 MI2
PART NUMBER: 33V73A3-MI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO SELECT OMS/RCS/KIT PROPELLANT QUANTITY FOR
VISUAL DISPLAY ON METER MI2. THERE ARE TWO OTHER REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT PATHS FOR THE OMS AND ONE REDUNDANT PATH FOR RCS. IN
THE OMS, ONE PATH IS THROUGH THE GPC THE OTHER HARDWIRED TO THE
GSE PNL (J207). LOSS OF ALL QUANTITY PATHS HAS NO EFFECT SINCE
GROUND CALCULATIONS WOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-508
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
607 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, RT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
METER, RT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 03 MII
33V73A3-MII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAGE MII PROVIDES A FALSE INDICATION OF RT OMS/RCS PROPELLANT
ULLAGE AND RT RCS HE TANK PRESSURES. REDUNDANT GPC MEASUREMENT
PATHS ARE AVAILABLE (RT OMS FU/OX V43P5321C/V43P5221C, RT RCS
FU/OX V42P3116C/V42P3115C, RT RCS HE TANK OX/FU V42P311OC,
V42P3112C/V42P3113C, V42P3114C). ERRONEOUS INDICATION FROM LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY IN PL & OO PHASES WOULD RESULT IN RT RCS HE TK
BEING DECLARED FAILED RESULTING IN A LOSS OF DELTA V AND LOSS OF
MISSION CAPABILITY (REF. FLIGHT RULE 6-41), UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
IS DETERMINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C E0 D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-509
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
608 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS FUEL TK ULLAGE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS FUEL TK ULLAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PROPELLANT FUEL TANK
PART NUMBER: 51V43PT403, 52V43PT503
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO UTILIZE PT403/PT503 FOR FU ULLAGE PRESSURE
MEASUREMENT. COULD FALSELY INDICATE FU LEAKAGE. THE WORST CASE
WOULD BE A FAILURE WHEN THE FU TK ISO VALVES ARE CLOSED DURING
RCS CROSSFEED FROM OTHER POD.
UNDER THESE CONDITIONS NO OTHER PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS ARE
AVAILABLE TO MONITOR TK STATUS. TO DETERMINE SENSOR FAILURE THE
HE ISO VALVE MUST BE OPENED WHILE MONITORING HE TK PRESSURE
MEASUREMENTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-510
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
609 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, OX TANK ULLAGE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
"l)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS OX TK ULLAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PROPELLANT OXIDIZER TANK
51V43PT404, 52V43PTS04
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO UTILIZE PT404/PT504 FOR OX ULLAGE PRESSURE
MEASUREMENT. COULD FALSELY INDICATE OX LEAKAGE. THE WORST CASE
WOULD BE A FAILURE WHEN THE OX TK ISOL VALVES ARE CLOSED DURING
RCS CROSSFEED FROM OTHER POD.
UNDER THESE CONDITIONS NO OTHER PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS ARE
AVAILABLE TO MONITOR TK STATUS. TO DETERMINE SENSOR FAILURE THE
HE ISO VALVES MUST BE OPENED WHILE MONITORING HE TK PRESSURE
MEASUREMENTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-511
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/2
610 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, FUEL TANK LOWER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, FUEL TANK LOWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PROPELLANT FUEL TANK
51V43TT405, 52V43TT505
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IN THE LIFTOFF PHASE. A SENSOR
FAILURE COULD INCORRECTLY LEAD TO FAILING OMS FU PROPELLANT TANK
(REF: JSC 20923 PCN-I, RULE 6-2) LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A SHALLOW ATO BEFORE SENSOR FAILURE IS DETERMINED
REFERENCES:
REV E
VS70-943099 REV EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-512
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/2
611 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX LOWER TANK
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX LOWER TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PROPELLANT OXIDIZER TANK
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT404, 52V43TT504
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IN THE LIFTOFF PHASE. A SENSOR
FAILURE COULD INCORRECTLY LEAD TO FAILING OMS OX PROPELLANT TANK
(REF: JSC 20923 PCN-I, RULE 6-2) LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A SHALLOW ATO BEFORE SENSOR FAILURE IS DETERMINED.
REFERENCES :
REV E
VS70-943099 REV EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-513
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 612 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PRESS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH; (POLES STUCK IN ONE OF THREE
POSITION OR POLES FAIL TO MAKE CONTACT IN ANY POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PRESS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 03 SI0
PART NUMBER: 33V73A3-SI0
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO UTILIZE GAGES Mg, MI0, AND MII FOR MONITORING.
REDUNDANT MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC AND ARE PART OF
THE C&W SYSTEM. THE LOSS OF ALL SIGNAL PATHS FOR OMS RT/LT/KIT
PROP ULLAGE, RCS RT/LT/FWD PROP ULLAGE AND RCS RT/LT/FWD HE TK
PRESSURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY REASONS SINCE
THE ACTUAL STATUS OF THE SYSTEMS ARE UNAVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C E0 D01; VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-514
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 613 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH; (POLES STUCK IN ONE OF THREE
POSITION OR POLES FAIL TO MAKE CONTACT IN ANY POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 03 SII
33V73A3-SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO SELECT OMS/RCS/KIT PROPELLANT QUANTITY FOR
VISUAL DISPLAY ON METER M12. THERE ARE TWO OTHER REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT PATHS FOR THE OMS AND ONE REDUNDANT PATH FOR RCS. IN
THE OMS, ONE PATH IS THROUGH THE GPC THE OTHER HARDWIRED TO THE
GSE PNL (J207). LOSS OF ALL QUANTITY PATHS HAVE NO EFFECT
SINCE GROUND CALCULATIONS WOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-515
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
614 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J3-i08; 56V76AI23 J3-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR PERFORMING AN OMS BURN
WITHOUT PERFORMING A GN2 PURGE POST BURN.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN INABILITY TO PERFORM AN OMS
BURN WITHOUT A GN2 PURGE. NO EFFECT ON MISSION WITHOUT FIRST
HAVING A FAILURE IN THE N2 SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-516
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
615 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J3-i08; 56V76AI23 J3-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, STILL MAINTAIN FULL CAPABILITY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, WOULD RESULT IN THE INABLITY TO PERFORM A PURGE AFTER
AN OMS BURN.
FOR A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN AN INABLITY TO
PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS, LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE (I/i).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-517
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
616 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J3-i07; 56V76AI23 J3-95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR PERFORMING AN OMS BURN
WITHOUT A PURGE. NEXT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT ELEMENT, WORST CASE,
WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO PERFORM A PURGE AFTER AN OMS
BURN. FOR A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS, LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE (2/IR) •
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-518
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
617 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J3-i07; 56V76AI23 J3-95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR PERFORMING AN OMS BURN
WITHOUT A PURGE. NEXT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT ELEMENT, WORST
CASE, WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO PERFORM A PURGE AFTER AN
OMS BURN. FOR A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS, LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE (2/IR) •
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-519
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 618 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J3-94; 54V76A121 J3-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR PERFORMING AN OMS BURN
WITHOUT PERFORMING A GN2 PURGE POST BURN.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN INABILITY TO PERFORM AN OMS
BURN WITHOUT A GN2 PURGE. NO EFFECT ON MISSION WITHOUT FIRST
HAVING A FAILURE IN THE N2 SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-520
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
619 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J3-94; 54V76AI21 J3-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, STILL MAINTAIN FULL CAPABILITY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
WORST CASE, WOULD RESULT IN THE INABLITY TO PERFORM A PURGE AFTER
AN OMS BURN.
FOR A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN AN INABLITY TO
PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS, LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-521
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
620 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J3-95; 54V76AI21 J3-95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR PERFORMING AN OMS
BURN WITH A PURGE. NEXT FAILURE OF REDUNANT ELEMENT, WORST
CASE, WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO PERFORM A PURGE AFTER AN
OMS BURN. FOR A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS, LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE (2/IR).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-522
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
621 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J3-95; 54V76AI21 J3-95
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR PERFORMING AN OMS BURN
WITHOUT A PURGE. NEXT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT ELEMENT, WORST CASE,
WOULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO PERFORM A PURGE AFTER AN OMS
BURN. FOR A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS, LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE (2/IR).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-523
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
622 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 2 VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR Jll-J' TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR JII-FF
(130) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES ENGINE PURGE VLV TO BE FAILED CLOSED AND IS
NO EFFECT. AFFECTED ENGINE LOST FOR I0 MINUTES AFTER SHUTDOWN TO
ALLOW FOR SUBLIMATION OF FROZEN PROP IN ENGINE LINES. OTHER
ENGINE AVAILABLE IF BURN REQUIRED WITHIN 10 MINUTES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES FOR I0 MINUTES AFTER BURNS. CRIT 1/1 FOR MANUAL
TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-524
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 623 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 2 VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR Jll-J' TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR JII-FF
(130) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES THE ENG PURGE VLV TO BE FAILED OPEN AND IS
NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL GN2 PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN OPEN BI-PROP VALVES, AND LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. WITH
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE OF SERIES
VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT IN ONE POD. LOSS OF AFFECTED
ENGINE, AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-525
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
624 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC.
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 1 VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 JII-G; 56V76AI23 JII-R (142) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES ENGINE PURGE VLV TO BE FAILED CLOSED AND IS
NO EFFECT. AFFECTED ENGINE IS LOST FOR i0 MINUTES AFTER SHUTDOWN
TO ALLOW FOR SUBLIMATION OF FROZEN PROP IN ENGINE LINES. OTHER
ENGINE AVAILABLE IS BURN REQUIRED WITHIN i0 MINUTES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH
ENGINES FOR I0 MINUTES AFTER BURNS. CRIT i/I FOR MANUAL
TAL CONTINGENCY OMS DUMP PURGE REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-526
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 625 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BUR/fEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 1 VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 JII-G; 56V76AI23 JII-R (142) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES THE ENG PURGE VLV TO BE FAILED OPEN AND IS
NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL GN2 PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN OPEN BI-PROP VALVES, AND LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. WITH
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE OF SERIES
VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT IN ONE POD, LOSS OF AFFECTED
ENGINE, AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-527
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
626 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JII-E' TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR J6-NN
(133) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS
DUMP DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AN ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-528
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
627 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JII-E' TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR J6-NN
(133) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE DRIVER RESULTS IN HAVING TO PLACE EITHER THE
ARM/PRESS OR THE ENG VLV SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION TO CLOSE ENG
CONTROL VLV NO. 2. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN ALL ENG
CONTROL VLV'S FAILED OPEN REQUIRING THE CLOSURE OF THE TK ISO
VLV'S TO STOP THE BURN. OMS PROPELLANT OR ENGINE ARE NO LONGER
AVAILABLE SINCE REOPENING OF THE TK ISO VLVIS COULD RESULT IN
SEVERE POD DAMAGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-529
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 628 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 2 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JII-F' TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR J6-PP
(134) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-530
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
629 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 2 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JII-F' TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR J6-PP
(134) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF DRIVER RESULTS IN HAVING TO PLACE EITHER THE ARM/PRESS
SWITCH OR THE ENG VLV SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION TO CLOSE ENG
CONTROL VLV NO. 2. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN ALL ENG
CONTROL VLV'S FAILED OPEN REQUIRING THE CLOSURE OF THE TK ISO
VLV'S TO STOP THE BURN. OMS PROPELLANT OR ENGINE ARE NO LONGER
AVAILABLE SINCE REOPENING OF THE TK ISO VLV'S COULD RESULT IN
SEVERE POD DAMAGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-531
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 630 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J3-I09 TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR J3-93
(134) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES I AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-532
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
631 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J3-i09 TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR J3-93
(134) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO DIRECTLY SHUT DOWN THE OME DURING A BURN.
IF A MALFUNCTION OCCURRED, LOW PC AND DELTA V, THE PLACEMENT OF
THE ARM/PRESS SWITCH TO THE OFF POSITION WOULD INSTRUCT THE GPC
TO PERFORM SHUT DOWN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN GPC CMDS
AS THE ONLY METHOD FOR OME SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-533
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 632 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III
AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
54V76AI21AR JII-D TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR J6-MM (135)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS TO OPEN GN2 PRESS ISOL
VALVE. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY EFFECT IS THE SAME AS GN2
PRESS ISOL VLV FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES
(ACCUMULATOR IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT TO GN2 ISOL VLV). THEREFORE
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND CG CONSTRAINTS
DURING DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO G14
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-534
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
633 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
54V76AI21AR JII-D TYPE III; 56V76AI23AR J6-MM (135)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT (GN2 PRESS ISO VLV IS STUCK IN THE
OPEN POSITION) REGULATOR LOCKS UP AND STOPS FLOW. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES OR
DAMAGE TO COMPONENTS RESULTING IN LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT AND/OR
INABILITY TO START ENGINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-535
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
634 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 2 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
III
AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
55V76AI22AR J6-NN TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-E TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-536
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
635 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 2 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
III
AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
55V76AI22AR J6-NN TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-E TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF DRIVER RESULTS IN HAVING TO PLACE EITHER THE ARM/PRESS
SWITCH OR THE ENG VLV SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION TO CLOSE ENG
CONTROL VLV NO. 2. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN ALL ENG
CONTROL VLV'S FAILED OPEN REQUIRING THE CLOSURE OF THE TK ISO
VLV'S TO STOP THE BURN. OMS PROPELLANT OR ENGINES ARE NO LONGER
AVAILABLE SINCE REOPENING OF THE TK ISO VLV'S COULD RESULT IN
SEVERE POD DAMAGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-537
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
636 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
III
AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
55V76AI22AR J6-MM TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-F TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF ENGINE
CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OMERESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-538
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
637 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1 VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
III
AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
55V76AI22AR J6-MM TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-F TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF DRIVER RESULTS IN HAVING TO PLACE EITHER THE ARM/PRESS
SWITCH OR THE ENG VLV SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION TO CLOSE ENG
CONTROL VLV NO. 2. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN ALL ENG
CONTROL VLV'S FAILED OPEN REQUIRING THE CLOSURE OF THE TK ISO
VLV'S TO STOP THE BURN. OMS PROPELLANT OR ENGINES ARE NO LONGER
AVAILABLE SINCE REOPENING OF THE TK ISO VLV'S COULD RESULT IN
SEVERE POD DAMAGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-539
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
638 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
III
AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
55V76AI22AR J3-93 TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR J3-93 TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-540
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
639 ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
III
AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
55V76AI22AR J3-93 TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR J3-93 TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO DIRECTLY SHUT DOWN THE OME DURING A BURN.
IF A MALFUNCTION OCCURRED, LOW PC AND DELTA V, THE PLACEMENT OF
THE ARM/PRESS SWITCH TO THE OFF POSITION WOULD INSTRUCT THE GPC
TO PERFORM SHUT DOWN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN GPC
CMDS AS THE ONLY METHOD FOR OME SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-541
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
640 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
III
AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
55V76AI22AR J6-KK TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-G TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS TO OPEN GN2 PRESS ISOL
VALVE. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY EFFECT IS THE SAME AS GN2
PRESS ISOL VLV FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES
(ACCUMULATOR IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT TO GN2 ISOL VLV) THEREFORE
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND CG CONSTRAINTS
DURING DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-542
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
641 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
III
AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
55V76AI22AR J6-KK TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-G TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT (GN2 PRESS ISOL VLV IS STUCK IN THE
OPEN POSITION) REGULATOR LOCKS UP AND STOPS FLOW. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES OR
DAMAGE TO COMPONENTS RESULTING IN LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURANT AND/OR
INABILITY TO START ENGINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-543
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
642 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 FILL/VENT VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JII-K' TYPE III; 54V76AI23AR JII-GG
(129) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPEN GN2 FILL/VENT VALVE.
WOULD BE A LAUNCH DELAY.
WORST CASE EFFECT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-544
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
643 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 FILL/VENT VLV
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JII-K' TYPE III; 54V76AI23AR JII-GG
(129) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE'S END RESULT WOULD BE A STUCK OPEN FILL/VENT VALVE.
THERE ARE TWO REMAINING SEALS TO PROTECT THE SYSTEM FROM GN2
LOSS. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH OME START CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-545
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
644 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
3/3
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: PNL O14 $9; PNL O16 $7
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4FI3; 33V73AI6FII
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-546
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
645 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
21 R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV & GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV & OME PURGE
1/2 VLVS
6) FUSE, 1A
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL C3AI SI; $2
PART NUMBER: 35V73A3AIFI; F3
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PURGE CAPABILITY FOR ASSOCIATED
LT/RT OME. IF A 2ND FAILURE OCCURS IN THE OTHER POD'S ARM/PRESS
SYSTEM DURING AN OMS BURN TRIGGERING THE FDI SYSTEM AND REQUIRING
MANUAL SHUTDOWN, THE OMS RM WOULD INCORRECTLY SHUTDOWN
GOOD POD AND NOT PERFORM THE OME GN2 PURGE. THE RESULT WOULD BE
A FAILED POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED AND A GOOD POD WHICH CANNOT BE
USED FOR i0 MINUTES. THIS COULD CAUSE YOU TO MISS
DESIRED TARGETS DURING OMS 1 INSERTION OR CAUSE AN OVERSHOOT OF
THE LANDING SITE DURING DEORBIT RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. FOR A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN
AN INABILITY TO PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-547
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
646 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
3/3
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: PNL 014 $9; PNL O16 $7
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4FI4; 33V73AI6FI2
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S
THEREFORE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY
WHEN ABOVE RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL
OMS DUMP DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP
TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS;
ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-548
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 647 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV & GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV & OME PURGE
1/2 VLVS
6) FUSE, 1A
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 2/ 2 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL C3AI SI; $2
PART NUMBER: 35V73A3AIF2; F4
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PURGE CAPABILITY FOR ASSOCIATED
LT/RT OME. IF A 2ND FAILURE OCCURS IN THE OTHER POD'S ARM/PRESS
SYSTEM DURING AN OMS BURN TRIGGERING THE FDI SYSTEM AND REQUIRING
MANUAL SHUTDOWN, THE OMS RM WOULD INCORRECTLY SHUTDOWN
THE GOOD POD AND NOT PERFORM THE OME GN2 PURGE. THE RESULT WOULD
BE A FAILURED POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED AND A GOOD POD WHICH
CANNOT BE USED FOR i0 MINUTES. THIS COULD CAUSE YOU TO MISS
DESIRED TARGETS DURING OMS 1 INSERTION OR CAUSE AN OVERSHOOT OF
THE LANDING SITE DURING DEORBIT RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE. FOR A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN
AN INABILITY TO PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4; FSSR STS83-O010A PART D 30 JUNE 85; FSSR STS
81-0026 CR29378A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-549
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
648 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1 VLV
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 JII-E'; 56V76AI23 J6-NN (133)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-550
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
649 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 2 VLV
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A121 JII-F'; 56V76A123 J6-PP (132)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO G14
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-551
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
650 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J6-NN; 54V76A JII-E (121)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-552
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
651 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORB I T: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J6-MM; 54V76A JII-F _121)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE OPERATION OF
ENGINE CONTROL VALVES 1 AND 2.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH OME'S THEREFORE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE
RCS REDLINES AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL OMS DUMP
DURING ABORTS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK
STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. FOR ABORTS; ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE OME RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
PERFORM DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO G14
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-553
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
652 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J8-24; 56V76AI23R J8-24 (i01)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR ENGINE PURGE VALVE, OPERATION CAN BE INDIRECTLY
DETERMINED BY MONITORING ENGINE AND N2 TANK PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-554
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 653 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
54V76AI21 J8-24; 56V76AI23R J8-24 (I01)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 654 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV & GN2 ENG CNTRL 1 VLV
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J8-41; 56V76AI23 J8-26
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TALKBACKS FOR THE ENGINE CONTROL NO. 1 AND ENGINE PRESS ISOL
VALVES WOULD FALSELY INDICATE VALVES FAILED CLOSED. THE ENGINE
CONTROL VALVE OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED BY MONITORING OME
OPERATION.
A FALSE INDICATION OF AN ENGINE PRESS ISOL VALVE FAILED CLOSE
COULD RESULT IN FAILING THE ASSOCIATED OME FOR ALL BURNS EXCEPT
DEORBIT, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD FALSELY INDICATE A FAILURE IN BOTH
OME'S GN2 SYSTEM. AT THIS POINT THE NEXT OMS BURN SHOULD BE
PERFORMED WITH SETP, FOR DETERMINATION OF OME HEALTH, NO EFFECT
ON MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-556
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
655 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 2 VLV
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TA_L:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J8-41; 56V76AI23 J8-26
c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SIGNAL STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-557
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
656 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 2 VLV
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76A122 J8-26; 54V76AI21 J8-26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE VALVE TALKBACK. VALVE OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED BY
MONITORING BALL VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, VALVE POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED FROM OME
OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-558
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
657 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 2 VLV
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3 / 3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J8-26; 54V76AI21 J8-26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, SIGNAL STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-559
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12130186
OMS
658
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-16; 56V76AI23R J2-5 (102)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TALKBACK FOR THE LT/RT OMS ENGINE VLV CREW SWITCH WOULD
FALSELY INDICATE A SWITCH FAILURE. ACTUAL ABILITY TO PERFORM AN
OMS BURN WITH ASSOCIATED ENGINE IS UNKNOWN UNTIL A BURN IS
PERFORMED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-560
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 659 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-16; 56V76AI23R J2-5 (102)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK FOR THE OMS ENGINE VLV CREW SWITCH STILL
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-561
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
660 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST" V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-17 TO GND; 56V76AI23 J2-6 TO GND
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SIGNAL STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-562
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 661 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-17 TO GND; 56V76AI23 J2-6 TO GND
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. A 2ND FAILURE OCCURS IN THE OTHER
POD'S ARM/PRESS SYSTEM DURING AN OMS BURN TRIGGERING THE FDI
SYSTEM AND REQUIRING MANUAL SHUTDOWN. THE OMS RM WOULD
INCORRECTLY SHUTDOWN THE GOOD POD AND NOT PERFORM THE OME GN2
PURGE. THE RESULT WOULD BE A FAILED POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED AND
A GOOD POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED FOR i0 MINUTES. THIS COULD
CAUSE YOU TO MISS DESIRED TARGETS DURING OMS 1 INSERTION OR CAUSE
AN OVERSHOOT OF THE LANDING SITE DURING DEORBIT RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-563
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
662 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-18; 56V76AI23 J2-7
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PURGE CAPABILITY FOR ASSOCIATED
LT/RT OME. A 2ND FAILURE OCCURS IN THE OTHER POD'S ARM/PRESS
SYSTEM DURING AN OMS BURN TRIGGERING THE FDI SYSTEM AND REQUIRING
MANUAL SHUTDOWN. THE OMS RM WOULD INCORRECTLY SHUTDOWN
THE GOOD POD AND NOT PERFORM THE OME GN2 PURGE. THE RESULT WOULD
BE A FAILED POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED AND A GOOD POD WHICH CANNOT
BE USED FOR i0 MINUTES. THIS COULD CAUSE YOU TO MISS
DESIRED TARGETS DURING OMS 1 INSERTION OR CAUSE AN OVERSHOOT OF
THE LANDING SITE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE. FOR
A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO G14
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-564
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 663 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
OME PURGE 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-18; 56V76AI23 J2-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SIGNAL STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-565
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
664 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-17 TO J3-i08; 56V76AI23 J2-6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. A 2ND FAILURE OCCURS IN THE OTHER
POD'S ARM/PRESS SYSTEM DURING AN OMS BURN TRIGGERING THE FDI
SYSTEM AND REQUIRING MANUAL SHUTDOWN. THE OMS RM WOULD
INCORRECTLY SHUTDOWN THE GOOD POD AND NOT PERFORM THE OME GN2
PURGE. THE RESULT WOULD BE A FAILED POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED AND
A GOOD POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED FOR 10 MINUTES. THIS COULD
CAUSE YOU TO MISS DESIRED TARGETS DURING OMS 1 INSERTION OR CAUSE
AN OVERSHOOT OF THE LANDING SITE DURING DEORBIT RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-566
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
665 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J2-17 TO J3-i08; 56V76A123 J2-6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SIGNAL STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-567
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 666 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[.P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J2-6 TO GND; 54V76AI21 J2-6 TO GND
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. A 2ND FAILURE OCCURS IN THE OTHER
POD'S ARM/PRESS SYSTEM DURING AN OMS BURN TRIGGERING THE FDI
SYSTEM AND REQUIRING MANUAL SHUTDOWN. THE OMS RM WOULD
INCORRECTLY SHUTDOWN THE GOOD POD AND NOT PERFORM THE OME GN2
PURGE. THE RESULT WOULD BE A FAILED POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED AND
A GOOD POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED FOR i0 MINUTES. THIS COULD
CAUSE YOU TO MISS DESIRED TARGETS DURING OMS 1 INSERTION OR CAUSE
AN OVERSHOOT OF THE LANDING SITE DURING DEORBIT RESULTIN IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4, FSSR STS 83,0010A, PART D, 30 JUNE 85; FSSR
STS 81-0026 CR29378A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-568
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 667 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J2-6 TO J3-94; 54V76AI21 J2-6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE NO EFFECT. A 2ND FAILURE OCCURS IN THE OTHER POD'S
ARM/PRESS SYSTEM DURING AN OMS BURN TRIGGERING THE FDI SYSTEM AND
REQUIRING MANUAL SHUTDOWN. THE OMS RM WOULD
INCORRECTLY SHUTDOWN THE GOOD POD AND NOT PERFORM THE OME GN2
PURGE. THE RESULT WOULD BE A FAILED POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED AND
A GOOD POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED FOR I0 MINUTES. THIS COULD
CAUSE YOU TO MISS DESIRED TARGETS DURING OMS 1 INSERTION OR CAUSE
AN OVERSHOOT OF THE LANDING SITE DURING DEORBIT RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4, FSSR STS 83,0010A, PART D, 30 JUNE 85; FSSR
STS 81-0026 CR29378A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-569
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
668 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J2-6 TO J3-94; 54V76AI21 J2-6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SIGNAL STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4, FSSR STS 83,0010A, PART D, 30 JUNE 85; FSSR
STS 81-0026 CR29378A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-570
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
669 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J2-6 TO GND; 54V76AI21 J2-6 TO GND
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SIGNAL STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-571
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
670 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
s)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 2/ 2 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J2-7; 54V76AI21 J2-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PURGE CAPABILITY FOR ASSOCIATED
LT/RT OME. A 2ND FAILURE OCCURS IN THE OTHER POD'S ARM/PRESS
SYSTEM DURING AN OMS BURN TRIGGERING THE FDI SYSTEM AND REQUIRING
MANUAL SHUTDOWN. THE OMS RM WOULD INCORRECTLY SHUTDOWN THE
GOOD POD AND NOT PERFORM THE OME GN2 PURGE. THE RESULT WOULD BE
A FAILURED POD WHICH CANNOT BE USED AND A GOOD POD WHICH CANNOT
BE USED FOR i0 MINUTES. THIS COULD CAUSE YOU TO MISS
DESIRED TARGETS DURING OMS 1 INSERTION OR CAUSE AN OVERSHOOT OF
THE LANDING SITE RESULTING IN POLLIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE. FOR
A MANUAL TAL THE LOSS OF THE PURGE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
PERFORM TIME CRITICAL PROP DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4; FSSR STS83-0010A PART D 30 JUNE 85; FSSR STS
81-0026 CR29378A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-572
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
671 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J2-7; 54V76AI21 J2-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, SIGNAL STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4, FSSR STS 83,0010A, PART D, 30 JUNE 85; FSSR
STS 81-0026 CR29378A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-573
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
672 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENGARM/PRESS (C3AI, SI/$2)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ARM/PRESS POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY.
5) GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV & GN2 ENG CONTRL 1/2 VLVS & OME PURGE
1/2 VLVS
6) SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG ARM/PRESS (C3AI, SI/$2)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL C3AI
PART NUMBER: 35V73A3AI-SI; $2
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT THE LT/RT ENGINE PURGE AFTER AN OME
BURN AND TO CLOSE LT/RT GN2 PRESS ISOL VLV. ON/OFF SELECTION
STILL AVAILABLE THROUGH LT/RT OMS ENG VLV SWITCH $9/$7, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS THE SAME EFFECT AS GN2 PRESS ISOL VLV
FAILING OPEN (FAILS TO CLOSE) RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
DOWNSTREAM LINES OR DAMAGE TO COMPONENTS RESULTING IN LOSS OF GN2
PRESSURANT AND/OR INABILITY TO START ENGINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4; MF0004-400 REV C (EEE PL)
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-574
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
673 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENGARM/PRESS (C3A1, S1/S2)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ARM POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV & GN2 ENG CONTRL 1/2 VLVS & OME PURGE
1/2 VLVS
6) SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG ARM/PRESS (C3AI, SI/$2)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL C3AI
PART NUMBER: 35V73A3AI-SI; $2
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT, REMAINING ENGINE START (IN
ACCUMULATOR) SAVED FOR DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS THE
SAME EFFECT AS GN2 ISOL VLV FAILING CLOSED RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF START CAPABILITY FOR BOTH
ENGINES. WITH FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
(ACCUMULATOR) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF ENGINE AND INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND
ORBITER ENTRY CG CONSTRAINTS. ACCUMULATOR PROVIDES FAIL-SAFE
PROTECTION FOR UPSTREAM FAILURES AND IS CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4; MF0004-400 REV C (EEE PL)
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-575
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 674 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENGARM/PRESS (C3A1, Si/S2)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
4) GN2 ASSEMBLY
5) GN2 ENG PRESS ISOL VLV & GN2 ENG CONTRL 1/2 VLVS & OME PURGE
1/2 VLVS
6) SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG ARM/PRESS (C3AI, SI/$2)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL C3AI
PART NUMBER: 35V73A3AI-SI; $2
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO OPERATE THE ASSOCIATED LT/RT BI-PROP
BALL VLV RESULTING IN LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. ONE FAILURE (RT/LT
ARM/PRESS SWITCH FAILURE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES AND THEREFORE LOSS OF DEORBIT
CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE RCS REDLINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR
TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. LOSS OF AN ENGINE RESULTS
IN AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMPRESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4; MF0004-400 REV C (EEE PL)
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-576
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 675 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
21ZR
I/i
ITEM: SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG CONTROL VLV
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG CONTROL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/i
3/3
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 014;016
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4-S9; 33V73AI6-S7
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO OPERATE THE ASSOCIATED LT/RT BI-PROP
BALL VLV RESULTING IN LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. ONE FAILURE (RT/LT
ARM/PRESS SWITCH FAILURE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES AND THEREFORE LOSS OF DEORBIT
CAPABILITY WHEN ABOVE RCS REDLINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR
TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. LOSS OF AN ENGINE RESULTS
IN AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PROP TANK STRUCTURAL AND ORBITER ENTRY CG
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4; MF0004-400 REV C (EEE PL)
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-577
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 676 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG CONTROL VLV
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ON POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
GN2 ENG CNTRL 1/2 VLV
SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG CONTROL VLV
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: PNL 014;016
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4-Sg; 33V73AI6-S7
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OMS ARM/PRESS SWITCH STILL AVAILABLE TO TERMINATE OMS
BURN IF NECESSARY.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN INABILITY TO SHUT DOWN THE LT
AND RT OME IN THE EVENT OF A SYSTEM MALFUNCTION. IF THE LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY IS DETECTED DURING ORBIT, THE OMS ENGINES SHOULD
BE DECLARED FAILED ACCEPT ON AN AS ON NEED OPERATIONS BASIS FOR
THE DEORBIT BURN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; VS70-
976102 REV F EO GI4; MF0004-400 REV C (EEE PL)
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-578
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 677 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BUR/fEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVCASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (STANDBY)
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 4, PCA 1 _
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32RPCI6; 54V76AI31RPC28
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE SUPPLY OF TVC MTR PWR TO
THE STANBY PITCH & YAW MOTORS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER
OME, THEREFORE DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS LOST WHEN ABOVE THE RCS
REDLINES, LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
(FOR MANUAL TAL LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-579
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 678 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (STANDBY)
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32RPCI6; 54V76AI31RPC28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM STANDBY PITCH & YAW ACTUATOR
CONTROL.
NO EFFECT UNLESS A FAILURE OF THE STANDBY CONTROLLER OCCURS, THEN
BOTH ACTIVE AND STANDBY CONTROLLERS COULD BE IN CONFLICT AND
RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL OMS ENGINE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-S80
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 679
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (STANDBY)
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT"
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
312R AOA: 313
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
55V76AI32RPCI5; 54V76AI31RPC27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE SUPPLY OF TVC MTR PWR TO
THE STANBY PITCH & YAW MOTORS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER
OME, THEREFORE DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS LOST WHEN THE RCD REDLINES,
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
(FOR MANUAL TAL LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE. )
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-581
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 680 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (STANDBY)
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
55V76AI32RPCIS; 54V76AI3 IRPC27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM STANDBY PITCH & YAW ACTUATOR
CONTROL.
NO EFFECT UNLESS A FAILURE OF THE STANDBY CONTROLLER OCCURS, THEN
BOTH ACTIVE AND STANDBY CONTROLLERS COULD BE IN CONFLICT AND
RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL OMS ENGINE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-582
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 681 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (ACTIVE)
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI33RPC25; 56V76AI33RPCI8
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE SUPPLY OF TVC MTR PWR TO
THE ACTIVE PITCH & YAW MOTORS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER
OME THEREFORE, DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS LOST WHEN ABOVE RCS
REDLINES, LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
(FOR MANUAL TAL LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN 1/1.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-583
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 682
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (ACTIVE)
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
54V76AI33RPC25; 56V76AI33RPCI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM ACTIVE PITCH & YAW ACTUATOR
CONTROL.
NO EFFECT UNLESS A FAILURE OF THE ACTIVE CONTROLLER OCCURS, THEN
BOTH ACTIVE AND STANDBY CONTROLLERS COULD BE IN CONFLICT AND
RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL OMS ENGINE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-584
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 683 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (ACTIVE)
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPC26; 56V76AI33RPCI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF TWO ELECTRICAL PATHS FOR THE SUPPLY OF TVC MTR PWR TO
THE ACTIVE PITCH & YAW MOTORS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER
OME THEREFORE, DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS LOST WHEN ABOVE RCS RELINES,
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE.
(FOR MANUAL TAL LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN I/i.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-585
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 684 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (ACTIVE)
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
54V76AI3 IRPC26; 56V76AI33RPCI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM ACTIVE PITCH & YAW ACTUATOR
CONTROL.
NO EFFECT UNLESS A FAILURE OF THE ACTIVE CONTROLLER OCCURS, THEN
BOTH ACTIVE AND STANDBY CONTROLLERS COULD BE IN CONFLICT AND
RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL OMS ENGINE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-586
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
i1141e7
OMS
685
HIGHEST CRITICALITY .HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (STANDBY)
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
55V76AI32FI6; 54V76AI31FI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ELECTRICAL POWER TO CONTROL CIRCUITRY FOR TVC STANDBY PITCH
& YAW MOTORS. ACTIVE TVC FOROME AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER OME
THEREFORE DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS LOST WHEN ABOVE RCS REDLINES,
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE. (MANUAL TAL LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN i/i.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-587
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 686 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BP_EAXDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVCASSEMBLY
ACTUATOR DRIVE MOTOR PITCH & YAW (ACTIVE)
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
54V76AI31FI7; 56V76AI33FI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ELECTRICAL POWER TO CONTROL CIRCUITRY FOR THE TVC ACTIVE
PITCH & YAW MOTORS. STANDBY TVC FOR OME AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER OME
THEREFORE DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS LOST WHEN ABOVE RCS REDLINES,
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE. (FOR MANUAL TAL LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
RESULTS IN i/i.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-588
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2 R
687 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM"
NO. 1
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE PNEUMATIC PRESSURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE PNEUMATIC PRESSURE NO.I
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OME
51V43PT004, 52V43PT004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO UTILIZE PT004 FOR GN2 TK PRESSURE MEASUREMENT. A
REDUNDANT LT/RT PRESSURE MEASUREMENT IS AVAILABLE UTILIZING PT005
MEASUREMENT V43P4548CI/V43P5548C. IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST
(FAILS LOW INDICATING LOSS OF GN2) THE REAL STATUS OF THE OME N2
TK WILL BE UNAVAILABLE OR FALSELY INDICATED (LOSS OF N2) AND CAN
RESULT IN FALSELY FAILING 20MS GN2 TKS LEAKING/FAILED, THEREFORE
MISSION CAPABILITIES LOST OR ATO COULD BE CALLED (REF
FLIGHT RULE 6-40).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-589
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
688 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
NO. 2
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE PNEUMATIC PRESSURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE PNEUMATIC PRESSURE NO.2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43PT005, 52V43PT005
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO UTILIZE PT005 FOR GN2 TK PRESSURE MEASUREMENT. A
REDUNDANT LT/RT PRESSURE MEASUREMENT IS AVAILABLE UTILIZING PT004
MEASUREMENT 43VP4547C/43VP5547C. IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSE
(FAILS LOW INDICATING LOSS OF GN2) THE REAL STATUS OF THE OME N2
TK WILL BE UNAVAILABLE OR FALSELY INDICATED (LOSS OF N2) AND CAN
RESULT IN FALSELY FAILING 2 OMS GN2 TKS LEAKING/FAILED;
THEREFORE, MISSION CAPABILITIES LOST OR ATO COULD BE CALLED
(REF FLIGHT RULE 6-40).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-590
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/2
689 ABORT: I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE REG OUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
GN2 ASSEMBLY
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE REG OUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OME
51V43PT006, 52V43PT006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF PT006 COULD LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING ONE OMS ENGINE
(SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-4, LINE FAILURE). FOR LO & OO LOSS OF AN OMS
ENGINE WOULD RESULT IN LIMITING ATTITUDE TO RCS DEORBIT
CAPABILITIES. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IN THE DO PHASE COULD LEAD TO
FAILURE OF TWO OMS ENGINES AND THEREFORE LOSS OF DEORBIT
CAPABILITY IF ABOVE THE RCS REDLINE. LOSS OF ONE OMS ENGINE
DURING RTLS & TAL WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO PERFORM TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-591
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 690 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BI-PROP 2 VLVS
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
55V76AI32F20; 56V76AI33FII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE POSITION INDICATION FOR (LT/RT) BI-PROP VALVE 2. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANY RESULTS IN LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION FOR ALL BI-
PROP VALVES LT & RT. NO LIMITATION WILL RESULT FROM THE FAILURE
SINCE BI-PROP PERFORMANCE AND HEALTH CAN BE INDIRECTLY
DETERMINED FROM ENGINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-592
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 691 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
BI-PROP 1 VLVS
FUSE, 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31FI3; FI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE POSITION INDICATION FOR (LT/RT) BI-PROP VALVE i. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANY RESULTS IN LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION FOR ALL BI-
PROP VALVES LT & RT. NO LIMITATION WILLRESULT FROM THE FAILURE
SINCE BI-PROP PERFORMANCE AND HEALTH CAN BE INDIRECTLY
DETERMINED FROM ENGINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-593
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
692 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, RT/LT OME PRESSURE PC
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
METER, RT/LT OME PRESSURE PC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL F7A5 M2
PART NUMBER: 34V73A7A5-MI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE VISUAL INDICATION OF PC. ENGINE HEALTH CAN STILL BE
MONITORED UTILIZING BALL VALVE POSITON, DELTA V AND ENGINE
TEMPERATURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A E0 BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-594
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
693 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR POSITION, BI-PROPELLANT VALVE 1
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
SENSOR POSITION, BI-PROPELLANT 1 VALVES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43LVI, 52V43LVI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE INDICATION OF VALVE POSITION COULD LEAD TO LIMITING OMS
ENGINE USE. THE ENGINE WILL BE USED ONLY IF THE OTHER ENGINE HAS
FAILED AND THEN ONLY FOR THE DEORBIT BURN (REF FLIGHT RULE 6-26).
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING LO OR OO PHASE WOULD LEAD TO
FAILURE TO REACH DESIRED ALTITUDE, (LIMIT ATTITUDE TO RCS
REDLINES TO ENSURE DEORBIT CAPABILITY).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; JSC
20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-595
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
694 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR POSITION, BI-PROPELLANT VALVE 2
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
SENSOR POSITION, BI-PROPELLANT 2 VALVES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43LV2, 52V43LV2
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE INDICATION OF VALVE POSITION COULD LEAD TO LIMITING OMS
ENGINE USE. THE ENGINE WILL BE USED ONLY IF THE OTHER ENGINE HAS
FAILED AND THEN ONLY FOR THE DEORBIT BURN (REF FLIGHT RULE 6-26).
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING LO OR OO PHASE WOULD LEAD TO
FAILURE TO REACH DESIRED ALTITUDE, (LIMIT ATTITUDE TO RCS
REDLINES TO ENSURE DEORBIT CAPABILITY).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E; JSC
20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-596
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
695 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE CHAMBER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OMEASSEMBLY
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS EMGINE CHAMBER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OME
51V43PT003, 52V43PT003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PC MEASUREMENT HIGH WILL BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FUTHER USE OF
THE AFFECTED ENGINE FOR NONCRITICAL OMS BURNS IF THE OTHER OMS
ENGINE IS STILL AVAILABLE (REF FLIGHT RULE 6-27). WITH THE LOSS
OF PC THE CREW WOULD BE UNABLE TO DISCERN INSTRUMENTATION FROM A
REAL PERFORMANCE PROBLEM DURING AN OMS BURN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-597
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
696 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE FU INLET PRESS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OMEASSEMBLY
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE FU INLET PRESS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43PT001, 52V43PT001
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO UTILIZE PT001 FOR FUEL INLET PRESSURE
MEASUREMENT. THE MEASUREMENT IS USED FOR LEAK ISOLATION AND (IN
CONJUNCTION WITH PC, FUEL INJECTOR TEMPAND BALL VALVE POSITION
INDICATOR) FOR ISOLATION OF OX FLOW RESTRICTION.
FAILURE OF THE SENSOR SEVERELY DEGRADES CREW MONITORING
CAPABILITY. DECREASED CAPABILITY TO DETERMINE FLOW RATE AND
DISCERN BETWEEN ENGINE AND PROPELLANT FAILURES.
RECOMMEND THIS PRESSURE MEASUREMENT BE INCLUDED IN FLIGHT RULE 6-
27.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-598
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
697 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE OX INLET PRESS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE OX INLET PRESS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43PT002, 52V43PT002
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO UTILIZE PT002 FOR OX INLET PRESSURE MEASUREMENT.
THE MEASUREMENT IS USED FOR LEAK ISOLATION AND (INCONJUNCTION
WITH PC, FUEL INJECTOR TEMPAND BALL VALVE POSITION INDICATOR)
FOR ISOLATION OF OX FLOW RESTRICTION. FAILURE OF THE SENSOR
SEVERELY DEGRADES CREW MONITORING CAPABILITY. DECREASED
CAPABILITY TO DETERMINE FLOW RATE AND DISCERN BETWEEN ENGINE AND
PROPELLANT FAILURES.
RECOMMEND THIS PRESSURE MEASUREMENT BE INCLUDED IN FLIGHT RULE 6-
27.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-599
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
698 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE ENGINE FUEL FEED LINE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENGINE FUEL FEED LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OME
51V43TT002, 52V43TT002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A FAILURE OF THE SENSOR, A FALSE TEMP INDICATION OF EITHER
<25 F OR >130 F THE ASSOCIATED ENGINE WOULD BE DECLARED FAILED
(REF JSC 20923 PCN-I, RULE 6-3) RESULTING IN LOSS OF FULL MISSION
CAPABILITIES DUE TO IMPOSED PROP MGR TECHS TO ENSURE DEORBIT
CAPABILITIES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO
INCORRECTLY FAILING TWO OMS ENGINES AND IF THIS DECISION IS NOT
REVERSED A POSSIBLE LOSS OF DEORBIT CAPABILITY WOULD RESULT THUS
LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW. FOR RTLS & OMS BOTH ENGINES ARE NEEDED TO
DUMP PROP AND ESTABLISH WEIGHT & CG FOR ACCEPTABLE LANDING.
CONSIDERING THE TIME ALLOWED DURING ABORTS ALL DECISIONS ARE TIME
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
84OCTI
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I; JSC-18958
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-600
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
699 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENGINE FUEL INJECTOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENGINE FUEL INJECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT001, 52V43TT001
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUEL INJECTOR TEMPERATURE FAIL HIGH/LOW WILL BE CAUSE TO
NO-GO FURTHER USE OF THE AFFECTED ENGINE FOR NONCRITICAL OMS
BURNS IF THE OTHER OME IS STILL AVAILABLE (REF FLIGHT RULE 6-27).
FAILURE OF THE SENSOR SEVERELY DEGRADES CREW MONITORING
CAPABILITY. AN ENGINE FAILURE COULD NOT BE DISTINGUISHED FROM A
PROPELLANT FAILURE IF IT OCCURS DURING AN OMS BURN WITH THE
AFFECTED ENGINE. THE ENGINE AND ASSOCIATED PROPELLANT SYSTEMS
WOULD BE SUSPECT AND COULD NOT BE USED WITHOUT POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO
GOOD ENGINE OR OMS POD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18958 84OCTI; JSC
20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-601
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
700 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENGINE OX VALVE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OMESUBSYSTEM
OMEASSEMBLY
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENGINE OX VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT003, 52V43TT003
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MISSION IMPACT. SENSOR PROVIDES A NONCRITICAL MEASUREMENT.
FAILURE CAN BE DETERMINED BY INSPECTING OX FEED LN TEMP
V43T4216A/V43T5216AAND ENGINE FU INJECTOR TEMP
V43T4643A/V43T5643A SENSORS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-602
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
701 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX ENG INLET
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
OME ASSEMBLY
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX ENG INLET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT407, 52V43TT507
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE DIRECT TEMP MEASUREMENT OF OX ENG INLET LN AND AN
INDIRECT INDICATION OF THE OME COVER HTR SYSTEM. VALIDITY OF
MEASUREMENT CAN BE DETERMINED FROM LN PRESS, OME COVER TEMPAND
FUEL FEED LINE TEMP MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E (ZONE 76-
C); JSC 20923 PCN-I; JSC 18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-603
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/IR
702 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR POSITION, ACTIVE PITCH ACTUATOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
SENSOR POSITION, ACTIVE PITCH ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43 ,52V43
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POSITION SENSOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT
CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR OME TVC. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER OME THEREFORE, DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS
LOST WHEN ABOVE RCS REDLINES (FLIGHT & ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-604
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/IR
703 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR POSITION, ACTIVE YAW ACTUATOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVC ASSEMBLY
SENSOR POSITION, ACTIVE YAW ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43 ,52V43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POSITION SENSOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT
CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR OME TVC. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER OME THEREFORE, DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS
LOST WHEN ABOVE RCS REDLINES (FLIGHT & ATO) o
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-605
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/1R
704 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR POSITION, STANDBY PITCH ACTUATOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVCASSEMBLY
SENSOR POSITION, STANDBY PITCH ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43 ,52V43
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POSITION SENSOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT
CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR OME TVC. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER OME THEREFORE, DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS
LOST WHEN ABOVE RCS REDLINES (FLIGHT & ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-606
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/IR
705 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR POSITION, STANDBY YAW ACTUATOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ( OPEN, SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OME SUBSYSTEM
TVCASSEMBLY
SENSOR POSITION, STANDBY YAW ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: OME
PART NUMBER: 51V43 ,52V43
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POSITION SENSOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT
CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR OME TVC. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
INABILITY TO CONTROL EITHER OME THEREFORE, DEORBIT CAPABILITY IS
LOST WHEN ABOVE RCS REDLINES (FLIGHT & ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; MC621-0059 REV E
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-607
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 706 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-S' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-FF
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8 'I 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-608
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 707 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-S' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-FF
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-609
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 708 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SiP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-CC TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-KK
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 FAND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-610
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 709 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-CC TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-KK
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-611
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
710 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-D' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-F
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-612
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 711 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANC% SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-D' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-F
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-613
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 712
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TA.L: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-FF TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-NN
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-614
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 713 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-FF TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-NN
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-615
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 714
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA 1; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-U' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-DD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S 'ION" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNEI85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-616
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 715 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR Jll-V' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-EE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-617
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 716
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-U' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-DD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-618
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 717 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-V' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-EE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANT8 AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-619
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 718
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-T' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-GG
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-620
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 719 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-T' TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-GG
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-621
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 720 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR JII-S' TYPE III; 54V76AI23AR Jll-S'
(145) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-622
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 721 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILUREMODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR JII-S' TYPE III; 54V76AI23AR JII-S'
(145) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-623
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 722 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KK TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR JII-KE (151) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR Jll-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-624
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 723 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
4)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KKTYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR JII-KK (151) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR Jll-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-625
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 724 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
a)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR J6-JJ (150) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-H
TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTRIS 'ION" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-626
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 725
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR J6-JJ (150) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-H
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-627
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 726 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) " THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NN TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR JII-NN (155) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR Jll-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 FAND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-628
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 727
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NN TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR JII-NN (155) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR Jll-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-629
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 728 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3 / 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR JII-V' TYPE III; 54V76AI23AR JII-V'
(142) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-630
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 729
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR Jll-V' TYPE III; 54V76AI23AR Jll-V'
(142) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-631
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 730 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR JII-U' TYPE III; 54V76AI23AR JII-U'
(143) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-632
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 731 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR JII-U' TYPE III; 54V76AI23AR JII-U'
(143) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-633
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 732 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR JII-T' TYPE III; 54V76AI23AR JII-T'
(144) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-634
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 733
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLI GHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR JII-T' TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-T'
(144) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-635
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 734 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR J6-AA TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR J6-U'
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF THE HTR "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR
GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD
STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 DEG F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGES. TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4"
BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552
DEG F AN A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615 DEG F
UNDER SAME CONDITIONS. AND BOTH TYPES WILL EXCEED THE QUALIFIED
TEMP OF 425 DEG F IN APPROXIMATELY 2 MIN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-636
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 735
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR J6-AA TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR J6-U'
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-637
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
736 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III 0
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-EE TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-MM
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF THE HTR "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR
GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD
STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 DEG F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A
4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF
552 DEG F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615 DEG
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS. AND BOTH TYPES WILL EXCEED THE
QUALIFIED TEMP OF 425 DEG F IN APPROXIMATELY 2 MIN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-638
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 737 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JII-EE TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-MM
TYPE III O
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B121JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-639
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 738 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR Jll-C TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-G
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF
THE HTR "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS
ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 DEG F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE LIFE
DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W
HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552 DEG F AND A
i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615 DEG F UNDER SAME
CONDITIONS. AND BOTH TYPES WILL EXCEED THE QUALIFIED TEMP OF 425
DEG F IN APPROXIMATELY 2 MIN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-640
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 739 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-C TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR JII-G
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-641
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 740 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-BB TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR Jll-JJ
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTRIS "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERTURE EXCEEDING
THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A
4" BY 8' 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF
552 F AND A I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615 F UNDER
SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-642
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 741
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
312R AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III O
AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21AR JII-BB TYPE III O; 55V76AI22AR Jll-JJ
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-643
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 742 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR J6-Y (153) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR J6-I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF THE HTR "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR
GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING INA TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD
STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 DEG F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGES. TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4" BY
8 I' 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552 DEG
F AN A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615 DEG F UNDER
SAME CONDITIONS. AND BOTH TYPES WILL EXCEED THE QUALIFIED TEMP
OF 425 DEG F IN APPROXIMATELY 2 MIN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-644
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 743
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR J6-Y (153) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR J6-I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-645
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 744
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MM TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR JII-MM (154) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR Jll-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF THE HTR "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR
GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD
STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 DEG F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A
4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF
552 DEG F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615 DEG
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS. AND BOTH TYPES WILL EXCEED THE
QUALIFIED TEMP OF 425 DEG F IN APPROXIMATELY 2 MIN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-646
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 745 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR JII-MM (154) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR JII-
MM TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-647
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 746 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR J6-KK (147) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR Jll-J
TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED 'ION"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF
THE HTR "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS
ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 DEG F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W
HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552 DEG F AND A
I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615 DEG F UNDER SAME
CONDITIONS. AND BOTH TYPES WILL EXCEED THE QUALIFIED TEMP OF 425
DEG F IN APPROXIMATELY 2 MIN.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-648
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 747 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR J6-KK (147) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR Jll-J
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-649
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 748
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
JJ TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR Jll-JJ (148) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR Jll-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERTURE EXCEEDING
THE POD STRUCTUAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425 F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A
4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF
552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615 F UNDER
SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-650
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 749 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
_)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
JJ TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23AR Jll-JJ (148) TYPE III; 54V76AI21AR Jll-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNEB85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-651
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
750 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IOA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23F JII-HH; 54V76AI21F JII-HH
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE GSE HTR SYSTEM WHICH IS
CONSIDERED A FAIL OPERATIONAL CONDITION SINCE NO TEMPERATURE
LIMITS WILL BE EXCEEDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-652
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 751 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21F JII-AA; 55V76AI22F JII-HH
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE GSE HTR SYSTEM WHICH IS
CONSIDERED A FAIL OPERATIONAL CONDITION SINCE NO TEMPERATURE
LIMITS WILL BE EXCEEDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-653
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/16/87 HIGHEST CRIT ICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 752 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT LOWER Y-WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21F JII-GG; 55V76AI22F JII-PP
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE OMS POD AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-654
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 753
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 10A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT LOWER Y-WEB GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23F JII-PP; 54V76AI21F JII-PP
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE OMS POD AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-655
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 754 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) FUSE, 10A, LT/RT OME GROUP 1
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEOREIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21F JII-W'; 55V76AI22F JII-CC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OME COVER HTR SYSTEM (LT/RT) HTR'S. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP
AVAILABLE. THE OME COVER HTR'S ARE NOT A CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM,
BUT LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-656
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HI GHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 755 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 10A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT OME GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21F JIIX'; 55V76AI22F JIIR'
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ENGINE SERVICE PANEL HTR SYSTEM (LT/RT) HTR'S. REDUNDANT
HTR GROUP AVAILABLE. THE ENGINE SERVICE PNL HTR SYSTEM IS NOT A
CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM, BUT LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO ANINABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-657
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 756 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 10A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT OME GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22F JII-W'; 56V76AI23F JII-W'
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OME COVER HTR SYSTEM (LT/RT) HTR'S. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP
AVAILABLE. THE OME COVER HTR'S ARE NOT A CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM,
BUT LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-658
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 757 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT OME GROUP 2
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[p]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22F JII-X'; 56V76AI23F Jll-X'
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ENGINE SERVICE PANEL HTR SYSTEM (LT/RT) HTR'S. REDUNDANT
HTR GROUP AVAILABLE. THE ENGINE SERVICE PNLHTR SYSTEM IS NOT A
CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM, BUT LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-659
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 758
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT UPPER Y WEB GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
54V76AI21F J6-LL; 55V76AI22F J6-L
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PART OF THE UPPER Y-WEB SYSTEM
(LT/RT) HTR'S. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FAILURE
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT. (SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-10)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-660
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 759 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 10A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT UPPER Y WEB GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21F J6-I'; 55V76AI22F J6-AA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PART OF THE UPPER Y-WEB SYSTEM
(LT/RT) HTR'S. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FAILURE
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT. (SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-10)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-661
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 760 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT UPPER Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22F J6-LL; 56V76AI23F J6-LL
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PART OF THE UPPER Y-WEB SYSTEM
(LT/RT) HTR'S. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FAILURE
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT. (SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-10)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-662
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 761 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
?)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A, LT/RT UPPER Y WEB GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22F J6-I'; 56V76AI23F J6-U'
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PART OF THE UPPER Y-WEB SYSTEM
(LT/RT) HTRIS. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FAILURE
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT. (SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-10)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-663
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 762 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, KEEL WEB & LOWER Y-WEB ,GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33F4; 54V76AI31F22
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE LOWER Y-WEB AND KEEL WEB AND WOULD
BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-664
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 763 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL & RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31FI0; 55V76AI32F4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-665
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 764 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL & RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33F2; 54V76AI31FI9
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-666
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 765
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT KEEL WEB & LOWER Y-WEB GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI31FII; 55V76AI32FI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE LOWER Y-WEB AND KEEL WEB AND WOULD
BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-667
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 766 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI31F9; 55V76AI32F3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-668
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 767 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31F8; 55V76AI32F9
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNEf85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-669
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 768 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI31F7; 55V76AI32FI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-670
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 769 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33FI; 54V76AI31F20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-671
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 770 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI32F6; 54V76AI33F8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-672
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 771 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI32FI9; 54V76AI33F6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
OF THE SEVEN KEEL WEB HYBRID DRIVERS THERE ARE THREE OF WHICH A
FAILURE OF ANY ONE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT (THE FAILURE
WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-673
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 772 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT OME GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA I; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI3 IF6; 55V76AI32FII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME HTR SYSTEM,
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABE. THE OME HTR SYSTEM IS NOT A
CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM, BUT LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-674
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 773 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) FUSE, 20A, LT/RT OME GROUP 2
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI32FI8; 54V76AI33F7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME HTR SYSTEM,
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABE. THE OME HTR SYSTEM IS NOT A
CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM, BUT LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-675
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/16/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 774 ABORT:
"ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA I; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76A13 IF12; 55V76AI32F2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-676
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 775 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
56V76AI33F3 ; 54V76AI3 IF21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-677
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 776 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) FUSE, 20A, LT/RT UPPER Y WEB GROUP 1
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA I; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31F5; 55V76AI32FI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF UPPER Y WEB HTR'S, REDUNDANT HTR
GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION
DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT (REF
FLIGHT RULE 6-10).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-678
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 777
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A, LT/RT UPPER Y WEB GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBI T:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2; AV BAY 6, PCA 3
55V76AI32F5; 56V76AI33F5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF UPPER Y WEB HTR'S, REDUNDANT HTR
GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION
DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT (REF
FLIGHT RULE 6-10).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-679
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 778
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 3A, LT/RT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S1
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4F3; FI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN FAILURE OF THE GROUP 1 HTR'S. SECOND
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH HTR GROUPS AND THEREFORE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-680
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 779 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 3A, LT/RT GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL A14 $1
36V73AI4FI; FI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 1 HTR'S. SECOND FAILURE
RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH HTR GROUPS AND THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION
DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-681
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 780 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 3A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 3A, LT/RT GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $2; $5
36V73AI4FT; F20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN FAILURE OF THE GROUP 2 HTR'S. SECOND
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH HTR GROUPS AND THEREFORE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-682
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
781 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 3A, LT/RT GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAF ING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $2; $5
36V73AI4F5; FI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN FAILURE OF THE GROUP 2 HTR'S. SECOND
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF BOTH HTR GROUPS AND THEREFORE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-683
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 782
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
126
ENGINE SERVICE PANEL
51V43HR 119, 121, 123, 125; 52V43HR 120, 122, 124,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE ENGINE SERVICE
PANEL HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-684
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
783 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
126
ENGINE SERVICE PANEL
51V43HR 119, 121, 123, 125; 52V43HR 120, 122, 124,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE ENGINE SERVICE
PANEL HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-685
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 784 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
126
ENGINE SERVICE PANEL
51V43HR 119, 121, 123, 125; 52V43HR 120, 122, 124,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE ENGINE SERVICE
PANEL HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-686
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
785 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
126
ENGINE SERVICE PANEL
51V43HR 119, 121, 123, 125; 52V43HR 120, 122, 124,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE ENGINE SERVICE
PANEL HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-687
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 786
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
134
GSE SERVICE PANEL
51V43HRII5, 129, 131, 133; 52V43HRII6, 130, 132,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HTR MIGHT NOT BE DETECTABLE. WORST CASE WOULD BE LOSS OF
ASSOCIATED GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP HTRS. THE REMAINING HTR SYSTEMS
ARE CAPABLEOF MAINTAINING PROPER THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PRPOPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-688
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 787
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
134
GSE SERVICE PANEL
51V43HRII5, 129, 131, 133; 52V43HRII6, 130, 132,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR GSE SEVICE PANEL HTR SYSTEM.
THE GSE SERVICE PNL HTR SYSTEM IS NOT A CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM.
REMAINING HTR SYSTEMS MAINTAIN THERMAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN
REDLINES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-689
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 788 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
134
GSE SERVICE PANEL
51V43HRII5, 129, 131, 133; 52V43HRII6, 130, 132,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HTR MIGHT NOT BE DETECTABLE. WORST CASE WOULD BE LOSS OF
ASSOCIATED GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP HTRS. THE REMAINING HTR SYSTEMS
ARE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING PROPER THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-690
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 789
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
134
GSE SERVICE PANEL
51V43HRII5, 129, 131, 133; 52V43HRII6, 130, 132,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR GSE SEVICE PANEL HTR SYSTEM.
THE GSE SERVICE PNL HTR SYSTEM IS NOT A CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM.
REMAINING HTR SYSTEMS MAINTAIN THERMAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN
REDLINES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-691
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
790 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBD Y WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: LOWER Y-WEB, INBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 57, 61, 73, 75, 77, 117, 127, 169, 171;
52V43HR 58, 62, 74, 76, 78, 118, 128, 170, 172
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABLILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE AREA OF
THE OMS TANK ISOL VALVES AND XFEED LN'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-692
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
791 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBD Y WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: LOWER Y-WEB, INBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 57, 61, 73, 75, 77, 117, 127, 169, 171;
52V43HR 58, 62, 74, 76, 78, 118, 128, 170, 172
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABLILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE AREA OF
THE OMS TANK ISOL VALVES AND XFEED LN'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-693
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 792 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: LOWER Y-WEB, INBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 57, 61, 73, 75, 77, 117, 127, 169, 171;
52V43HR 58, 62, 74, 76, 78, 118, 128, 170, 172
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABLILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE AREA OF
THE OMS TANK ISOL VALVES AND XFEED LN'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-694
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
793 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: LOWER Y-WEB, INBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 57, 61, 73, 75, 77, 117, 127, 169, 171;
52V43HR 58, 62, 74, 76, 78, 118, 128, 170, 172
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABLILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE AREA OF
THE OMS TANK ISOL VALVES AND XFEED LN'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-695
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 794 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPTGROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 79, 83; 52V43HR 80, 84
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-696
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
795 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPTGROUP1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTSTO MOUNTINGRESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 79, 83; 52V43HR 80, 84
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-697
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
796 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPTGROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 79, 83; 52V43HR 80, 84
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-698
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
797 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPTGROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 79, 83; 52V43HR 80, 84
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-699
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 798 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COVER
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 87, 89, 207, 209; 52V43HR 88, 90, 208, 210
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME COVER HTR
SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-700
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
799 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COVER
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 87, 89, 207, 209; 52V43HR 88, 90, 208, 210
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME COVER HTR
SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-701
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
800 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COVER
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 87, 89, 207, 209; 52V43HR 88, 90, 208, 210
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME COVER HTR
SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-702
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
801 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COVER
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 87, 89, 207, 209; 52V43HR 88, 90, 208, 210
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME COVER HTR
SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-703
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 802 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENG COMPTGROUP 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENG COMPT GROUP1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 81, 85; 52V43HR 82, 86
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-704
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
803 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENG COMPT GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BUR/tEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENG COMPT GROUP1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 81, 85; 52V43HR 82, 86
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-705
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 804 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENG COMPTGROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENG COMPT GROUP2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 81, 85; 52V43HR 82, 86
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-706
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
805 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENG COMPTGROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENG COMPT GROUP2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 81, 85; 52V43HR 82, 86
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-707
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 806 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: KEEL WEB
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 33, 37, 41, 43,
45, 47; 52V43HR 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 34, 38, 42, 44, 46,
48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMP. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE
CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO. A FAILURE IN ANY ONE OF
THE 47W HTRIS COULD GO UNDETECTED DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-708
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
807 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: KEEL WEB
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 33, 37, 41, 43,
45, 47; 52V43HR 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 34, 38, 42, 44, 46,
48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMP. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE
CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO. OUT OF THE 14 HTR'S
THERE ARE SIX IN WHICH A SHORT WOULD NOT BE DETECTED
(HRI9,21,25,29,41,47/HR20,22,26,30,42,48), BUT FAILURE OF ANY OF
THE SIX WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-709
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 808 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: KEEL WEB
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 33, 37, 41, 43,
45, 47; 52V43HR 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 34, 38, 42, 44, 46,
48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMP. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE
CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO. A FAILURE IN ANY ONE OF
THE 47W HTR'S COULD GO UNDETECTED DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-710
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
809 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 2
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION: KEEL WEB
A[2 ] B[F] C [P]
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 33, 37, 41, 43,
45, 47; 52V43HR 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 34, 38, 42, 44, 46,
48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMP. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD BE
CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO. OUT OF THE 14 HTR'S
THERE ARE SIX IN WHICH A SHORT WOULD NOT BE DETECTED
(HRI9,21,25,29,41,47/HR20,22,26,30,42,48), BUT FAILURE OF ANY OF
THE SIX WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-711
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
810 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OMS TEST PORT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 191; 52V43HR 192
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, 'PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVEN WITH THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY ADEQUATE PROPELLANT
TEMPERATURE WILL BE MAINTAINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-712
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
811 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: OMS TEST PORT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 191; 52V43HR 192
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF HTR WILL DISABLE 2-47W KEEL WEB HTR'S REMAINING KEEL
WEB HTR'S ARE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING PROPER PROPELLANT TEMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-713
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 812 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: OMS TEST PORT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 191; 52V43HR 192
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVEN WITH THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY ADEQUATE PROPELLANT
TEMPERATURE WILL BE MAINTAINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-714
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
813 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.Jo PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OMS TEST PORT
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 191; 52V43HR 192
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF HTR WILL DISABLE 2-47W KEEL WEB HTR'S REMAINING KEEL
WEB HTR'S ARE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING PROPER PROPELLANT TEMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-715
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 814 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
OXIDIZER PRESS PANEL
51V43HR 223, 225, 227; 52V43HR 224, 226, 228
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL OX PRESS PNL (FAILED OPEN) HTR'S WOULD RESULT IN A
LONGER DUTY CYCLE FOR THE KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM. POSSIBLY
RESULTING IN HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMPS IF NO ACTION TAKEN,
THEREFORE CREW MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO CYCLE HTR SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-716
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
815 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OXIDIZER PRESS PANEL
51V43HR 223, 225, 227; 52V43HR 224, 226, 228
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN FAILURE OF THE KEEL WEB
HTR SYSTEM (THESE HTRS ARE PART OF THE KEEL WEB SYSTEM AND A FAIL
SHORT FOR ALL WOULD FAIL SIX/GROUP OF THE KEEL WEB HTRS) AND
WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-717
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 816 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OXIDIZER PRESS PANEL
51V43HR 223, 225, 227; 52V43HR 224, 226, 228
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL OX PRESS PNL (FAILED OPEN) HTR'S WOULD RESULT IN A
LONGER DUTY CYCLE FOR THE KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM. POSSIBLY
RESULTING IN HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMPS IF NO ACTION TAKEN,
THEREFORE CREW MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO CYCLE HTR SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-718
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
817 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OXIDIZER PRESS PANEL
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 223, 225, 227; 52V43HR 224, 226, 228
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN FAILURE OF THE KEEL WEB
HTR SYSTEM (THESE HTRS ARE PART OF THE KEEL WEB SYSTEM AND A FAIL
SHORT FOR ALL WOULD FAIL SIX/GROUP OF THE KEEL WEB HTRS) AND
WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-719
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 818
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BUR/<_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
222
RCS HOUSING
51V42HR215, 217, 219, 221; 52V42HR216, 218, 220,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-720
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87
OMS
819
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
222
RCS HOUSING
51V42HR215, 217, 219, 221; 52V42HR216, 218, 220,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-721
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
820 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
222
RCS HOUSING
51V42HR215, 217, 219, 221; 52V42HR216, 218, 220,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-722
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
821 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
222
RCS HOUSING
51V42HR215, 217, 219, 221; 52V42HR216, 218, 220,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-723
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 822 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 159. 161, 163, 165, 167, 155, 157; 52V43HR
160. 162, 164, 166, 164, 156, 158
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-724
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
823 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 159. 161, 163, 165, 167, 155, 157_ 52V43HR
160. 162, 164, 166, 164, 156, 158
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-725
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 824
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 159. 161, 163, 165, 167, 155, 157; 52V43HR
160. 162, 164, 166, 164, 156, 158
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-726
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
825 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 159. 161, 163, 165, 167, 155, 157; 52V43HR
160. 162, 164, 166, 164, 156, 158
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-727
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 826 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 103; 52V43HR 92, 94,
96, 98, I00, 104
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-728
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 827
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 103; 52V43HR 92, 94,
96, 98, i00, 104
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-729
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 828 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 103; 52V43HR 92, 94,
96, 98, i00, 104
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-730
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 829
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 103; 52V43HR 92, 94,
96, 98, I00, 104
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-731
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 830
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 149, 151, 153; 52V43HR 150, 152, 154
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-732
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
831 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RCS HOUSING
51V43HR 149, 151, 153; 52V43HR 150, 152, 154
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-733
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 832 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 2
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RCS HOUSING
51V43HR 149, 151, 153; 52V43HR 150, 152, 154
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-734
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 833
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RCS HOUSING
51V43HR 149, 151, 153; 52V43HR 150, 152, 154
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-735
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 834 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 105, 107, 109, 113, 141, 145, 143, 211,
213; 52V43HR 106, 108, ii0, 114, 142, 146, 144, 212, 214
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-736
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
835 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 105, 107, 109, 113, 141, 145, 143, 211,
213; 52V43HR 106, 108, ii0, 114, 142, 146, 144, 212, 214
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-737
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 836 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 105, 107, 109, 113, 141, 145, 143, 211,
213; 52V43HR 106, 108, ii0, 114, 142, 146, 144, 212, 214
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-738
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
837 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: " 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 105, 107, 109, 113, 141, 145, 143, 211,
213; 52V43HR 106, 108, II0, 114, 142, 146, 144, 212, 214
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-739
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 838
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: UPPER Y-WEB, INBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 59, 63, 65, 67; 52V43HR 60, 64, 66, 68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER INBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-740
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
839 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: UPPER Y-WEB, INBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 59, 63, 65, 67; 52V43HR 60, 64, 66, 68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER INBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-741
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 840 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3 / 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: UPPER Y-WEB, INBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 59, 63, 65, 67; 52V43HR 60, 64, 66, 68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER INBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-742
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 841
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: UPPER Y-WEB, INBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 59, 63, 65, 67; 52V43HR 60, 64, 66, 68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER INBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-743
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 842
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: UPPER Y-WEB, OUTBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 49, 51, 53, 55; 52V43HR 50, 52, 54, 56
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER OUTBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-744
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 843
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: UPPER Y-WEB, OUTBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 49, 51, 53, 55; 52V43HR 50, 52, 54, 56
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER OUTBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS INLOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-745
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 844 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: UPPER Y-WEB, OUTBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 49, 51, 53, 55; 52V43HR 50, 52, 54, 56
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER OUTBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-746
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
845 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: UPPER Y-WEB, OUTBOARD
PART NUMBER: 51V43HR 49, 51, 53, 55; 52V43HR 50, 52, 54, 56
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER OUTBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-747
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 846 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY, LT/RT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31K3; 55V76AI32K5
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO FROM PART OF GROUP 1 HTR SYSTEM.
NO EFFECT UNLESS A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WHICH
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTRIS "ON"
SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING
IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF
425 F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON
WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552 F AND A I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A
MAX TEMP OF 615 F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-748
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 847
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY, LT/RT GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31K3; 55V76AI32K5
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 1 HTR'S, GROUP 2 STILL
FULLY OPERATIONAL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (2ND FAILURE) RESULTS
IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-749
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 848 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY, LT/RT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBI T: 2/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI31K4; 55V76AI32K6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO FROM PART OF GROUP 1 HTR SYSTEM.
NO EFFECT UNLESS A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WHICH
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON"
SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING
IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF
425 F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON
WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552 F AND A I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A
MAX TEMP OF 615 F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-750
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 849 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY, LT/RT GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI31K4; 55V76AI32K6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 1 HTR'S, GROUP 2 STILL
FULLY OPERATIONAL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (2ND FAILURE) RESULTS
IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-751
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 850
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH (FAILS ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY, LT/RT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3, AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33K5; 54V76AI31KS
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO FROM PART OF GROUP 1 HTR SYSTEM.
NO EFFECT UNLESS A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WHICH
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON"
SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING
IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF
425 F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON
WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A
MAX TEMP OF 615 F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE185; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-752
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 851
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY, LT/RT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3, AV BAY 4, PCA 1
56V76AI33K5; 54V76AI31K5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 2 HTR'S, GROUP 1 STILL
FULLY OPERATIONAL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-753
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 852 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY, LT/RT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2, AV BAY 6, PCA 3
55V76AI32K4 ; 56V76AI33K3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO FROM PART OF GROUP 1 HTR SYSTEM.
NO EFFECT UNLESS A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WHICH
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON"
SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING
IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF
425 F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON
WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A
MAX TEMP OF 615 F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-754
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 853
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY, LT/RT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2, AV BAY 6, PCA 3
55V76AI32K4; 56V76AI33K3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 2 HTR'S, GROUP 1 STILL
FULLY OPERATIONAL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-755
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 854
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-8A; 55V76AI22R J3-127A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURES AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/N0-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-756
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 855 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI21R J4-8B; 55V76AI22R J3-127B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURES AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/N0-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-757
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 856 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA I; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-8A; 55V76AI22R J3-127A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATIONs MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-758
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 857 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-8B; 55V76AI22R J3-127B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-759
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 858 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J8-118A; 55V76AI22R J3-101A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURES AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/N0-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-760
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 859 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA I; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J8-118B; 55V76AI22R J3-101B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURES AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/N0-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-761
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 860 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R JS-II8A; 55V76AI22R J3-1OIA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-762
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 861 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J8-118B; 55V76AI22R J3-101B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-763
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 862
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J4-8A; 56V76AI23R J4-8A
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURES AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/N0-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-764
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 863 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
312R AOA: 313
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J4-8B; 56V76AI23R J4-8B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURES AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-765
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 864
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J4-8A; 56V76AI23R J4-SA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-766
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 865 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J4-8B; 56V76AI23R J4-8B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-767
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 866
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J3-101A; 54V76AI21R J3-101A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURES AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/N0-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-768
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 867
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J3-113B; 54V76AI21R J3-113B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURES AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENTRY
ON NEXT DAILY GO/N0-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-769
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 868 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[- ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J3-101A; 54V76AI21R J3-101A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-770
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OM S FLI GHT:
869 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT KEEL WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J3-113B; 54V76AI21R J3-113B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, KEEL WEB HTR SYSTEM STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-771
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 870 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA I; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J3-127A; 55V76AI22R J3-113A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF ANY HTR GROUP. SECOND
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 1 HTRS, GROUP 2 STILL FULLY
OPERATIONAL.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-772
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 871 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J3-127A; 55V76AI22R J3-113A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ISOLATION RESISTANCE, ALL HTR GROUPS STILL
OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-773
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 872
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J3-127B; 55V76AI22R J3-113B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF ANY HTR GROUP. SECOND
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 1 HTRS, GROUP 2 STILL FULLY
OPERATIONAL.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-774
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 873 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J3-127B; 55V76AI22R J3-112B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ISOLATION RESISTANCE, ALL HTR GROUPS STILL
OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-775
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 874
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J3-113A; 54V76AI21R J3-113A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF ANY HTR GROUP. SECOND
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 2 HTRS, GROUP 1 STILL FULLY
OPERATIONAL.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-776
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 875 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J3-113B; 54V76AI21R J3-113B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF ANY HTR GROUP. SECOND
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 2 HTRS, GROUP 1 STILL FULLY
OPERATIONAL.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPER THERMAL CONTROL IN THE RCS HOUSING AND WOULD BE CAUSE FOR
ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-777
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 876
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J3-113A; 54V76AI21R J3-113A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ISOLATION RESISTANCE, ALL HTR GROUPS STILL
OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 0CT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-778
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 877 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 4, LCA 1
56V76AI23R J3-113B; 54V76AI21R J3-113B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF ISOLATION RESISTANCE, ALL HTR GROUPS STILL
OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-779
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 878
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W, LT/RT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI3 IAIR35; 55V76AI32AIR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE SWITCH TALKBACK, SWITCH POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY
DETERMINED BY MONITORING GROUP 1 HTR OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-780
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 879 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W, LT/RT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR35; 55V76AI32AIR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-781
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 880 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W, LT/RT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
56V76AI33AIRI0; 54V76AI31AIR39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE SWITCH TALKBACK, SWITCH POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY
DETERMINED BY MONITORING GROUP 2 HTR OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-782
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
881 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W, LT/RT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIRI0; 54V76AI31AIR39
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-783
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
882 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE )
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, COVER THERMO. TEMP
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, COVER THERMO. TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OME COVER
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT419, 52V43TT519
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE DIRECT TEMP MEASUREMENT FOR OME COVER HTR SYSTEM.
ALTHOUGH VALIDITY OF THE MEASUREMENT (SENSOR FAILURE) MIGHT NOT
BE IMMEDIATELY DETERMINED A THERMOSTAT FAILURE "OFF" IS
CONSIDERED FAIL OPERATIONAL FOR THE SYSTEM AND A THERMOSTAT
FAILURE "ON" CAN BE DETERMINED BY MONITORING THE OX ENG INLET
TEMP MEASUREMENT V43T4216A/V43T5216A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-784
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
883 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENG SERVICE PNL
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
57
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENG SERVICE PNL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ENGINE SERVICE PANEL
51V43TT412, 52V43TT512
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE DIRECT TEMP MEASUREMENT FOR THE OME SERVICE PANEL HTR
SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH VALIDITY OF MEASUREMENT (SENSOR FAILURE) MIGHT
NOT BE IMMEDIATELY DETERMINED A THERMOSTAT FAILURE "OFF" IS
CONSIDERED FAIL OPERATIONAL AND A THERMOSTAT FAILURE "ON" CAN BE
DETERMINED BY MONITORING FU FEED LN TEMP V43T4642A/V43T5642A AND
OX INLET TEMP V43T4216A/V43T5216A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV 3; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-785
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
884 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, GSE SERVICE PNL
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, GSE SERVICE PNL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GSE SERVICE PANEL
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT411, 51V43TT511
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE DIRECT TEMP MEASUREMENT FOR THE GSE SER PNL HTR
SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH VALIDITY OF MEASUREMENT MIGHT NOT BE
IMMEDIATELY DETERMINED, A THERMOSTAT FAILURE, EITHER "ON" OR
"OFF" RESULTS IN A FAIL OPERATIONAL CONDITION FOR THIS HTR
SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73B760210 REV E; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-786
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
885 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, LEFT/RIGHT SKIN TEMP 38
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, LEFT/RIGHT SKIN TEMP 38
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: POD SKIN
PART NUMBER: 51V09TT420, 52V09TT520
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
51V09TT420 & 52V09TT520 IS PART OF THE MADS SYSTEM AND THEREFORE
NOT A PART OF THIS ANALYSIS (NOT USED DURING ANY FLIGHT PHASE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73B760210 REV E; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-787
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
886 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
BASE)
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OMS ENG COMPT B.H.S. (POD
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OMS ENG COMPT B.H.S. (POD BASE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ENGINE COMPARTMENT, (B.H.S. POD BASE)
51V43MTT418, 52V43TTSI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, PROVIDES A NONCRITICAL MEASUREMENT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73B760210 REV E; JSC
18549, 820CT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-788
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
887 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX DRAIN PNL TEMP 1 & TEMP 2
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX DRAIN PNL TEMP 1 & TEMP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OXIDIZER DRAIN PANEL
51V43TT409, 51V43TT410, 52V43TT509, 52V43TT510
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. SENSOR FAILURE CAN BE DETERMINED BY MONITORING REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO INCORRECTLY
FAILING THE INBOARD Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM AND SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT
HTR GROUP BEFORE SENSOR FAILURE IS DETERMINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73B760210 REV 3; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-789
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
888 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS HSG VERNIER COMP TEMP 2
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS HSG VERNIER COMP TEMP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: RCS HSG VERNIER THRUSTER PNL
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT402, 52V43TT502
c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, FAILURE CAN BE DETERMINED FIRST BY MONITORING REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT V43T4701A(51V43TT414)/V43T5701A(52V43TT514) AND
SECOND BY MONITORING THE RATE AT WHICH THE SENSOR MEASUREMENT
CHANGED. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WORST CASE WOULD BE
SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM BEFORE SENSOR FAILURE COULD BE
DETERMINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943009 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-790
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
889 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS HSG VERNIER COMPTTEMP 1
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS HSG VERNIER COMPTTEMP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: RCS HSG VERNIER THRUSTER PNL
PART NUMBER: 51V43TT414, 52V43TT514
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, FAILURE CAN BE DETERMINED FIRST BY MONITORING REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT V43T4711A(51V43TT402)/V43T5711A(52V43TT502) AND
SECOND BY MONITORING THE RATE AT WHICH THE SENSOR MEASUREMENT
CHANGED. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WORST CASE WOULD BE
SWITCHING TO REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM BEFORE SENSOR FAILURE COULD BE
DETERMINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, 820CT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-791
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
890 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS PRESS PNL SPRT TEMP 1
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS PRESS PNL SPRT TEMP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RCS OX PRESS PNL
51V43TT413, 52V43TT513
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, FAILURE CAN BE DETERMINED FIRST BY MONITORING REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT V43T4710A (51V43TT4103)/V43T5710A(52V43TT5103) AND
SECOND BY MONITORING THE RATE AT WHICH THE SENSOR MEASUREMENT
CHANGED. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY THE STATUS OF THE KEEL WEB
HTR SYSTEM OPERATION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
PROPELLANT TEMPERATURES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV 3; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-792
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
891 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS PRESS PNL SPRT TEMP 2
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS PRESS PNL SPRT TEMP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RCS OX PRESS PNL
51V43TT403, 52V43TT503
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, FAILURE CAN BE DETERMINED FIRST BY MONITORING REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT V43T4700A (51V43TT413)/V43T5700A(52V43TT513) AND
SECOND BY MONITORING THE RATE AT WHICH THE SENSOR MEASUREMENT
CHANGED. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY THE STATUS OF THE KEEL WEB
HTR SYSTEM OPERATION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING
PROPELLANT TEMPERATURES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549,820CT,LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-793
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
892 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, UPPER Y-WEB INBD
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, UPPER Y-WEB INBD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER Y-WEB, INBOARD
51V43TT416, 52V43TT516
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. LOSE DIRECT TEMP MEASUREMENT FOR THE INBD Y-WEB HTR
SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH VALIDITY OF THE MEASUREMENT (SENSOR FAILURE)
MIGHT NOT BE IMMEDIATELY DETERMINED A THERMOSTAT FAILURE "OFF" IS
CONSIDERED FAIL OPERATIONAL AND A THERMOSTAT FAILED "ON" CAN BE
DETERMINED BY MONITORING THE UPPER OUTBD Y-WEB TEMP
V43T4702A/V43T5702A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-794
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
893 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, UPPER Y-WEB OUTBD
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, UPPER Y-WEB OUTBD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER Y-WEB, OUTBOARD
51V43TT415, 51V43TT515
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSE DIRECT TEMP MEASUREMENT FOR THE OUTBD Y-WEB HTR
SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH VALIDITY OF THE MEASUREMENT (SENSOR FAILURE)
MIGHT NOT BE IMMEDIATELY DETERMINED A THERMOSTAT FAILURE "OFF" IS
CONSIDERED FAIL OPERATIONAL AND A THERMOSTAT FAILURE "ON" CAN BE
DETERMINED BY MONITORING THE UPPER INBD Y-WEB TEMP
V43T4703A/V43T5703A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, 82OCT, LTR JUNE 85
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-795
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 894 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GSE SERVICE PANEL
51V43S43; 52V43S44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR GSE SEVICE PANEL HTR SYSTEM.
THE GSE SERVICE PNL HTR SYSTEM IS NOT A CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM.
REMAINING HTR SYSTEMS MAINTAIN THERMAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN
REDLINES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-796 C- / O
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 895 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. B_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: GSE SERVICE PANEL
PART NUMBER: 51V43S43; 52V43S44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425FAND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-797
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 896
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
"I)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: GSE SERVICE PANEL
PART NUMBER: 51V43S51; 52V43S52
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR GSE SEVICE PANEL HTR SYSTEM.
THE GSE SERVICE PNL HTR SYSTEM IS NOT A CRITICAL HTR SYSTEM.
REMAINING HTR SYSTEMS MAINTAIN THERMAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN
REDLINES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-798
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 897
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GSE SERVICE PANEL
51V43S51; 52V43S52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A l" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-799
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
898 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
1
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KEEL WEB
51V43S21; 52V43S22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN FAILURE OF THE KEEL WEB HTR
SYSTEM AND IS CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO IF THE
ENVIRONMENT CANNOT MAINTAIN THERMAL REDLINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-800
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
899 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
1
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
KEEL WEB
51V43S21; 52V43S22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-801
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
900 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KEEL WEB
51V43S23; 52V43S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN FAILURE OF THE KEEL WEB HTR
SYSTEM AND IS CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO IF THE
ENVIRONMENT CANNOT MAINTAIN THERMAL REDLINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-802
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
901 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KEEL WEB
51V43S23; 52V43S24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425FAND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-803
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 902
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: LOWER INBOARD Y-WEB
PART NUMBER: 51V43S33; 52V43S34
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF LOWER INBOARD Y-WEB HTR
SYSTEM. RE-ENTRY COULD BE REQUIRED IF THERMAL LIMITS CANNOT BE
MAINTAINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-804
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 903 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LOWER INBOARD Y-WEB
51V43S33; 52V43S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425FAND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-805
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
904 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LOWER INBOARD Y-WEB
51V43S35; 52V43S36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF LOWER INBOARD Y-WEB HTR
SYSTEM. RE-ENTRY COULD BE REQUIRED IF THERMAL LIMITS CANNOT BE
MAINTAINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-806
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 905 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LOWER INBOARD Y-WEB
51V43S35; 52V43S36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTROS "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8'o 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-807
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 906 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43S37; 51V43S38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-808
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 907 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: OME COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 51V43S37; 51V43S38
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425FAND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-809
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 908 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OME COMPARTMENT
51V43S39; 51V43S40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME
COMPARTMENT HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-810
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 909
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OME COMPARTMENT
51V43S39; 51V43S40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S 'tON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-811
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HI GHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 910 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: OME COVER
PART NUMBER: 51V43S53; 51V43S54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME COVER HTR
SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-812
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
911 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/ 1R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: OME COVER
PART NUMBER: 51V43S53; 51V43S54
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTRIS "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-813
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 912 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: OME COVER
PART NUMBER: 51V43S55; 51V43S56
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE OME COVER HTR
SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-814
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 913 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
a/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OME COVER
51V43S55; 51V43S56
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTRIS "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425FAND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-815
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 914 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RCS HOUSING
51V43S47, 51V42S41; 52V43S47, 52V42S41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN FAILURE OF THE RCS HOUSING
HTR SYSTEM AND IS CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO IF THE
ENVIRONMENT EXCEEDS THERMAL REDLINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-816
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 915 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43S47, 51V42S41; 52V43S47, 52V42S41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTRIS "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7 'I 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-817
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 916 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS HOUSING
PART NUMBER: 51V43S45, 51V42S49; 52V43S45, 52V42S49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN FAILURE OF THE RCS HOUSING
HTR SYSTEM AND IS CAUSE FOR ENTRY ON NEXT DAILY GO/NO-GO IF THE
ENVIRONMENT EXCEEDS THERMAL REDLINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-818
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 917 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3 / 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RCS HOUSING
51V43S45, 51V42S49; 52V43S45, 52V42S49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PARTFAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTRfS "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A 1" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-819
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 918 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: UPPER INBOARD Y WEB
PART NUMBER: 51V43S31; 51V43S32
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER INBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-820
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 919
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 1
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J° PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: UPPER INBOARD Y WEB
PART NUMBER: 51V43S31; 51V43S32
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER'THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425FAND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-821
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 920 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: UPPER INBOARD Y WEB
PART NUMBER: 51V43S29; 51V43S30
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER INBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-822
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
921 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 2
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER INBOARD Y WEB
51V43S29; 51V43S30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-823
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 922
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER OUTBOARD Y-WEB
51V43S27; 51V43S28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER OUTBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-824
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBS YSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/ IR
MDAC ID: 923 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3 / 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER OUTBOARD Y-WEB
51V43S27; 51V43S28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425FAND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A 1 It BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-825
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 924 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PH_E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER OUTBOARD Y-WEB
51V43S25; 51V43S26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN A POSSIBLE FAILED OFF CONDITION FOR THE UPPER OUTBOARD
Y-WEB HTR SYSTEM. REDUNDANT HTR GROUP AVAILABLE, BUT LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPER POD THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-826
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 925 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V. J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: UPPER OUTBOARD Y-WEB
PART NUMBER: 51V43S25; 51V43S26
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR SET BEING FAILED "ON"
WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN POD. A
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH
ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON" SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE
REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING IN A TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. TESTS HAVE SHOWN
THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON WILL HAVE A MAX
TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 615
F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; 73A760210 REV E; JSC
18549, OCT 82, LTR JUNE 85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MDAC-STL MEMO NO.
598-E242-808 23FEB78
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-827
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 926 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ON POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH TOGGLE, RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] siP] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 14
36V73AI4-SI ; 36V73AI4-S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO PART OF GROUP 1 HTR SYSTEM. NO
EFFECT UNLESS A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WHICH WOULD
RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON"
SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING
IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF
425 F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON
WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552 F AND A I" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A
MAX TEMP OF 615 F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-828
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 927 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLERCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ON POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH TOGGLE, RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 14
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4-S2 ; 36V73AI4-S5
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO PART OF GROUP 1 HTR SYSTEM. NO
EFFECT UNLESS A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HTR GROUP WHICH WOULD
RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HTR'S "ON"
SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HTR GROUP IS ACTIVE RESULTING
IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF
425 F AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT A 4" BY 8" 47W HTR WITH BOTH ELEMENTS ON
WILL HAVE A MAX TEMP OF 552 F AND A i" BY 7" 10W HTR WILL HAVE A
MAX TEMP OF 615 F UNDER SAME CONDITIONS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-829
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
928 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE, RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 1
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH TOGGLE, RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 14
36V73AI4-SI ; 36V73AI4-S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 1 HTR'S, GROUP 2 STILL
FULLY OPERATIONAL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (2ND FAILURE) RESULTS
IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-830
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
929 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE, RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 2
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN THE OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH TOGGLE, RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 14
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4-S2 ; 36V73AI4-S5
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUP 1 HTR'S, GROUP 2 STILL
FULLY OPERATIONAL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (2ND FAILURE) RESULTS
IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN POD THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549 15 OCT'82, LTR
28 JUNEm85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; 73A760210 REV A
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-831
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 930 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J6-PP TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-832
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 931 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J6-PP TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO UTILIZE THE
CONTROL TEMP THERMOSTAT. THE OVER TEMP THERMOSTAT STILL
AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN SAFE HTR OPERATION.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-833
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 932 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J6-MM TYPE III
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES :
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-834
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 933 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
5)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J6-MM TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO UTILIZE THE
CONTROL TEMP THERMOSTAT. THE OVER TEMP THERMOSTAT STILL
AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN SAFE HTR OPERATION.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-835
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE" i/05/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBS YSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 934 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21ARJ6-NN TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-836
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 935 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21ARJ6-NN TYPE III
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO UTILIZE THE
CONTROL TEMP THERMOSTAT. THE OVER TEMP THERMOSTAT STILL
AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN SAFE HTR OPERATION.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-837
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
936 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22ARJ6-PP TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-838
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 937 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J6-PP TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO UTILIZE THE
CONTROL TEMP THERMOSTAT. THE OVER TEMP THERMOSTAT STILL
AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN SAFE HTR OPERATION.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED 'ION" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-839
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 938
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J6-H' TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-840
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 939 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J6-H' TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO UTILIZE THE
CONTROL TEMP THERMOSTAT. THE OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT STILL AVAILABLE
TO MAINTAIN SAFE HTR OPERATION.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-841
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 940 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J6-EE TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-842
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/05/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 941 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J6-EE TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO UTILIZE THE
CONTROL TEMP THERMOSTAT. THE OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT STILL AVAILABLE
TO MAINTAIN SAFE HTR OPERATION.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-843
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 942 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3 / 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32F28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-844
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/05/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 943 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 10A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32F23
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-845
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 944 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31F25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, PBK CIRCUITRY NOT USED SINCE PBK DOES NOT EXIST.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-846
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
945 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31F26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-847
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 946 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3 / 3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31F30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-848
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 947 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 10A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32F22
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT ENOUGH INFORMATION ON PBK CIRCUITRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-849
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 948
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, IA
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT"
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4, $8
36V73AI4F26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-850
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 949
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, IA
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4, $7
36V73AI4F25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-851
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 950 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31F24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-852
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 951 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUSE, 20A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32F21
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-853
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 952 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER
ELEMENT (A/B)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43HRI051; HE1052; HE1053; HE1054
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-854
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 953 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER
ELEMENT (A/B)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRI051; HRI052; HRI053; HRI054
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 150CT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-855
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 954 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER ELEMENT
(A/B)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43HRI031; HE1032; HE1033; HE1034
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-856
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 955 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER ELEMENT
(A/B)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRI031; HRI032; HRI033; HRI034
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-857
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 956 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
(A/B)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER ELEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43HRI041; HRI042; HRI043; HRI044
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-858
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 957 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER ELEMENT
CA/B)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43HRI041; HE1042; HE1043; HE1044
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-859
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 958
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRII00
] e[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 150CT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-860
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 959 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRII00
] B [ ] C C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-861
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 960 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB HEATER (A/B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB HEATER (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43HRII20; HRII22
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 150CT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-862
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 961 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB HEATER (A/B)
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BUR/tEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB HEATER (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
40V43HRII20; HRII22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-863
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 962
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE:
L FUEL AND OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE HEATER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
L FUEL AND OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRII41; HRII42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-864
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 963 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE:
L FUEL AND OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE HEATER
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
L FUEL AND OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRII41; HRII42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2_ JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-865
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
964 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(A/B)
FAILURE MODE:
LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRI011; HRI012
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-866
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 965
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
CA/B)
FAILURE MODE:
LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43HRI011; HRI012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-867
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 966
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSS FEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRIII0
] B[ ] C[. ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-868
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 967 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43HRIII0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-869
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 968 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB HEATER (A/B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB HEATER (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43HRII30; HRII32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LNIS WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-870
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 969 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB HEATER (A/B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB HEATER (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43HRII30; HRII32
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-871
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 970 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE:
R FUEL AND OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE HEATER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
R FUEL AND OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRII51; HRII52
B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-872
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 971 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
ELEMENT (A/B)
FAILURE MODE:
R FUEL AND OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE HEATER
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
R FUEL AND OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRII51; HRII52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-873
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
972 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(A/B)
FAILURE MODE:
RIGHT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RIGHT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRI021; HRI022
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-874
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
973 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(A/B)
FAILURE MODE:
RIGHT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RIGHT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS (A/B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43HRI021; HRI022
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN.
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-875
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 974
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32K3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO TURN OFF "B" XFEED HTR SYSTEM. CONTROL
THERMOSTATS WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL ENVIROMINT. SECOND
FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM RESULTS IN BOTH "A" & "B" XFEED HTR
SYSTEMS STUCK IN AUTO MODE.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-876
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 975
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
GNORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32K3
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-877
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 976 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IK2
B [ P] C [ F]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO TURN OFF "A" XFEED HTR SYSTEM. CONTROL
THERMOSTATS WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL ENVIROMINT. SECOND
FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM RESULTS IN BOTH "A" & "B" XFEED HTR
SYSTEMS STUCK IN AUTO MODE.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-878
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 977 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-879
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 978 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21 J8-38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, XFEED THERMAL CONTROL STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-880
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 979 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21 J8-38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-881
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 980 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM Z
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21 J8-35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-882
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 981 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21 J8-35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, XFEED THERMAL CONTROL STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-883
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 982 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J8-38
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, XFEED THERMAL CONTROL STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-884
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 983 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J8-38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-885
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 984 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TA_L: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEOREIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22 J8-35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-886
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 985 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22 J8-35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, XFEED THERMAL CONTROL STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-887
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 986 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE SWITCH TALKBACK. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE DETERMINED BY
MONITORING HTR OPERATION WITH REDUNDANT SYSTEM TURNED OFF.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-888
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
987 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-889
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 988
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI3 IAIRI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE SWITCH TALKBACK. SWITCH POSITION CAN BE DETERMINED BY
MONITORING HTR OPERATION WITH REDUNDANT SYSTEM TURNED OFF.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-890
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 989 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE SWITCH TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES:
JUNE 85
VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-891
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
990 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
AFT FUSLG FUEL HI PTBLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
AFT FUSLG FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43MTII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: LOSE FAILURE DETECTION OF
ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL,
CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-11174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-892
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
991 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43MTI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: LOSE FAILURE DETECTION OF
ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL,
CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 0CT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
C-/f
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-893
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
992 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
BHD FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
BHD FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
40V43MT7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: LOSE FAILURE DETECTION OF
ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL,
CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-894
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY NDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
993 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
BHD OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
BHD OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43MT8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: LOSE FAILURE DETECTION OF
ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL,
CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-895
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/2
994 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
CENTER - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
CENTER AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43MTI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: WORST CASE WOULD BE A FALSE
INDICATION OF HTR SYSTEM FAILED "OFF" ON A MISSION CRITICAL
CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED
CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-896
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
995 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
LEFT AFT FUEL XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
LEFT AFT FUEL XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43MTI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. NOT FOUND IN SSSH, HTR SYSTEMS BOOK JSC-18549, OR
MML. ASSUMED ERROR IN VS70-943099 DWG.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-897
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
996 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SENSOR
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
LEFT AFT FUSLG LOW PT OXIDIZER DRAIN LINE TEMP
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
LEFT AFT FUSLG LOW PT OXIDIZER DRAIN LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43MT9
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: LOSE FAILURE DETECTION OF
ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL,
CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-898
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 997
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
LEFT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
LEFT AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43MT2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS) EFFECT: WORST CASE WOULD BE A FALSE
INDICATION OF HTR SYSTEM FAILED "OFF" ON A MISSION CRITICAL
CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED
CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-899
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 998
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
LEFT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
S)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
LEFT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43MTI9
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: LOSE FAILURE DETECTION OF
ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL,
CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED. NOTE: LOCATION NOT LISTED
ON VS70-943099 (43-AJ) DWG LOCATION WAS DETERMINED FROM SSSH AND
HTR SYSTEMS BOOK JSC-18549.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 0CT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-900
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 999
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
RIGHT AFT FUEL XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RIGHT AFT FUEL XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43MT01
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. NOT FOUND IN SSSH, HTR SYSTEMS BOOK JSC-18549, OR
MML. ASSUMED ERROR IN VS70-943099 DWG.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-901
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
i000 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SENSOR
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
RIGHT AFT FUSLG LOW PT OXIDIZER DRAIN LINE TEMP
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RIGHT AFT FUSLG LOW PT OXIDIZER DRAIN LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43MTI0
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: LOSE FAILURE DETECTION OF
ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL,
CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-902
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/2
I001 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE )
RIGHT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RIGHT AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43MT3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: WORST CASE WOULD BE A FALSE
INDICATION OF HTR SYSTEM FAILED "OFF" ON A MISSION CRITICAL
CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF INTERCONNECT/XFEED
CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 0CT'82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-903
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 2/2
1002 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE)
RIGHT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED, OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
RIGHT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43MT20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING THE CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE WITH A SENSOR INDICATING CROSSFEED TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F) WITH OUT FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IT WAS A SENSOR FAILURE AND SECOND EXCEPTING THE
RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABLITY FOR THE THERMAL SYSTEM. (THIS
ENSURES XFEED FOR ABORTS)) EFFECT: LOSE FAILURE DETECTION OF
ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL,
CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED. NOTE: LOCATION NOT LISTED
ON VS70-943099 (43-AJ) DWG LOCATION WAS DETERMINED FROM SSSH AND
HTR SYSTEMS BOOK JSC-18549.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-II174, SSSH, REV C
DCN-5; JSC-18549 15 OCTI82, LTR 28 JUNE'85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-904
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1003 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (LT DECK)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (LT DECK)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI012; $2012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-905
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1004 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (LT DECK)
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (LT DECK)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43S1012; $2012
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 150CT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-906
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1005 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (RT DECK)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (RT DECK)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[3] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI022; $2022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-907
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1006 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (RT DECK)
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (RT DECK)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI022; $2022
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-908
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1007 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI052; $2052
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-909
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1008 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI052; $2052
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-910
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1009 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL & OX LOWERCENTERXFEED LINE CONTROLTEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SI051; $2051
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITITES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-911
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
i010 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OX LOWER CENTER XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 _ ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI051; $2051
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED 'iON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-912
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
I011 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI032; $2032
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-913
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1012 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWERLEFT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI032; $2032
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F)o THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEMIS OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-914
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OX LOWER LEFT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SI031; $2031
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-915
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1014 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OX LOWER LEFT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI031; $2031
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, _ PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-916
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1015 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SI042; $2042
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-917
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1016 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI042; $2042
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEEDLNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-918
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: i017 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OX LOWER RIGHT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI041; $2041
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-919
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1018 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL & OX LOWER RIGHT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI041; $2041
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN' S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 150CT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-920
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1019 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/nmC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SI011; $2011
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-921
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1020 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI011; $2011
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTRIS FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-922
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1021 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CROSSFEED
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SII01; $2101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO B12; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-923
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1022 ABORT:
HDW/Fu'NC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SII01; $2101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LNIS WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEMIS OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-924
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1023 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SII02; $2102
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-925
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1024 ABORT:
HDW/FUN C
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SII02; $2102
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR_S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-926
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1025 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43SI122; $2122
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-927
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1026 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
40V43S1122; $2122
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTRIS FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-928
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1027 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43SI121; $2121
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-929
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1028 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ a ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
40V43SI121; $2121
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTRIS FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-930
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1029 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI142; $2142
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-931
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1030 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI142; $2142
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN' S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED 'tON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-932
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
1031 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cr ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SI141; $2141
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-933
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1032 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI141; $2141
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTRIS FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-934
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1033 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OXIDIZER FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI021; $2021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN A FAILED "OFF" HTR SYSTEM ON A MISSION
CRITICAL CROSSFEED LN. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-935
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/18/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1034 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OXIDIZER FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SI021; $2021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEMIS OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTRtS FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-936
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1035 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SIIII; $2111
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LNIS WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-1
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-937
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1036 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SIIII; $2111
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B° LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-938
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1037 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]- C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SII12; $2112
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-939
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1038 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SII12; $2112
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LNIS WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-940
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1039 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43SI132; $2132
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-941
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1040 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OXIDIZER HI PTBLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43SI132; $2132
RIP] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-942
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1041 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43SI131; $2131
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-943
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1042 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 40V43SI131; $2131
B[P] c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-944
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1043 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI152; $2152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-945
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1044 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BODY
50V43SI152; $2152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED 'ION" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-946
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1045 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI%ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI151; $2151
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: LOSE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. SECOND FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM. THE
HTR SYSTEM IS NOT MISSION CRITICAL. CROSSFEED CAN STILL BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 150CT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-947
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
OMS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1046 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT BODY
PART NUMBER: 50V43SI151; $2151
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DETERMINING CRITICALITIES IT IS ASSUMED A LAUNCH WOULD NOT
TAKE PLACE IF TEMPERATURES ON THE MAIN CROSSFEED LN'S WERE
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90 F). THIS WILL ENSURE
CROSSFEED CAPABILITIES FOR ABORTS. EFFECTS: FIRST FAILURE
RESULTS IN AN INCREASE OF THE HTR SYSTEM'S OPERATING RANGE (75 F
TO 90 F). SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP
THERMOSTAT) WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A
OR B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR
MORE HTR'S FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SAFETY REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT
FAILED "ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352
F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-18549 15OCT82, LTR
28JUNE85; JSC 20923 PCN-1; MC363-0031 REV C AMENDMENT SEQ 4
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-948
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1047 ABORT:
HDW/FUN C
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES A AUTO ($7)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BUR/tEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES A AUTO ($7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 14
36V73AI4-S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO TURN OFF "A" XFEED HTR SYSTEM. CONTROL
THERMOSTATS WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL ENVIRONMENT. SECOND
FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM RESULTS IN BOTH "A" & "B" XFEED HTR
SYSTEMS STUCK IN AUTO MODE.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
JUNE 85; MF004-400 REV C
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-949
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1048 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES A AUTO ($7)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN AUTO POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES A AUTO ($7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 14
36V73AI4-S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO TURN OFF "A" XFEED HTR SYSTEM. CONTROL
THERMOSTATS WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL ENVIRONMENT. SECOND
FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM RESULTS IN BOTH "A" & "B" XFEED HTR
SYSTEMS STUCK IN AUTO MODE.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
JUNE 85; MFO004-400 REV C
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-950
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1049 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES B AUTO ($8)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES B AUTO ($8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 14
36V73AI4-S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/XFEED CAPABILITY, LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY, LOSS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OR PROP FAILURES, AND LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO BALANCE PROP WEIGHTS BETWEEN PODS IF PREVIOUS
FAILURE REQUIRES SUCH ACTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
JUNE 85; MFO004-400 REV C
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-951
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
OMS FLIGHT:
1050 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES B AUTO ($8)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN AUTO POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CROSSFEED
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES B AUTO ($8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 14
36V73AI4-S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO TURNOFF "A" XFEED HTR SYSTEM. CONTROL
THERMOSTATS WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL ENVIRONMENT. SECOND
FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM RESULTS IN BOTH "A" & "B" XFEED HTR
SYSTEMS STUCK IN AUTO MODE.
SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME SYSTEM (OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT) WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED HTR GROUP A OR B. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF ONE OR MORE HTR'S
FAILED "ON" WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY
REASONS (OVER TEMP OF CROSSFEED LNS). (ONE HTR ELEMENT FAILED
"ON" CONTINUOUSLY CAN HAVE A SURFACE TEMP AS HIGH AS 352 F.)
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC 18549, OCT 82, LTR
JUNE 85; MF004-400 REV C
REPORT DATE 02/04/87 C-952
MDAC
ID
i00
i01
102
105
106
107
108
109
ll0
iii
ll6
I17
118
119
120
121
122
126
127
128
129
130
132
133
134
135
136
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
TANK, HELIUM STORAGE
TANK, HELIUM STORAGE
COUPLING, HELIUM FILL
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
HELIUM PRESSURE
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
HELIUM PRESSURE
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
VALVE, HELIUM.ISOLATION
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
HELIUM PRESSURE
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
HELIUM PRESSURE
REGULATOR ASSY, HELIUM
PRESSURE
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM
PRESSURE
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM
PRESSURE
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM
PRESSURE
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM
PRESSURE
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES, FUEL
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES,
OXIDIZER
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES
FAILURE MODE
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
FAILS TO REGULATE,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, HIGH
OUTPUT, FAILS TO LOCKUP,
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
LOW OUTPUT, REGULATES AT
LOWER THAN NORMAL PRESSURE
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, REVERSE
FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE, REVERSE FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE, REVERSE FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
D-I
MDAC
ID
141
142
143
144
145
149
150
153
155
156
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
168
171
174
190
191
192
193
194
ITEM
VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
VALVE-PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
PROPELLANTLINES AND MECHANICAL
FITTINGS-MMH AND NTO
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PROPELLANT
PRESSURECHECK
VALVE-GROUND,MANUALISOLATION
VALVE-GROUND,MANUALISOLATION
COUPLING-TANKVENT
PROPELLANTLINES AND MECHANICAL
FITTINGS-MMH AND NTO
GIMBAL BELLOWS
GIMBAL BELLOWS
GIMBAL BELLOWS
PROPELLANTTANK
PROPELLANTTANK
COUPLING-PROPTANK, HORIZONTAL
DRAIN PORT
COUPLING-TANKACQ. SYSTEMTRAP
FILL/VENT PORT
COUPLING-TANKACQ. SYSTEM
FILL/VENT PORT
COUPLING-PROPELLANT,TANK
TEST PORT
COMMUNICATIONSCREEN
COMMUNICATIONSCREEN
GALLERYLEGS
COLLECTORMANIFOLD
PROPELLANTLINES AND MECHANICAL
FITTINGS-MMH AND NTO
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
FAILS TO OPEN, BURST DISK
FAILS TO RUPTURE, RELIEF
VALVE FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
BURST DISK RUPTURES AT
LOWER THAN BURST PRESSURE
BURST DISK LEAK, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, RELIEF
VALVE FAILS TO RESEAT
(OPENS AFTER BURST DISK
RUPTURE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION
RESTRICTED FLOW
RUPTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS
OF RETENTION CAPABILITY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
HELIUM PASSAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM
PASSAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM
PASSAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
D-2
MDAC
ID
195
196
197
198
200
202
203
205
206
207
210
213
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
227
228
230
231
234
238
239
240
ITEM FAILURE MODE
GIMBAL BELLOWS
GIMBAL BELLOWS
GIMBAL BELLOWS
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL
FITTINGS-MMH AND NTO
COUPLING-PROPELLANT LOW POINT
DRAIN
COUPLING-OMS/RCS PROPELLANT
FILL PORT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO
RELIEVE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
COUPLING-PROPELLANT GROUND PURGE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
CROSSFEED GIMBAL JOINT
FLEXIBLE LINE ASSEMBLY
FLEXIBLE LINE ASSEMBLY
CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND
MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND
MECHANICAL FITTINGS
VALVE-CROSSFEED
VALVE-CROSSFEED
VALVE-CROSSFEED
COUPLING-HIGH POINT BLEED
COUPLING-CROSSFEED DRAIN
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL
FITTINGS-MMH AND NTO
GIMBAL BELLOWS
GIMBAL BELLOWS
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO
RELIEVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, NO
BELLOWS ANGULAR DEFLECTION
D-3
MDAC
ID
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
265
267
270
272
273
276
ITEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
GIMBAL BELLOWS
GIMBAL BELLOWS
GIMBAL BELLOWS
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
ENGINE INLET FILTER AND ORIFICE
ENGINE INLET FILTER AND ORIFICE
BELLOWS-TVC GIMBAL
BELLOWS-TVC GIMBAL
BELLOWS-TVC GIMBAL
COUPLING-HIGH POINT BLEED
TEST PORT
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE
RELIEF
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE
RELIEF
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/
PURGE TEST PORT
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
OME ALIGNMENT BELLOWS
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN
PORT
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL
FITTINGS-MMH AND NTO
FAILURE MODE
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
CONTAMINATION PASSAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
NO BELLOWS ANGULAR
DEFLECTION
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN, RESTRICTED
FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED
FAILS MID TRAVEL, PARTIALLY
OPEN/CLOSED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
DELAYED OPERATION
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
OPEN AT SPECIFIED PSID
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
D-4
MDAC
ID
277
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
290
295
298
303
305
308
3O9
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
ITEM
COUPLING-OMS ENGINE TRICKLE
PURGE PORT
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
PLATELET INJECTOR ASSEMBLY
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
NOZZLE EXTENSION
NOZZLE EXTENSION
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND
MECHANICAL FITTINGS
TANK-GN2 STORAGE
PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING ASSEMBLY
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
CHECK VALVE-GN2
CHECK VALVE-GN2
CHECK VALVE-GN2
GN2 ACCUMULATOR
GN2 ACCUMULATOR
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND
MECHANICAL FITTINGS
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND
MECHANICAL FITTINGS
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
ORIFICE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE
INLET
ORIFICE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE
VENT
CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
VALVE VENT
FAILURE MODE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BURN
THROUGH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BURN
THROUGH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
FRACTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BURN
THROUGH, FRACTURE,
DEFORMATION, FLANGE LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
BUCKLING (DURING ASCENT)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
REGULATES AT LOW PRESSURE
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, VALVE
FAILS TO RESEAT
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
DELAYED OPERATION
RESTRICTED FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW, INABILITY
TO VENT GN2 TO AMBIENT.
FAILS TO OPEN
D-5
MDAC
ID
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
343
344
348
349
353
358
359
362
363
364
367
368
373
376
377
378
381
399
410
411
416
417
ITEM
CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
VALVE VENT
CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
VALVE VENT
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
VALVE-GN2 PURGE
CHECK VALVE-GN2 PURGE
CHECK VALVE-GN2 PURGE
GIMBAL RING
BEARING-GIMBAL RING
GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD
ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
ANTI-BACK DEVICE
BEARING-SPHERICAL ROD END
BEARING-SPHERICAL ROD END
MECHANICAL STOP-SNUBBER
OUTPUT SHAFT
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO CLOSE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
OPERATE, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS TO CLOSE, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, PISTON
SEAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (GN2)
DELAYED OPERATION
FAILS TO OPERATE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
FRACTURE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO FUNCTION,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
FRACTURE
FAILS TO OPERATE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
BETWEEN ACME SCREW AND
NUT TUBE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
FRACTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
FRACTURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
FRACTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FAILS
OUT OF TOLERANCE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
FRACTURE, DISATTACHMENT
OF ACTUATOR TO ENGINE
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF
OUTPUT)
FAILS SHORT
D-6
MDAC
ID
418
419
439
44O
441
443
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
482
484
486
488
492
496
498
5OO
502
504
5O8
513
514
517
518
520
523
524
526
528
530
ITEM
DIODE
DIODE
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE
PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV A
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE
PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV A
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE
PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV B
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT OMS HE
PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV B
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF
OUTPUT)
FAILS SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
THE CLOSE POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
THE GPC POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
THE CLOSE POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
THE GPC POSITION)
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO
ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO
ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO
ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS
TO ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS
TO ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO
ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO
ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO
ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO
ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS
TO ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS
TO ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
D-7
MDAC
ID
532
535
537
538
544
558
561
562
564
567
568
570
572
575
576
578
58O
583
584
594
595
610
611
622
624
626
628
630
631
632
633
634
636
638
639
640
641
644
645
646
647
648
649
65O
651
ITEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, FUEL
TANK LOWER
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX
LOWER TANK
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
FUSE, 3A
FUSE, 3A
FUSE, 3A
FUSE, 3A
D-8
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
CLOSE POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
GPL POSITION)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED,
OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED,
OPENED, FAILES-OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE)
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
MDAC
ID
661
662
664
666
667
670
672
673
674
675
676
689
698
706
708
710
712
714
715
718
720
722
724
726
728
730
732
734
736
738
740
742
744
746
747
782
773
784
ITEM
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
SWITCH, OMSLT/RT ENG ARM/PRESS
(C3AI, SI/S2)
SWITCH, OMSLT/RT ENG ARM/PRESS
(C3AI, Sl/S2)
SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG ARM/PRESS
(C3AI, Sl/S2)
SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG CONTROL
VLV
SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENG CONTROL
VLV
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE
REG OUT
SENSOR TEMPERATURE ENGINE
FUEL FEED LINE
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL
GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL
GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL
GROUP 2
FAILURE MODE
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
ARM/PRESS POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
ARM POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
OFF POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
OFF POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
ON POSITION)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN,
SHORTED, FAILS OUT OF
TOLERANCE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED,
OPENED, FAILS-OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE)
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
D-9
MDAC
ID
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
797
806
807
8O8
809
815
817
818
ITEM
HEATER, LT/RT ENG SERV PNL
GROUP2
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL
GROUP1
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL
GROUP1
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL
GROUP2
HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL
GROUP2
HEATER, LT/RT LOWERINBD Y WEB
GROUP1
HEATER, LT/RT LOWERINBD Y WEB
GROUP1
HEATER, LT/RT LOWERINBD Y WEB
GROUP2
HEATER, LT/RT LOWERINBD Y WEB
GROUP2
HEATER, LT/RT OMECOMPTGROUP1
HEATER, LT/RT OMECOMPTGROUP1
HEATER, LT/RT OMECOMPTGROUP2
HEATER, LT/RT OMSKEEL WEB
GROUP1
HEATER, LT/RT OMSKEEL WEB
GROUP1
HEATER, LT/RT OMSKEEL WEB
GROUP2
HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB
GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL
GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PNL
GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
DRAIN PNL GROUP 1
FAILURE MODE
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDEHEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
D-10
MDAC
ID
819
82O
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
83O
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
846
848
ITEM
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
DRAIN PNL GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
DRAIN PNL GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
DRAIN PNL GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
PITCH DN GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
PITCH DN GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
PITCH DN GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
PITCH DN GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
PITCH UP GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
PITCH UP GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
PITCH UP GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
PITCH UP GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
VERNIER GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
VERNIER GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
VERNIER GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING
VERNIER GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW
GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW
GROUP 1
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW
GROUP 2
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW
GROUP 2
RELAY
RELAY
FAILURE MODE
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDEHEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO
MOUNTING RESULTING IN OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED
POSITION)
FAILS HIGH
D-II
MDAC
ID
85O
852
895
897
899
901
903
905
907
907
911
913
915
917
919
921
923
925
926
927
952
953
954
955
ITEM
RELAY
RELAY
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE
SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE
SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL
WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP 1
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL
WEB HEATER SYSTEM GROUP 2
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER
INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER
INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME
COMPT GROUP 1
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME
COMPT GROUP 2
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME
COVER GROUP 1
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME
COVER GROUP 2
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS
HOUSING GROUP 1
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS
HOUSING GROUP 2
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER
INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 1
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER
INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 2
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER
OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER
OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATER
LT/RT POD GROUP 1
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATER
LT/RT POD GROUP 2
FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER
FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER ELEMENT
(A/B)
FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER
FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER ELEMENT
(A/B)
FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT
FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER ELEMENT
(A/B)
FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT
FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER ELEMENT
(A/B)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS HIGH (FAILS
ENERGIZED)
FAILS HIGH
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
ON POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN
ON POSITION)
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
D-12
MDAC
ID
956
957
964
965
972
973
976
994
997
998
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
i010
1011
1012
1015
ITEM
FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWERRIGHT
FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATERELEMENT
(A/B)
FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWERRIGHT
FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATERELEMENT
(A/B)
LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX
LINE HEATERELEMENTS(A/B)
LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX
LINE HEATERELEMENTS(A/B)
RIGHT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX
LINE HEATERELEMENTS(A/B)
RIGHT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX
LINE HEATERELEMENTS(A/B)
RELAY
CENTER- AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER
XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEFT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER
XFEED LINE TEMPSENSOR
LEFT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE
TEMPSENSOR
RIGHT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER
XFEED LINE TEMPSENSOR
RIGHT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE
TEMP SENSOR
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER
TEMP (LT DECK)
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER
TEMP (LT DECK)
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER
TEMP (RT DECK)
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER
TEMP (RT DECK)
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER
FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER
FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FUEL & OX LOWER CENTER XFEED
LINE CONTROL TEMP
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT
FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT
FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT
FEED LINE OVER TEMP
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS HIGH
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED,
OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED,
OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE)
ERROENOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED,
OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE)
ERROENOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED,
OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE)
ERROENOUS OUTPUT (SHORTED,
OPEN, FAILS-OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE)
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
D-13
MDAC
ID
i016
1024
1026
1030
1038
1040
1044
ITEM
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWERRIGHT
FEED LINE OVERTEMP
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE OVERTEMP
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB
OVERTEMP
L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED
LINE OVER TEMP
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE OVER
TEMP
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4
UMB OVERTEMP
R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED
LINE OVERTEMP
FAILURE MODE
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
D-14
